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This study examines notions of government and market failure in British
healthcare by tracking and analysing the changing views of opinion formers.
Presenting original data that highlights the attitudes of today's opinion formers
towards populist notions in health economics it provides a unique insight into
the limits and boundaries of contemporary debate. Significantly, the research
concludes that swathes of elite opinion no longer support the National Health
Service (NHS) in its traditional nationalised guise.
While opinion formers instead now believe in a much greater plurality of public
and private healthcare today's elite not only question the idea of state
healthcare but they also remain sceptical of a purist libertarian market.
Indeed, in noting that healthcare has always attracted the interventionist
attentions of those with state power, the study questions in fundamental ways
the meaning of such terms as 'market' and 'private sector'. In highlighting the
timeless propensity for medical and health professionals to seek legislative
favour, it argues that the world has never actually seen anything resembling a
real market in the bio-medical paradigm and its forbears. Healthcare has
always been a deeply corporatist venture run in association with a range of
mystical, military, religious, or purely political statist elites.
The study begins with an historical overview of healthcare from the military
hospitals of the Roman period, through the religiosity of the Middle Ages, the
mutuality of the nineteenth century, the statism of the National Health Service
and the recent rise of public private partnerships. Examining such concepts as
monopoly, consumer ignorance, moral hazard and externality, it also analyses
notions of public versus private goods in the context of today's healthcare.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century dawns, this thesis explores one of the most important
issues concerning people around the world, the organisation and delivery of
healthcare.
Analysing the opinions of an influential range of British healthcare opinion
formers, it seeks to question and explore the dominant paradigm of market failure
in health economics. In seeking to clarify and examine commonly held notions of
market failure amongst health professionals, politicians and journalists it
highlights the intellectual and conceptual environment in which the health policy
conversation is popularly cited and bound.
Worldwide health crisis
During the 2001 general election British voters made it clear that health policy
was a primary concern. It seemed to capture the public imagination more than
any other domestic policy issue. According to a MORI opinion survey conducted
in the last week of the election campaign, 73 per cent of voters chose health and
the National Health Service (NHS) as their primary issue1. Across the developed
world a similar story is told whereby the politics of healthcare increasingly
dominate electoral debate.
Yet in a sense this is strange given we live at a time of unprecedented wealth,
peace and advanced medical technology. It is peculiar that at a time of ever-
greater prosperity people seem increasingly disillusioned with their healthcare
systems and deem them to be failing when compared to expectations.
I The Times, MORl Political Attitudes in Britain 5 June 2001. Also see:
http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&g=Mori+health+poll+June+200 I&btnG=Google+Search&meta=
Today, a great deal of literature suggests that across the world, political,
regulatory and professional authorities which oversee most health systems are
being questioned and challenged by ordinary people as never before.
In America, the problems surrounding healthcare delivery are profound. Away
from a large private medical insurance and self-funding market, government
provides two types of healthcare system and both schemes face problematic
futures.
US federal law requires all states to provide citizens with guaranteed levels of
healthcare under the Medicaid program. Here the federal government provides
matching funds for millions of - what are popularly termed - underprivileged
people.
Today, every US state is required by federal statute to assist those people in
need and to help them access a medical care program acceptable to the federal
Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
Overall, eligibility standards vary from state to state depending on legislation.
However, at the very least, states are required to provide recipients with (1)
inpatient hospital care (other than in an institution for tuberculosis or mental
disease), (2) outpatient hospital services, (3) laboratory and x-ray services, (4)
nursing facility services for those over the ages of twenty-one and (5) physicians'
services, regardless of location or treatment.
In addition to this minimum, states can underwrite a host of other services,
including physical therapy, dental care, diagnostic, preventive, and rehabilitative
services, and the cost of prescribed drugs, dentures, prosthetic devices, and
eyeglasses.
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The second US healthcare system is called Medicare. It provides medical and
care services to the elderly reliant upon state support. Together, Medicaid and
Medicare consume more than 7 percent of American GDP and today both
programs are facing increasing funding pressure.
With nearly 40 million Americans not covered by private medical insurance and
therefore reliant in some way upon Medicaid it is not surprising that healthcare is
a contentious issue. US opinion polls consistently demonstrate that the state's
role in healthcare is one of the most pressing issues of concern and debate.
Across many parts of America Medicaid, state funded, hospitals are under
financial threat. Many are on the verge of bankruptcy, such as Washington's
General Hospital in the nation's capital".
The financial outlook for Medicare is similarly poor. According to Peter J. Ferra of
Washington DC's CATO Institute:
"Medicare is perhaps the most difficult problem facing the nation. Most of
the elderly rely on it to pay for essential medical care they could not
otherwise finance. Yet, the costs are skyrocketing beyond the ability of
taxpayers to pay them.
"On our current course, by 2010 total Medicare spending will have
doubled to about $540 billion. At current tax rates, payroll taxes will cover
only 38 percent of those expenses. Medicare premiums paid by seniors
would only cover another 13 percent, even assuming they continue to rise
at recent rates. By 2030, under the government's own projections,
Medicare will cost $2.2 trillion to $3 trillion per year, accounting by itself for
28 percent to 38 percent of the entire federal budget.
2 Visited in early 2000 by the author.
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"This runaway spending is expected despite severe price controls on
Medicare services and treatments that will only deteriorate the quality of
care for retirees over time."3
In Britain, the National Health Service and its persistent failings have been a
primary cause for public concern for some years now. As an Adam Smith
Institute report, launched immediately after Tony Blair's 2001 general election
victory, pointed out:
"If a privatized health service had made many of its patients wait for 18
months for their operations, put them on trolleys in corridors when they
arrived, given more than a quarter of them an illness which they did not
have when they arrived, and confiscated the organs of their dead babies
without bothering to seek their permission, or even to tell them, people
would have blamed privatization. For that matter, if one of its practitioners
had murdered 150 of his patients, or one of its surgeons had removed
healthy kidneys instead of diseased ones, or one of its teams had
conducted smear tests so incompetently that operable disease was not
treated, while healthy women were unnecessarily subjected to distressing
operations, all this would somehow have been put down to the reckless
pursuit of profits, or to putting shareholders ahead of patients.
"... Many of the above horror stories are symptomatic of an institution
which has an inadequate relationship with its customers. As with all state-
run bodies, there is a tendency for producer concerns (often dressed up
as "professional judgement") to dominate over responsiveness to
customers. ,,4
3 Peter J. Ferra, 'Heroic Medicare Rescue', 30 April 1999, CATO Today's Commentary, www.cato.org
4 Butler, E and Pirie, M (2001) The New Shape of Public Services, Adam Smith Institute, London, p.9.
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In Canada, public opinion again seems to be increasingly calling into question
the Canadian government's Medicare system in ways that would have seemed
unimaginable only ten years ago. For example, in the work Operating in the Dark:
The Gathering Crisis in Canada's Public Healthcare System, Brian Lee Crowley,
Dr. David Zitner and Nancy Faraday-Smith comment:
"While the operating assumption of the political class seems to be that
Medicare is the third rail of Canadian politics ("Touch it and you die"), in
fact public opinion seems to be undergoing something of an evolution in
respect of the public health care system. In particular, the idea of more
private involvement in health care provision seems to be growing in
attractiveness as people become better informed about the costs of the
public system and its poor performance, and as a general sense of
systemic breakdown grows."s
In a Compass poll for the National Post6 Conrad Winn finds that 41 per cent of
Canadians now believe that individuals should be free to choose private health
insurance so that they can obtain better or at least faster health treatment than at
present.
Similarly, in a poll carried out for the Consumer Policy Institute in October 1997
Angus Reid pointed out that 65 per cent of Canadians believe that individuals
should have a much greater degree of choice within the healthcare system.
Although there remains significant differences of opinion on what this might mean
in practice, how and whether it would cost more or less than the current
arrangements, the direction of Canadian thinking is clear. As Canadians
increasingly find they are more economically empowered and prosperous so they
5 Brian Lee Crowley, David Zitner, and Nancy Faraday-Smith (2000) Operating in the Dark: The Gathering
Crisis in Canada's Public Health Care System, Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, Halifax, Nova Scotia,
p.6.
National Post, 6th September 1999.
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are dissatisfied with the state healthcare system and want more direct control of
those areas of their lives that have up until now been controlled by the public
sector.
In David Gratzer's seminal work, Code Blue, he argues that Canadians are
increasingly questioning a system in which:
"We hear the horror stories every day: hospital hallways lined with
patients; long waiting lists for cancer treatment; a shortage of high-tech
equipment"."
He continues:
"No wonder confidence in medicare, Canada's most cherished social
program, has fallen to a historic low"."
In Sweden, state healthcare has been under pressure for some years. With
public expenditure and the wider welfare state increasingly under strain, private
sector providers such as Capio have recently taken over the running of a number
of hospitals particularly in and around Stockholm.
Once an icon of progressive West European social democracy, Sweden is today
fast turning its back on the traditional model of nationalised health provision and
fundinq".
In France, Germany, Italy and elsewhere in Europe10 the story is similar. As the
boundaries of public sector funding and capability are reached so people's
dissatisfaction with state healthcare is growing ever more vocal. Just as
7 See: http://www.davidgratzer.com/codeblue.php Also see: David Gratzer, (1999) Code Blue: Reviving
Canada's Health Care System, Montreal and Toronto, ECW Press.
8 Ibid.
9 Johnny Munkhammar (2005) European Dawn: After the Social Model, Timbro Publishers, Stockholm.
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privatisation and Iiberalisation have been used to transform many state industries
in these countries over the last two decades, so such policy ideas are being
applied to the so-called human services of healthcare, education and welfare.
Across the world, traditional assumptions surrounding healthcare are being
questioned as never before. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) recently made clear:
"OECD health systems are facing a number of major policy challenges.
Rising demand due mainly to population ageing, rapid innovation and
diffusion of medical technology [have led to concerns] about efficiency in
provision. ,,11
Questioning the state's role in healthcare
Following the supply side revolution of the 1980s, a small but growing number of
academics, politicians and other opinion formers are citing government failure as
the enemy of better healthcare not markets. Attacking government
interventionism in healthcare the flaws they commonly note include:
• monopoly provision of health services
• lack of accountability
• politicisation of health care decision making
• barriers to innovation
• lack of regular and reliable information about health outcomes.
Today, many twentieth century assumptions concerning the failure of markets to
effectively deliver healthcare are being challenged and a new consumer oriented
orthodoxy espoused.
10 Ibid.
II July 2001, The DEeD Health Project can be found on www.oecd.org
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Libertarian writers such as David Friedman12 and Brian Micklethwait13
controversially argue that there is no such thing as market failure in healthcare,
instead many of the problems popularly imputed upon so-called healthcare
failure is invariably the result of various forms of government intervention.
In Britain, as in many other developed countries, the healthcare debate ultimately
takes two popular forms. One opinion views state healthcare, in the British case
the National Health Service, and the idea of healthcare being free at the point of
delivery, as being a sacred non-negotiable principle. This perspective is
accurately portrayed in the following terms:
"That people should be left to die for the mere lack of a few thousand quid
for some machine that will mimic one of their organs is an abomination.
We are falling behind our continental rivals, who spend a far higher
proportion of their GNP on medical care. Public opinion has again and
again revealed itself eager for more health care spending, and content to
pay more in taxation to finance such increases. The idea of turning the
whole show over to those overpriced peacocks in the medical private
sector is appalling, not to say a recipe for the American health method,
which is that if you get sick, you are either bankrupted or you die."!"
Popular opinion number two asserts that the National Health Service is simply
another nationalised industry and that it has all the characteristic failures of such
an institution. Here, this school of argumentation can be summarised as follows:
"Price anything at zero (or thereabout), and the queue for it will stretch out
infinitely. Give a succession of blank cheques to any organisation and the
12 David D. Friedman (1989) The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism, Open Court
Publishing, Chicago. . . . ..
13 Brian Micklethwait, (1991) How and How Not to Demonopohse Medlcme, Political Notes. 56.,
Libertarian Alliance, London.
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people running the thing will tend to abscond with or waste most of the
money, even as they complain about the stinginess of the cheque signers.
However, the British public being so incomprehensively wedded to the
NHS, and so infuriatingly unimpressed by the medical private sector, they
must not be told point blank and to their faces that the NHS ought to be
closed down. No, one must be "realistic". One must instead speak of
"reforming" the NHS, and of making it less wasteful and better
manaqed.?"
For classical liberals and libertarians in general the truth lies far beyond both of
these positions.
For them the root of the problem is that British medicine, all British medicine be it
formerly NHS or independent sector, is ultimately a government sponsored
monopoly. This is because to be a doctor one must be accepted as such by the
General Medical Council (GMC). Or to put it another way the government, on
advice from doctors, chooses the doctors who choose and unchoose all the other
doctors. Importantly:
"If you are not or are no longer a "doctor" (as the government, advised, by
its preferred bunch of doctors, understands that word), then there are
three things you may not do. These are, in ascending order of importance:
sign death certificates, prescribe drugs, and (in general) take medical
risks.... In other words, medicine is a government sponsored monopoly.
You can't practise medicine in any significant way if you can only
prescribe insignificant drugs or cures, and only take insignificant risks. So
far as I can judge it, things are approximately like this everywhere. In no
country on earth is medicine un-interfered with by the local state.,,16
14 Brian Micklethwait, ibid., p.l.
15 Ibid.
16 Brian Micklethwait, ibid, p.2.
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In Britain and elsewhere in Europe, the United States of America is often seen as
having the most extreme possible example of a free market health system. Yet in
reality, there is little - if any - widespread understanding of the existence of
Medicaid or Medicare. Today, most British people would find it hard to believe
that the US government has any major state healthcare programs - let alone
historically spend a greater proportion of its national wealth on them than the
British government does on the NHS17.
Yet America does have large state healthcare programs, it does spend a
substantial proportion of its national income on them and it is arguably even more
restrictive when it comes to medical risks and safety than virtually anywhere else
in the world. As one commentator recently observed:
"There, under the influence of a deranged generation of lawyers whose
aim seems to be to bring civilisation itself to a standstill, nobody is now
allowed to take medical risks, not even doctors. If anything goes wrong
with any medical procedure, then no matter how conscientiously the risks
were explained to the patient and no matter how many forms he signed
saying that yes he understood this and please could they get on with the
operation, if things then go at all badly wrong, the patient - or if he dies his
relatives - can then sue the doctor for double the doctor's life savings. To
spell this out in plain English, what the Americans lawyers are engaged in
doing is making medicine illegal. All medicine, even medicine practised by
the one government favoured American trade union. Add this obsession
with safety to the fact that the American Medical Association has the same
armlock on American medicine as the GMC has here, and it is hardly to be
wondered at if American medical services are cripplingly expensive, and
. "18are becoming more so.
17 David Green (1985) Challenge to the NHS A Study of Competition in American Health Care and the
Lessons for Britain, London, Institute of Economic Affairs.
18 Brian Micklethwait, op.cit., p.2.
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For classical libertarians the everyday debate about the ownership of hospitals
and funding schemes is important but ultimately superficial. For them, the health
policy debate should be more concerned with the medical monopoly and its
consequences than the usual questions surrounding nationalised industries:
"A free market would be something else entirely. In a free medical market,
the very process of defining who is and who is not a doctor would be
negotiated entirely between the people offering themselves as doctors and
the people deciding whether to submit themselves to these doctors as
patients...At the heart of the medical issue is the right of the individual to
take whatever risks he wants to take and make deals on what basis, and
the duty of any court, lawyers and politicians to respect rather than
retrospectively overturn these oetaus."!"
For Micklethwait a real free market would mean that people would be able to take
whatever drugs they wanted to and medical practitioners would be able to
advertise their services. Overtime a new consumer driven market reliant upon
reputation - not state regulation - would emerge.
"Far from being obvious to me that a truly free medical market would be
disastrous, I believe on the contrary that such arrangements would be of
huge benefit to mankind, and that the sooner medicine is done this way
the better.
"Things would not, inevitably, be perfect. Some fools would make crass
blunders, by ignoring manifestly superior medical services for the most
frivolous of reasons, and by patronising the most notoriously incompetent.
Some such fools would perish from their foolishness. Others would merely
be unlucky. No law can prevent either stupidity or bad luck, although the
19 Ibid.
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world is now filled with the particular stupidity which consists of refusing to
face this truth, and with the many luckless victims of this stupidity.,,2o
He concludes:
"Given that for most people the avoidance of suicide rather than suicide is
the objective, a truly free medical market would enable them, for the first
time ever, to purchase steadily improving medical advice and medical
help, and at a steadily diminishing price.
"One of the most pernicious restrictions on medicine imposed by the
current medical regime is the restriction on advertising. In a free market
rival medical procedures, rival medical "philosophies", rival views on the
relative importance of confidentiality, hygiene, speed of treatment,
riskiness of treatment, and so forth, would all battle it out in the market
place. "Alternative" therapists would be allowed to prescribe potentially
dangerous drugs, as only government favoured therapists may now. It
would be up to the patients to pick therapists who seemed to know what
they were doing and their look out if they chose badly. The already thriving
medical periodical press would assist with voluminous comparative
advice, praise and criticism.
"In such a free market, any number of different medical styles could be
practiced, and patients would make their cholces.r"
Exploring health markets and the idea of failure
While libertarian writers hold controversial and radical views, a growing number
of mainstream commentators are citing government regulation and interference
20 Ibid, p.3.
11 Ibid.
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in the so called health market for being against the public and professional
interest. And it is to this area of inquiry that the rest of this study is primarily
concerned.
Away from such highly charged notions as who is actually right in this debate, or
even by what criteria such an assertion could be judged, this study is primarily
interested in how healthcare opinion formers think about health economics and
the causal links they make concerning the production of outcomes.
How for instance do healthcare opinion formers react to such notions as
monopoly and choice, regulation and reputation and advertising restrictions and
consumer information?
With this exploration in mind, the next chapter begins with an examination of the
literature and history of market failure in health economics and other areas of
mainstream economic and political science.
Chapter three then goes on to examine the history, growth and experience of
British healthcare prior to the creation of the National Health Service in 1948.
Away from modern notions of market failure and government intervention, it
introduces a much wider history of British healthcare. In beginning to test today's
popular notions of market failure, a wide range of historic evidence and literature
is reviewed.
Overall, the chapter argues that since Roman times, political elites in the British
Isles have always sought to plan, control and regulate the provision of health
services. Through the Roman military, then the church, the Royal Colleges,
Parliament, the granting of professional legislative favour in the name of the
'public good', the state has systematically encroached on every area and facet of
healthcare delivery.
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Coming up to the modern world, the chapter argues that by the early 1940s the
context in which full blown health nationalisation would occur had become
compelling and seemingly inevitable.
Chapter four moves on to examine the record and history of the NHS. Analysing
the service's intellectual roots and early aspirations, it explores its de facto record
concerning capital investment, resource allocation, and comparative outcomes
data - as well as a host of other socio-economic criteria. Data on the class
breakdown of people who work in the service is presented, as is its record on the
allocation of resources per illness episode by socio-economic group. Overall, the
chapter presents a comparative overview of the performance of the service in
relation to the aspirations of its founding fathers, the institutions that had pre-
dated it and the ideas of its contemporary social democratic defenders.
Chapter five presents the methodology behind the study's empirical research into
the opinions of a representative sample of British healthcare opinion formers. In
doing so it explores how the respondent sample was sought, how the questions
were framed, and how the data was collected and analysed.
Chapter six goes on to present the initial research findings. In presenting the data
generated from the research it starts to clarify some of the conceptual boundaries
surrounding commonly held notions of market economics amongst British
healthcare opinion formers.
Chapter seven provides a comparative overview of the results and highlights the
implications of the main findings. In exploring the attitudes and mindset of the
people who oversee the current health policy debate it reveals a much greater
acceptance for a role for markets and private healthcare than was previously the
case.
14
FinallyI chapter eight concludes the work by contextualising the overall research
findings. In exploring the attitudes and beliefs of today's healthcare opinion
formers it highlights the constraints and boundaries of current thinking.
15
CHAPTER II
THE RISE OF MARKET FAILURE AS AN IDEA IN
MODERN HEALTH ECONOMICS
This chapter examines the literature and history of market failure as a concept
in health economics and in other areas of mainstream economic and political
thought. Away from questions of who is correct in the debate, or even by what
criteria such an assertion could be judged, the chapter is primarily concerned
with how modern health opinion formers have come to think about markets in
health economics, and the causal links they make concerning both the
production of health outcomes and consumer satisfaction.
Notions of Market Failure
Today, most people believe that there are circumstances in which the state
should become involved in economic decision making - particularly in areas
such as healthcare and education. Yet this is an area of debate and
contention that has evolved over many decades. To fully understand how
today's consensus has been reached and what constraints it places on the
current healthcare debate in Britain, it is first important to explore the literature
available and to delve further into the history of the idea of market failure.
While markets are often viewed as being excellent allocators of resources, by
making sure that if there is a good or a service that a person values more
highly than it costs to produce it then somebody will decide to produce it,
there are nevertheless many problematic questions that seemingly arise.
Normally, when a market exchange takes place it is clear that both parties will
be better off. That is, the net private benefit, which equals the private benefit
minus the private cost, is greater than zero, so X is produced and consumed.
However, markets are arguably problematic when the net private benefit of a
market transaction does not equal the net social benefit - that is when the
social benefit (the sum of private benefits of all individuals in a society) does
16
not equal or exceed the social cost (the sum of private costs of all individuals
in a society). It follows from this logic that when net private benefit does not
equal net social benefit, individuals can make exchanges that are privately
beneficial but socially costly.
Today, many economists argue that if the government can intervene and
bring private costs and benefits more in line with true social costs and
benefits, the exchanges that occur will, on a net basis, be more socially
beneficial. For them, government intervention can be easily justified.
One rationale that economists often use for government intervention involves
externalities and the problem that markets are said to have in coping with
them. An externality occurs when, as Tyler Cowen has put it:
"...one person's actions affect another person's well-being and the
relevant costs and benefits are not reflected in market prices."
Externalities therefore, cause net social benefit to diverge from net private
benefit. However, it is important to recognise that in arguing that private net
benefit sometimes differs from social net benefit it does not automatically
justify government intervention. For as Cowen has himself pointed out:
'The imperfections of market solutions to public goods problems must
be weighed against the imperfections of government solutions.
Governments rely on bureaucracy and have weak incentives to serve
consumers. Therefore, they produce inefficiently."
According to Edwin G. Wese, to understand the modern concern with
externalities and the idea of market failure one has to go back to the writings
of the early advocates of laissez faire in the eighteenth and nineteenth
I Tyler Cowen, 'Public Goods and Externalities', The Library of Economics and Liberty, on-line at:
http://www.econlib.orgilibrary/Enc/PublicGoodsandExternalities.html
2 Ibid.
3 Edwin G. West, Classical Libertarian Compromises on State Education, The Freeman, October 1996,
The Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York.
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centuries and to first examine their treatment of education. For it was in this
area that the early advocates of classical liberal ideas began to accept the
need for government intervention in some instances and therefore, by
implication, encourage the idea of 'market failure' as a notion in modern
economics.
For West, early libertarians such as Tom Paine, Adam Smith and John Stuart
Mill were inconsistent thinkers. And "their tendency to compromise seriously
weakened the defences against the all-encompassing state'? - particularly
later, in areas such as healthcare.
Early Libertarian Compromises on State Education
In his famous book The Rights of Mans, first published in 1791-1792, Tom
Paine argued that the quantity and duration of education being received by
most children was insufficient and that the shortfall was not due to an inherent
unwillingness on the part of parents to adequately educate their offspring, but
simply due to poverty.
For Paine, poverty in turn was mainly caused by excessive taxes on the poor.
General taxation and in particular the excise had systematically increased
during the late eighteenth century. However, land taxes - paid predominantly
by the aristocracy - had been decreasing.
At that time, just over half of all tax revenue serviced a substantial national
debt. The remainder was spent on current government expenses that Paine
believed to be extravagant and unnecessary. He insisted that the money
taken in taxation from ordinary people and average families was more than
enough to finance a basic education for their children.
After producing a radical agenda for reducing government expenditure, Paine
outlined his thoughts on how to dispose of what he called the surplus.
4 Edwin G. West, op.cit., October 1996, p.652.
5 Tom Paine, (1961) [1791] The Rights of Man, Everyman, London.
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However, instead of proposing a simple reduction in taxes for the poor, as the
overall direction and logic of his argument pointed, he instead advocated a
conditional remission of taxes. The condition was that parents should send
their children to school to learn reading, writing and arithmetic.
As such, Paine was essentially advocating a voucher scheme. But who did he
suggest would monitor such a system? On this point, he had no qualms in
recommending that this function should fall to a minister in each church
parish:
"The ministers of every parish...to certify jointly to an office, for that
purpose, that this [educational] duty be performed."
After speaking up for the liberty of the average man, Paine made it clear that
he ultimately mistrusted him. As West argues:
"The implication was that if simple tax reduction was resorted to, the
people could not be depended on to spend enough of their increased
disposable incomes on education. Yet Paine's initial argument was that
it was heavy taxation that was the main obstacle to private purchase of
education. He had no evidence that the reluctance was due to basic
family preferences. And even if it was, there remained the issue of
liberty. Did Paine's rights of man not extend to freedom to decide the
type and amount of education for their children? Unfortunately,
however, he failed to address this question.
"Paine's voucher scheme demanded schooling; yet this was not
the only vehicle for education. Why then did he superimpose his own
choice? And why should ministers of religion have the sole right to
monitor the voucher program? Would they not increasingly modify the
definition of education to become more and more in conformity with
6 Tom Paine, op.cit, p.248.
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their particular religious creed? What constraints were there on the size
of the special office that Paine wanted the ministers to report to?"
Adam Smith's famous 1776 book The Wealth of Nations8 argued that
economic prosperity and growth will primarily occur when natural liberty is
respected and leads to participation in the division of labour. However, in
Book V, he argued that when specialisation reaches its fullest development
the worker "becomes as stupid and ignorant as is possible for a human
creature to become"."
Smith's forecast of the wholesale degeneration of labour was based on the
argument that government would fail to take the necessary steps to prevent it.
Therefore, the main role of government is to secure the education of the
common people.
Like Paine, Smith mistrusts the capacity of ordinary people to educate their
children. Once a market economy establishes its concomitant division of
labour, "The minds of men are contracted and rendered incapable of
elevation. Education is despised, or at least neglected... ,,1o. Simultaneously
observing that people of some rank and fortune have money to afford
education, Smith declares: "It is otherwise with the common people. They
have little time to spare for education. Their parents can scarce afford to
maintain them even in lntancy.?"
Here, Smith falls into the same contradictory trap as Paine. As West asserts:
"To maintain that poverty is the formidable obstacle tells us nothing
about the real tastes of people for education. The only true test is to
see what happens when poverty is removed. But in any case even if
7 Edwin G. West, op.cit., October 1996, p.653-654. .
8 Adam Smith, (1976) [1776] An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of NatIons,
reprinted in two volumes, R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd, eds, Clarendon Press,
London.
9 On this see Edwin G West, October 1996, op cit., p.654.
10 Ibid.
II Adam Smith, (1976) op.cit., p.784
20
people would buy less education than Smith would like, his willingness
to bring in government would appear to conflict with his famous
principle of "naturalliberty".,,12
Smith is inconsistent in yet another sense too. His position that many parents
were too poor to educate their children conflicted with his general economic
argument that wages per capita had been rising for two centuries and that
further progress to higher stages of the division of labour through the invisible
hand was expected to bring greater monetary rewards for all ranks of society.
If Smith expected real incomes to continue to rise surely leisure and education
would become more affordable too?
Indeed, Smith's prediction of rising real incomes is clearly borne out by the
evidence. The general conclusion of economic historians is that in Britain by
1850 real wages were about double those of 1801-1804.13 Similarly, his view
that a systematic rise in real incomes would lead to increases in leisure
activity was unambiguously borne out by the fact that people's hours of work
steadily declined."
While the state's major educational intervention in England and Wales came
in 1870 when the Forster Act introduced government schools for the first time,
by 1869 most people were already hterate.l'' Contrary to popular Dickensian
mythology most children were already receiving schooling and most working
class parents were paying private fees for it. It is therefore arguable that by
the time the state intervened, the market was already well on its way to
providing the levels of education that Smith and Paine had previously desired.
Commenting on Smith's inconsistency, West concludes:
12 Edwin G. West, October 1996, op cit., p.654.
13 R. S. Neale, The Standard of Living 1780-1844: A Regional and Class Study, in Arthur J. Taylor,
(1976) The Standard of Living in Britain in the Industrial Revolution, Methuen, London, p..173.
14 Joseph S. Zeisel, The Workweek in American Industry 1850-1956, Monthly Labour Review, (1958)
pp.8I,58. ... ..
15' Edwin G. West, (1970) Education and the State, Institute of Economic Affairs, Second EdItIOn,
London, p.xvii.
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"The Scottish Act of 1696, which impressed Smith, laid down that a
school should be erected in every parish and that teachers' salaries be
met by a tax on local heritors and tenants. This schooling, however,
was not made compulsory by law; and neither was it made free. The
parental fees made up a big part of the teachers' salaries and were
paid by every social class. Indeed, the Scots did not have "free" and
compulsory schooling until about the same time the English did in the
1880s. The more Smith championed the Scots parochial school
system, therefore, the more implicit credit he was paying to working
parents. Their action in voluntarily paying fees to purchase education at
the parish schools was obviously a tribute to them in Smith's own time
despite his contrary statement. ..that education would be "despised"
after the division of labour was established.
"More interesting still, it was the fee-paying private schools that
were bearing the main burden of Scottish education in terms of the
number of scholars. For every one Scottish parochial school pupil in
1818 there were two non-parochial school pupils. And the latter
outnumbered the former by much more than two to one in the growing
industrial areas such as Greenock, Paisley, and Glasgow - the very
areas where Smith argued there was greater need for schoolinq.?"
Like Tom Paine and Adam Smith, J. S. Mill has the reputation for being a
serious advocate of freedom of the individual. In his celebrated 1859 essay
On liberty", Mill asserted that:
"... the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.,,18
16 Edwin G. West October 1996, op cit., p.656. See also, Select Committee on Education of the Poor,
Parliamentary pa~ers, 1818, III. There is also an account of this paper in Edinburgh Review XCI, 1827,
on. 107-132.
11 J. S. Mill, (1962) [1859] On Liberty, Fontana, London.
18 Ibid., p.l35.
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When it comes to education and schooling, Mill scores many points with
modern libertarians as a result of his famous remark that:
"A general state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people
to be exactly like one another... in proportion as it is efficient and
successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural
tendency to one over the body.,,19
However, this statement should not be read as endorsing a free market in
education. For on this idea, Mill was opposed. Instead, he believed that lithe
uncultivated cannot be competent judges of cultivation.v" In other words,
market failure occurs because:
"... persons requiring improvement, having an imperfect or altogether
erroneous conception of what they want, the supply called forth by the
demand will be anything but what is essentially required.?"
Failing to acknowledge the empirical evidence around him, Mill seems to have
made the same critical error that Smith did before him. He protested that:
"...even in quantity it is [in 1848] and is likely to remain, altogether
insufficient, while in quality, though with some slight tendency to
improvement, it is never good except by some rare accident, and
generally so bad as to be little more than nominal.,,22
From this statement it is clear that Mill could not have read any of the national
reports on education, not least because the first full census commenting on
schooling did not appear until 1851 - three years after he had written the
previous quote. Instead, it seems likely that he relied heavily on the highly
19 Ibid., p.239.
20 J. S. Mill, (1969) Principles of Political Economy, Augustus Kelly, New York, p.953.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p.956.
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questionable information and data provided by his circle of radical and
utilitarian friends, such as John Kay of the Manchester Statistical Society.23
On the highly subjective matter of quality, Mill even failed to explore one of the
major outputs of education - literacy. Yet we now know from the leading
historian of this subject, R. K. Webb, that by the late 1830s between two-
thirds and three quarters of the working classes were already literate." So
despite Mill's general dislike of governmental provision of education he, like
Paine and Smith before, was willing to compromise.
The first part of the compromise was his reconciliation to the idea of some
form of limited state education:
"Though a government, therefore, may, and in many cases ought to,
establish schools and colleges, it must neither compel nor bribe any
person to come to them.,,25
Again, a state school should exist:
"... if it exists at all, as one among many competing experiments,
carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others
up to a certain standard of excellence.,,26
Without any real and substantive evidence, Mill made the presumption that
state schools would always be superior pacesetters.
The second of Mill's major compromises was his insistence that education
should be made compulsory. While he acknowledged that compulsory
education should not be equated with compulsory state schooling, he sought
to underpin the idea with the public enforcement of examinations:
23 Edwin G. West, 'The Benthamites as Educational Engineers', History of Political Economy, 1992,
24:3.
24 Edwin G. West, October 1996, op cit., p.656.
2S Mill, op cit., 1962, p.240.
26 Ibid.
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"Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a
gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal
acquisition and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum general
knowledge virtually cornpulsory.?"
Ultimately Mill endorsed Bentham's utilitarian system of examinations as the
price to be paid for the right to a vote. Yet, his ideas did not in any way
suggest a fundamental removal of state power in the area of education.
Instead, he sought only to restrict its authority to the power of those state
officials who would now oversee an examination system. For him, providing
these examinations were confined to the "instrumental parts of knowledge"
and the realm of objective fact then a minimum state was acceptable.
However, Mill never entered into a debate concerned with what would
constitute a certain minimum of general knowledge? He never addressed the
fundamental question of who was to determine the subjects to be taught?
How would one choose between, say, political economy or geography? He
never pronounced on whether powers of censorship could be easily
exercised? Or what should happen if certain individuals had aversions to
certain subjects? Mill himself for instance strongly objected to the teaching of
theology and profoundly believed that national education should be a strictly
secular affair.
Overall, his desire to judge ordinary people led him to make exactly the same
error as Tom Paine and Adam Smith had. Yet, while Paine and Smith had
argued that people were simply too poor to purchase education, Mill's version
of this non-sequitur went as follows:
27 For more on this see Edwin G. West, October 1996, op cit., p.656
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"In England ... elementary instruction cannot be paid for, at its full cost,
from the common wages of unskilled labour, and would not if it
could".28
Yet, how did he know this to be true? In reality, as West concludes:
"We have here, it seems, not so much the libertarian as the intellectual
paternalist with noble intentions. Certainly his treatment of other
people's opinions on this subject seemed to contradict the spirit of
Mill's On Liberty as it is popularly conceived."29
When it came to education, Tom Paine, Adam Smith and J. S. Mill were not
radical libertarians. Instead, they are perhaps better categorised as being free
market conservatives. For ultimately, their primary objective was the liberation
of the masses into a world of culture - their conception of what constituted
culture.
In articulating this worldview, they all made significant compromises that
legitimised the intervention of the state. While their support for the free market
led them to favour private tuition fees, they failed to foresee the scale and
consequences of the government bureaucracy they were promoting.
Interestingly, it was left to another more radical libertarian, William Goodwin to
defend the unfettered market. A philosopher by background, he prophetically
warned in 1796:
"Before we put so powerful a machine under the direction of so
unambiguous an agent, it behoves us to consider well what it is that we
do. Government will not fail to employ it to strengthen its hands
and perpetuate its institutions. ,,30
28 Mill, op cit., 1962, p.959.
29 Edwin G. West, October 1996, op cit., p.656.
30 William Goodwin, (1796) Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and
Happiness, London, p.297.
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Similarly, the French economist Frederic Bastiat, far from emphasising the
social benefits of education as a justification for public expenditure, instead
focused on the social costs of public expenditure as a justification for keeping
government out of education - as well as most other endeavours including
health care. In his 1850 work Economic Hermoniee" he wrote of the moral
and intellectual decay that results from the state's attempt to satisfy a human
want through services rendered publicly rather than privately:
"When the satisfaction of a want becomes the object of a public
service, it is in large part removed from the sphere of individual
freedom and responsibility. The individual. ..ceases to exercise free
control over the satisfaction of his own wants, and, no longer having
any responsibility for satisfying them, he naturally ceases to concern
himself with doing so. Foresight becomes as useless to him as
experience. He becomes less his own master; he has lost, to some
extent, his free will; he has less initiative for self-improvement; he is
less of a man. Not only does he no longer judge for himself in a given
case, but he loses the habit of judging for himself. This moral torpor
which takes possession of him, likewise takes possession of his fellow
citizens, and we have seen entire nations fall in this way into disastrous
inertia.,,32
Although Bastiat's perspective was not simply about the social costs attendant
on education per se, it was a broad rebuttal to an ever increasing number of
commentators who, following Paine, Smith and Mill, supported government
intervention as a means of generating social benefits - not least on the basis
of cultural and even national character.
In Alfred Marshall's classic textbook first published in 1890, Principles of
Economics,33 the social costs and benefits of involving the state's provision
and funding of education was discussed more in terms of political and moral
31 Frederic Bastiat (1850) Economic Hannonies, reprinted 1996, Irvington-on-Hudson, The Foundation
for Economic Education.
32 See: Ibid. Chaper 17, 'Public and Private Services'.
33 Alfred M~hall, (1920) Principles of Economics, Eigth Edition London, Macmillan & Co.
27
philosophy than economics. In Book IV, Chapter VI, he discussed the merits
of state intervention in industrial training and in paragraph seventeen
asserted:
"There is no extravagance more prejudicial to the growth of national
wealth than that wasteful negligence which allows genius that happens
to be born of lowly parentage to expend itself in lowly work. No change
would conduce so much to a rapid increase of material wealth as an
improvement in our schools.t"
Expanding on this theme he continued:
"We may then conclude that the wisdom of expending public and
private funds on education is not to be measured by its direct fruits
alone. It will be profitable as a mere investment, to give the masses of
the people much greater opportunities than they can generally avail
themselves of. For by this means many, who would have died
unknown, are enabled to get the start needed for bringing out their
latent abilities. And the economic value of one great industrial genius is
sufficient to cover the expenses of the education of a whole town.,,35
Marshall's support for the state funding of schools came from his
straightforward belief that general schooling would allow more people of
exceptional talent and vigour to become productive and that the additional
innovation and productivity they would create would more than pay for the
public expense of education.
A similar argument was presented by Charles F. Bastable concerning state
intervention in the technical education for trades. In Book I, Chapter V of his
1892 book, Public Pinence", he made an explicit appeal to the idea of net
34 Ibid.
3S Ibid.
36 Charles F. Bastable (1892) Public Finance, reprinted 1917, 3rd edition, London, Macmillan & Co
Ltd.
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social and private benefit discrepancies concerning technical education. He
asserted that:
"Expenditure on such an object is productive even in a financial point
of view, and it may further be argued that individual or family interest
will not suffice to accomplish the end desired."37
While he did go on to note the potential drawbacks of state intervention in
technical education, he nevertheless repeated the argument that "public
outlay may be of advantage in promoting industrial training".38
Taking all of these writers together, it is clear that during the late eighteenth
century and through the nineteenth century a consensus was reached
whereby state education was seen to impart social benefits not captured by
private calculations. Although there was a variety of opinions on exactly what
these benefits were, the direction and course was clear.
While Goodwin and Bastiat in their own ways confronted these views head-
on, history demonstrates they were not sufficiently powerful in their
persuasion of wider opinion. Their view, that state education would in turn
generate its own highly damaging social costs, failed to capture the popular
and moral imagination. Their belief that government was not a cure in
education but would worsen the situation failed to capture hearts and minds. It
fell on deaf ears.
For Edwin G. West what happened in the education debate was to have
serious ramifications in other areas - particularly healthcare. Once esteemed
and early classical liberals such as Paine, Smith and Mill could be cited for
acknowledging a justifiable role for the state in education, it was perhaps only
a matter of time before subsequent generations of more statist intellectuals
would actively exploit and build upon this - theoretically inconsistent -
position.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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Indeed, the writings of Marshall and Bastable attest to a new and fast
emerging consensus. It was not long before the new forms of state
intervention they so eloquently described became a reality that was duplicated
and spread across other economic sectors.
By the late nineteenth century, intellectuals and opinion formers in the most
advanced nations of the world were becoming increasingly attracted to the
ideas of a new technocratic modernity based on the centralising principles of
municipal and public sector benevolence. In education, law enforcement and
healthcare the seeds of state intervention had been firmly sown. They were
being ploughed and nurtured in the mindset of market failure.
Private Supply of Public Goods
Today, it is popularly believed the there are many goods essential to the
functioning of society which can be produced only by the state. The public
good thesis in Britain may be summarised in the following historic terms:
"The unrestricted operation of market forces in nineteenth century
Britain produced grave consequences, especially a lack of major public
goods as public order, sanitation and education. This shortcoming was
remedied only by a massive expansion of the state, without which
capitalist society would have broken down. The market was unable to
solve these difficulties.,,39
Today, to question this version of history seems strange and almost
inappropriate. However, while there was certainly a massive expansion of the
state in the nineteenth century - and, as such, the idea of a Victorian age of
laissez-faire is at least in part a myth - the key question is was this expansion
necessary. As the historian Stephen Davies has commented:
39 This line was the theme of a television series, based upon the book, Victorian Values. The series and
the central thesis were summarised in a powerful article by Peter Kellner later published in The
Independent. Peter Kellner, 'Thatcher's Flawed View of the Past', The Independent, 13 April 1987; 1.
Walvin, (1987) Victorian Values, London, Andre Deutsch.
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"Surely the Blue Books, official reports and the works of social
investigators reveal a horrendous state of affairs in the early nineteenth
century, with large towns and cities lacking such elementary facilities
as water, lighting, and an effective police force to protect the public
from rising crime? Weren't the inhabitants deprived of education and
other elements of culture? Certainly, the condition of many larger towns
and their inhabitants was often deplorable. These deficiencies had two
main causes: a sharp rise in population, coupled with large-scale
urbanisation; and an utterly inadequate system of local government,
riddled with corruption and jobbery. ,,40
One set of proposals - and ultimately those that were successful - was put
forward by reformers such as Edwin Chadwick, who forcefully argued for a
reconstruction of the state." But there was a different view put forward by
more libertarian inclined thinkers to remove the restrictions of the established
and largely corrupt system. The view here was to allow the market to produce
the solutions necessary.
Indeed, research which moves beyond the official publications of the day,
reveals that this was actually happening. And a brief examination of two
separate activities where private provision of public goods was far advanced
by the 1830s serves to demonstrate this reality.
For Davies, policing and law enforcement, and the supply of water and
sanitation, both illustrate the tenuous and fragile record upon which modern
notions of market failure have become so firmly established in the popular
mind.
The years between 1750 and 1850 saw the rapid development of a multitude
of private agencies of law enforcement. The services on offer ranged from the
40 Stephen Davies, (1987) The Private Supply of'Public Goods' in Nineteenth Century Britain,
Historical Notes No.3., Libertarian Alliance, London, p.l.
41 S. E. Finer, (1952) The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick, Methuen, London.
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systematic use of newspaper advertising to professional detectives and thief-
catchers.
The most significant were the private associations for the prosecution of
felons. These were voluntary associations of citizens that were initially set up
to defray the sizeable costs of mounting criminal prosecutions and that over
time grew to resemble private police forces. Overtime they acquired, by
popular market demand, a wide range of functions including crime-prevention
and insurance.
Association members paid for these services in proportion to their ability to
pay. The income was then used to pay for compensation for loss through theft
or criminal damage; to recover stolen goods wherever possible; to cover the
cost of criminal prosecutions - and for the compiling of information against
known delinquents. Moreover, the monies were used to finance permanent
community foot-patrols or watchers.
Between 1744 and 1856 at least 450 such associations were set up in
Britain.42 By the 1830s the largest and most successful of these organisations
- agencies such as the Barnet Association - had effectively become private
police forces in their own right. The evidence suggests that they were highly
successful and provided a service that was reasonably priced, efficient and
popular. The membership spanned the social classes and was by no means
simply confined to the well healed.
Similarly, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the supply of water and
sanitation was mainly in the hands of the chartered private water companies.
Although these organisations did not receive a favourable press following the
42 A. Schubert, 'Private Initiative in Law Enforcement: Associations for the Prosecution of Felons,
1774-1856', in V. Bailey (ed) (1981) Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth Century Britain, Croom
Helm, London.
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1842 Sanitation Report,43 the picture was arguably rather more complex than
a simple reading of this influential document suggests.
In many areas, such as Ashton-under-Lyne, private water companies worked
effectively and provided high quality water at a constant supply and at high
pressure." While in London there were problems with the supply of water and
sanitation, as most contemporary commentators acknowledged, the central
problem was the lack of competition and the chaotic state of local
government. In the metropolis there were 300 separate bodies operating
under 250 local Acts."
Under examination, similar points can be made in other service areas at this
time. In law, there was a vigorous development of private arbitration. And in
fire services, major insurance companies such as Sun Alliance led the way
with private market solutions." Overall, the nineteenth century saw an
explosive growth in the private supply of public goods, with some examples
surviving to this day - such as the Royal Lifeboat Institution founded in 1824.47
However, given this historical evidence the question again presents itself -
why was the statist solution adopted? This is a complex area but some
suggestions can be made. Dr. Davies agues:
"The problems were so acute in many cases that drastic action did
seem necessary. The laissez-faire solution could be blocked by the
vested interests of the old order and was not supported by a sufficiently
powerful interest group. By contrast the state reformers had a coherent
ideology in Benthamism and were able to work with the vested
43 For an analysis on this report see: M. W. Flynn (ed) (1965) Report on the Sanitary Condition of the
Labouring Population of Great Britain by Edwin Chadwick, 1842, Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh.
44 P. H. Holland, (1846) Report on the Ashton under Lyne Water Works, Towns Improvement
Company, London.
4S Stephen Davies, (1987) op.cit., p.2. .... . . .
46 H.W. Arthurs, (1985) Without the Law: AdmmIstratIve JustIce and Legal PluralIsm m Nmeteeth-
Century England, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
47 Nigel Meek (1999) The Plausibility of Large-Scale, High-Tech, Voluntarily-Funded Emergency
Organisations: The Example of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, Economic Notes No.86,
Libertarian Alliance, London.
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interests, even if some of their more radical proposals were thwarted.
The central figure in this movement was Edwin Chadwick, whose
career is classic proof of the importance of outstanding individuals in
history. Yet the main reason for the 'triumph of the state' was the fear
of the mid-Victorian elite that society was facing the prospect of moral
disintegration. They feared that economic development was dissolving
the social bonds and producing an atomised 'state of nature'.48
On the question of the development of state education and the central
importance of 'morality', he comments:
"The primary objection to non-state education was its lack of moral
instruction, while the prosecution associations were seen as
inadequate because they concerned themselves only with such
matters as crimes against property and person while ignoring 'moral'
offences, such as prostitution and drunkenness. Even the debate over
sanitation was thought to be as much about morals as about drains"."
Davies is critical of the fact that most historians have failed to adequately
question their favoured sources in this area. He believes that highly
impressionistic literary accounts are accepted as being the whole truth and
that the accounts written by middle-class, often evangelical, observers are
taken at face value with little attempt to identify the assumptions which
informed them - or to test them against other evidence.
To him the most serious offence is the often unthinking respect given to
official reports. For it has now been clearly shown that many of these
publications, including the 1834 Poor Law, 1839 Constabulary and 1842
Sanitation Reports, are highly tendentious propagandistic works with evidence
doctored and manipulated and "hearsay evidence or urban folk-myths
presented as fact.,,50 As Davies comments:
48 Stephen Davies, (1987) op.cit., p.2.
49 Ibid.
so Ibid.
34
"Thus the majority of respondents to the 1839 Constabulary Report
said that they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs and saw
no requirement for a state police force, and yet when Chadwick drew
up the Report most of this evidence was simply omitted.,,51
Chadwick drew up all the Reports mentioned above. And behind this absence
of criticism was his 'whiggish' view of history which saw the growth of the
modern state as an inevitable and core part of 'progress'. For Davies
therefore:
"The historical evidence does not support arguments for the necessity
of the state as a provider and regulator. Instead, it lends a support to
the thesis that the market is capable of producing private solutions to
the problem of 'public goods' .,,52
When asking what view can be reached from this re-examination of history,
he concluded:
"Mainly that the necessity of a large state for commercial society is not
only unproven but even doubtful. It seems apparent that many of the
'core' functions of the state can be provided in quite a different way
through the market. History can offer ideas as to how the state today
may be replaced and even as to what a truly commercial society might
be like.,,53
SI Mark Blaug, 'The Poor Law Report Re-examined', in The Journal of Economic History, 1964. For
more on the 1839 Constabulary Report see: L, Radzinowicz, (1968) A History of English Criminal
Law, Vol.IV, Stevens, London, pp.259-60. For more on the 1842 Sanitation Report see: G. Kearns,
~ate Property and Public Health Reform in England, 1830-1870, unpublished paper, Department of
Geography, University of Liverpool.
S2 Stephen Davies, (1987) op.cit., p.2.
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Market Failure, Public Goods and Health Economics
By the end of the nineteenth century and for the first half of the twentieth, the
command economy model was ascendant.
Whether further encouraged in Britain by the translation of Karl Marx's work
into English in 1890, or by the rise of an essentially middle class Fabian elite
that actively embraced parliamentary socialisrn'", The dominant ideas of most
of the early twentieth century centred around the ideas of state planning,
public sector benevolence and notions of equity.
At a time when the socially democratic economics of Keynes was arguing that
politicians should run society through the principles of 'management by an
intelligent elite', even many Conservatives found it attractive to argue for a so-
called 'ordered middle way' between orthodox socialism and laissez-faire
liberalisms5. It was in this world of pre-Popparian thought that Harold
Macmillan wrote:
"The next step forward, therefore, in our social thinking is to move on
from 'piece-meal planning' to national planning - from the
consideration of each industry or service separately to a consideration
of them all collectively."s6
54 Hal Draper, 'The Two Souls of Socialism', New Politics Vol 5, No.1, Winter 1966.
55 It is curious how the existence of an alliance of statist Toryism and Socialism has fallen out of any
popular consciousness. One of the few studies can be found in Semmel, B., (1960) Imperialism and
State Refonn: English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
M.A. There is a growing literature on eugenics, 'right wing' (that is, anti-capitalist and anti-liberal)
social Darwinism and paternalism. See: Searle, G. R, (1971) The Ouest for National Efficiency, Oxford
Universisty Press, Oxford and (1986) Social Hygiene in Twentieth Century Britain, Croom Helm,
London. Soloway, R. A., (1990) Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate
in Twentieth Century Britain, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. Some socialist scholars
are also beginning to reconsider the origins and nature of the rise of the welfare state in light of such
evidence. See: Skocpol, T., (1992) Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social
Policy in the United States, Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, Cambridge M.A. Jamieson, L.,
and Corr, H., (eds) (1990) State, Private Life and Political Change, Macmillan, London. Dwork, D.,
(1987) War is Good For Babies and Other Young Children, Tavistock Publications, London. Under
analysis, the origins of the welfare state looks less like the pure juice of human kindness and altruism, a
liberation of the masses, and increasingly more like authoritarian social engineering for the sake of
national strength, war or racial hygiene.
56 Macmillan, H., (1938) The Middle Way, Macmillan & Co, London, p.176.
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Given that Conservatism rested during this period upon such holistic notions
as the subsumation of the individual to the politics of community, nation and
empire, it is perhaps understandable that in the 1930s many leading
Conservatives accepted the fashionable case for greater social planning and
state intervention. Now convinced by the arguments concerning market
failure, Macmillan for instance asserted:
"Expert criticism has revealed the deficiencies of partial or piecemeal
planning, and has made it clear that we must carry the idea of planning
further, and evolve such a national scheme. We must take account of
all the problems, and of all the repercussions of partial schemes with
limited objectives. If we do not widen its scope, the whole idea of
planning will be discredited.
"...The weakness of partial planning seems to me to arise from
the incomplete and limited application of the principles of planning. The
lesson of these errors, which I regard as errors of limitation, is not that
we should retreat. On the contrary, we must advance, more rapidly and
still further, upon the road of conscious regulation. liS?
Around the same time, another Conservative commentator, Reginald
Northam, similarly argued in favour of more state planning and
interventionism. In his 1939 book, Conservatism The Only Way, he argued in
the following terms:
"...a prime consideration of the State must ever be to attempt to secure
such conditions as will as produce the greatest employment, for it is in
that way the national wealth can be most effectively produced and
distributed.
"...The emphasis must be on man, on human values and not on
material values. Economic forces which would have an anti-social
effect must be checked by the authority of the State. National wealth
57 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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can be measured in terms of £ s. d. It can also be measured in terms of
human happiness.r'"
Northam articulated a Conservative perspective typical of his generation.
State interventionism and the individual's duty to the wider community were all
combined into a powerful cocktail built on the assumptions of market failure:
"Action by the State in determining the flow of trade which we have
seen in these post-war years, is more typical of our traditional outlook
than the laissez-faire attitude of previous generations.
"...The responsibility of the individual is to realise his duty to the
community into which he has been born, in order, not only that he may
become the biggest he can become in that community, but also that
the rights which our forefathers gained for us through service may be
retained for us and may be passed on to those who come after".59
In mid and late twentieth century Britain such notions were the consensual
backbone of mainstream political culture. And where markets were not
perceived as achieving socially desirable outcomes, economists invoked the
now popular notions of market failure.
Indeed, health economics - particularly as it emerged in Britain in the 1950s
and beyond - has consistently emphasised the unique nature of health care;
drawing on the view that market failure is somehow inherent and unavoidable.
The conclusion reached is that in this particular area of welfare unfettered
markets are wholly and inevitably inappropriate.
To social democratic and collectivist writers on health and welfare such as
Tawney, Titmuss and Laksi,6o social justice and equality are the key activating
58 Northam, R., (1939) Conservatism The Only Way, The Right Book Club, London, 105.
59 Ibid., pp. Ill, 115.
60Tawney R. H. (1912) The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century, London: Lo~~an, Green
and Co; (1921) The Acquisitive Society (1961 edn.), London: Fontana; (1926) RelIgIOn and the
Rise of Capitalism (1938 edn.), West Drayton: Pelican Books; (1931) Equality (1964 edn.),
London: Unwin Books; (1935) 'Christianity and the social revolution', New Statesman and Nation,
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themes. They regard resources as being available for collective use and
consequently favour government intervention. They criticise the pursuance of
personal advantage rather than the general good - believing that the latter
does not bring about the former. The market is criticised for being
undemocratic, inasmuch as these thinkers believe it encourages decisions to
be taken by a small power elite, and other people to suffer at the hands of
arbitrary distributional forces. The market is also said to be unjust because it
distributes rewards which are unrelated to individual need or merit, and
because the costs of economic change are also distributed arbitrarily.
Under the influence of the social democratic paradigm and its value
judgements, a set of standard assumptions have come to inform most modern
health economics and from which a critique of the free market is derived. For
example, in the standard text book The Economics of the Welfare State61 the
author, Nicholas Barr asserts:
"Private markets allocate efficiently only if the standard assumptions
hold - that is, perfect information, perfect competition, and no market
failures such as external effects. The underlying question is why health
care is 'different' from equally vital commodities like food.,,62
Following this highly value laden introduction Barr immediately goes on to
further highlight his prejudice. Accepting the modern - highly regulated and
corporatist - health market as being in some way analogous to a real free
market process, he writes:
November; (1953) The Attack and Other Papers, London: George Allen and Unwin; (1966) The
Radical Tradition. Twelve essays on politics, education and literature (ed. Rita Hinden),
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Richard Titmuss, 'The Irresponsible Society', Fabian Tract 232,
April 1960; (1962) Income, Distribution and Change, London; (1971) The Gift Relationship,
London; (1974) Social Policy: An Introduction, London. Harold Laski (1933) Democracy in
Crisis, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press; (1944) Faith, Reason, .and
Civilisation, Viking Press, London; (1948) Liberty in the Modem State, London, Allen & Unwin.
61 Nicholas Barr, (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, Third Edition, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
62 Ibid., P 282.
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"Does medical care conform with standard assumptions? First, are
individuals perfectly informed about the nature of the product (in
analytical terms, is their indifference map well defined)? The answer,
clearly, is no.,,63
Equating contemporary health care practices with a real market, he continues:
"In addition, individuals are often ignorant about which types of
treatment are available, and about the outcome of different
treatments, which is often problematic. Furthermore, what little the
patient knows is generally learnt from the provider of medical services;
and many types of treatment (e.g. setting a broken leg) are not
repeated so that much of what a patient learns is of little future use.,,64
Barr is typical of many academic commentators. On matters of consumer
choice and information, he simply operates within the given - statist -
institutional boundaries and therefore confidently asserts that with:
"Medical care:
• Much (though not all) the information is technically complex, so that a
person would not necessarily understand the information even were it
available.
• Mistaken choice is costlier and less reversible than with most other
commodities.
• An individual generally does not have time to shop around if his
condition is acute (contrast the situation with a car repair, which can be
left until the car owner has enough information and can afford the
repair).
• Consumers frequently lack the information to weigh one doctor's
advice against another's.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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• Health and health care have strongly emotive connotations - for
example, ignorance may in part be a consequence of fear, superstition,
etc.,,65
Barr acknowledges that in some areas, such as hi-fis and used cars,
consumers can buy information from consumer magazines or have it provided
by trade associations, but interestingly he forgets to mention advertising.
Without justifying his argument, he goes on to state - as if an a priori truth -
that:
"... health care is inherently a technical subject, so that there is a limit to
what consumers could understand without themselves becoming
doctors. The problem is exacerbated by the existence of groups who
would not be able to make use of information even if they had it, such
as victims of road accidents.,,66
There is no questioning here of whether health care really is more technically
difficult or more challenging for consumers to understand than any of the
other products mentioned - namely, motor cars and hi-fi systems." There is
no reference to the Libertarian argument that in a market consumers do not
have to have perfect information or anything approaching it. Instead, they
should have access to the commercial free speech, advertising and the
reputations that emerge from brands over time.
When it comes to health economics as a discipline there is usually little if any
reference to the role of brands or market driven reputation. Instead, there
appears to be an implicit respect for the given boundaries of government
intervention and statutory regulation.
For instance, turning to prices, Barr continues:
65 Ibid., p. 283.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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"Here, again, it can be argued that most consumers are ignorant of
what a particular form of treatment 'should' cost; and, because a great
deal of medical care is not repeated, information often has no future
use. Nor would it help if consumers were well informed about prices.
Rational choice requires simultaneous knowledge both of prices and of
the nature of the product (Le. of both budget constraint and indifference
map); knowledge of prices without adequate information about different
types of treatment will not ensure efficiency.,,68
Tellingly, Barr immediately goes on to assert that:
"... if the only problem were inadequate information about prices, the
appropriate intervention would be regulation, either in the form of a
published price list or through price controls. But where information
about the nature of the product is imperfect, ignorance about prices
adds further weight to the argument for more substantial state
involvement".69
The whole debate is couched in favour of state interventionism and state
control. From the straw man of so called 'perfect information', the artificial
edifice of imperfect prices is quickly established.
Again, working within given boundaries, health economists are quick to assert
that "... the market solution is insurance".7° And that:
"The real issue, therefore, is whether the private market can supply
medical insurance efficiently.,,71
Locked again into a world of similar a priori assumptions, health economists
popularly assert that when we are considering health insurance markets there
are five technical conditions to adhere to:
68 Ibid., p. 284.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 285
71 Ibid.
42
"... the probability of needing treatment. ..must be independent across
individuals, and less than one; it must be known or estimable; and
there must be no substantial problem of adverse selection or moral
hazard (the last three conditions adding up to perfect information on
the part of the insurance company).,,72
Not only are current models of insurance viewed as being indicative of a real
free market in health care - a notion which is itself highly questionable for
many libertarians - but issues such as adverse selection and moral hazard are
typically discussed only in terms of market failure - not state sector (or
political) failure.
The idea that, in a democracy, state health and welfare systems normally
adversely favour - and thereby disproportionately benefit - articulate middle
class recipients over poorer clients is usually excluded from text books.
Similarly, the argument that state health and welfare systems can themselves
encourage problems of moral hazard is normally marginalised or excluded
from most mainstream literature.
When these things are occasionally referred to, interventionist - not market
based - ideas, are then usually invoked as the logical next step. Hence, the
following statement concerning market failures in health care:
"Thus the lower-income individuals may have less information relevant
to choices about health; in addition, they may be less able to make use
of any information they acquire. In such cases intervention in the
following forms may improve equity as well as efficiency.
Regulation would be concerned with the professional
qualification of doctors and nurses, with drugs, and with medical
facilities in both public and private sectors.
72 Ibid., p.286.
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Where imperfect information causes under-consumption, a
subsidy might be applied either to prices (e.g. free medical
prescriptions) or to incomes.
...Where problems of inadequate information and inequality of
power are serious, efficiency and equity may jointly be maximised by
public allocation and/or production. In broad terms this depends on two
factors: whether the private or public sectors is more efficient at
producing health care; and whether monitoring of standards is more
effective in one sector or the other.,,73
What starts out purporting to be about economics and an analysis of health
care, soon degenerates into a stream of subjective and highly politicised
assumptions concerning the constructed notion of market failure and the idea
of state supported equity.
Criticising much mainstream economics Professor John Burton has argued in
his paper, 'Economics: Still Dismal After All These Years',74 that the bias
against genuine market processes generally occurs because students of
economics are invariably taught to look at economic questions as a set of
relatively simple and mathematically tractable equations. For him, the implicit
assumption is that economic systems are one with a low order of complexity
and therefore equitable with a mathematical system. He complains that:
"Repeated exposure to this assumption in a variety of guises (the
Keynes and monetarist macro models, Marshallian and Walrasian
models of markets, etc.), has the unfortunate consequence of
ingraining a habit of thought in the student. He starts to believe that
real world economic processes are non-complex systems, and that
they are just as manipulable as the equation systems that he is taught
to handle mathematically. ,,75
73 Ibid., p.290. . . .
74 John Burton, (1989) Economics: StIlI Dismal After All These Years, Economic Notes No.1?,
London, Libertarian Alliance.
75 Ibid.
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However, in recent decades a fightback against interventionist economics has
gathered pace. Going beyond the tentative views of the early classical
Libertarians mentioned above (Tom Paine, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill),
a new generation of thinker has emerged which challenges much of what has
gone before. And it is to these writers and their ideas on healthcare that we
now turn.
Libertarian Riposte
In 1920, Ludwig von Mises published his essay - 'Die Wirlschaftrechnung im
Sozialistischen Gemeinwesen' - Economic Calculation in the Socialist
Commonwealth". This paper - and Mises's subsequent works - ignited a
fascinating debate in political economy that raged throughout the inter-war
years. A devastating critique of Marxism," and other fashionable advocates of
command and control economics, Mises argued that in order for one to make
sensible decisions regarding the allocation of factors of production, it is
necessary to refer to the prices of these factors. If such prices were to be
endowed with any degree of 'economic' rationale, then Mises considered it
vital that they be established spontaneously in an 'anarchic' market.
Mises argued that abolition of markets for factors" would result In the
inevitable breakdown of economic sectors and industry:
"Under socialism all the means of production are the property of the
community. It is the community alone which can dispose of them and
which determines their use in production.?"
Remove a market for factor inputs, no production good would "ever become
the object of exchange",80 hence, it would:
76 Ludwig von Mises (1935 [1920]), 'Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth', reprinted
in Hayek (1935, ed), Collectivist ~cono~ic. Planning: Routledge, Lond~n, pp. 87-130. , ..
77 For more on this see: Andrzej Walicki (1988) Karl Marx as Philosopher of Freedom, CrItical
Review, Volume 2, Number 4, pp. 10-59.
78 This of course is the scenario envisioned in orthodox Marxism.
79 Mises (1935 [1920]), op.cit., p. 89.
80 Ibid, p. 93.
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"... be impossible to determine its monetary value"."
Mises contended that under the anarchic organisation of classical economics,
market prices acted as "aids to the mind".82 Although not able to account for
perfection, monetary calculation does at least facilitate the practical co-
ordination of highly intricate production processes. The existence of highly
subjective market prices enables each decision maker to take into account
much information, which - absent such prices - they could not possibly be
aware of.
Remove the assistance provided by such 'aids to the mind' and Mises argued
that the human mind would be unable to "orient itself properly among the
bewildering mass of intermediate products and potentialities of production.r"
For him, the exchange ratios that emerged in the course of market exchange,
facilitated a type of "intellectual division of labour" that allowed those
participating in trade to draw upon each other's knowledge in an indirect
manner.
Of the vast array of projects that are technically feasible at any particular point
in time, only a small number are likely to prove 'economically rational' over the
longer term. Therefore, if available resources are to be utilised effectively, it is
vital that those in charge of production possess have some method that
enables them to discriminate between the various methods in which factors
can be combined, eliminating those which are considered uneconomic. Mises
argued that the human mind alone "is too weak to grasp the importance of
any single one among the countlessly many" factors.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 102.
83 Ibid., 103.
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"No single man can ever master all the possibilities of production,
innumerable as they are, as to be in a position to make straightway
jUdgements of value without the aid of some system of cornputatton.r'"
Those in charge of industrial production under socialism and centrally planned
systems have need of a surrogate for the price system. That is, a surrogate
aid to mind capable of guiding them through the plethora of potential factor
combinations; a guide through the "oppressive plenitude of economic
potentialities".85 For Mises, central planners and Marxists are the
unreasonable'" in pursuit of the unfeasible.
Its unfeasibility had been strongly hinted at by Frederich von Wieser in 1889,
N. G. Pierson in 1902, Enrico Barone in 1908. However, it took until 1920 for it
to be explained in detail by Mises.
One of Mises student's, Friedrich Von Hayek, elaborated still further honing
and refining the position. For Hayek, the problem of economic calculation as
it confronts a factor manager - which was Mises's original concern - can best
be interpreted as the surface manifestation of a deeper underlying 'knowledge
problem'. As Andrew Farrant has commented:
"An individual producer is faced with the problem of coordinating his
activities with those of N other economic agents; his decision making
process must take account of a vast plethora of esoteric detail, relating
to matters concerning his factor inputs, the relative cost of potential
substitutes, and so forth - 'details' that are widely dispersed throughout
the global productive structure. The vast majority of this 'knowledge' is
unavailable to any producer in an easily accessible form. No producer
84 Ibid., 102.
8S Ibid., 101.
86 See: David Ramsay Steele (1992) From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of
Economic Calculation, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, p. 375. Steele contends that if Marxism had been
"more unabashedly utopian, it would not have had the same motive to evade discussions of the
mechanics of its proposed future society. The attempt to abstain from utopianism merely leads to
unexamined utopias." Moreover, he continues, there is "no escape from utopianism, other than mute
abstentionism. But we can criticize our utopias, discard those convicted of unfeasibility, and replace
them with better utopias. Wishful thinking is no vice, but openness to argument is a wonderful virtue."
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can know - it being an epistemological impossibility - every intricate
facet relating to the manufacture (or extraction, in the case of raw
materials) of his factor inputs. Yet, as Hayek's opponents readily
admitted, such detail must be taken into account, if production is to
proceed in a sensible manner. liB?
To illustrate this point, Hayek recounts a story about the market for tin.
Providing an overview of the story, Farrant continues:
"The price of tin reflects (admittedly, in a less than ideal way) a vast
plethora of detail, that cannot by its nature be 'known' to those for
whom tin serves as a factor input. The price of tin reflects _
encapsulates - factual detail pertaining to: the supply of tin; various
demands for it as an industrial input; the various supply and demands
for tin substitutes; the costs of producing tin; factors relating to tin
complements; and so forth ad infinitum. By reference to the price of tin,
a producer - problems of signal-extraction notwithstanding - can adapt
his activities to a change in any of the various factors enumerated
above. An increase in the price of tin - due perhaps, to a decrease in
the supply of a tin substitute, an increase in the demand for tin, or a
strike at a tin mine - will have the result that tin users will be made
aware that it is now necessary to utilise tin more sparingly; perhaps - in
the case of a marginal usage - foregoing the use of tin entirely."BB
Having encountered the Austrian School of Economics and Von Mises In
1922, and being profoundly affected by their anti-socialist teachings, Hayek
spent much of the rest of his life exploring the truths of the school's teachings.
Overall the Austrian School of Economics sees society as a web of complex,
human interactions in which prices act as signals for human behaviour:
87 Andrew Farrant, The Socialist 'Calculation' Debate: Lange Versus Mises and Hayek, Economic
Notes No. 71, Libertarian Alliance, London, p. 3.
88 Ibid.
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"For the 'Austrian economist' the free market and the language of price
are the very sources and mechanisms of wealth, the diversity of goods
produced by many individuals is richer and more useful, ensuring
greater and more widespread wealth than any system which attempts
to control from the centre. A diversity of different attempts to predict
future needs is what guarantees innovation. The role of market pricing
is partly that of allocating resources to the preferred use. Its more
important role however, is that of transmitting information about
preferences and about relative scarcities. Only markets can effectively
utilise information dispersed throughout millions of economic agents.
Profit is a signal which demonstrates that the entrepreneur is doing the
right thing for people he cannot know. Price is therefore the language
of the complex or extended order of modern societies. The knowledge
utilised in this extended order is greater than that which any single
agent such as a government department can possibly acquire."a9
Hayek's 'Austrian' theory has three fundamental strands. The primacy of
individual freedom, the value of the market mechanism and the assertion that
'social justice' is not only fruitless - because there is no such thing - but
actively harmful, because it can and will end up by destroying individual
freedom.
For Hayek, the market has been historically beneficial to humanity because it
is efficient and it protects individual choice and freedom:
89 Graham, D., and Clarke, P., (1986) The New Enlightenment, Macmillan, London, in association with
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49
"[It is] a procedure which has greatly improved the chances of all to
have their wants satisfied. It is the only procedure yet discovered in
which information widely dispersed among millions of men can be
effectively utilised for the benefit of all - and used by assuring to all an
individual liberty desirable on ethical grounds.,,9o
While exponents of the free market from William Goodwin to Friedrich Hayek,
defended the free market on the basis of its overall social product and its
capacity to create wealth and prosperity for all, the American philosopher and
novelist Ayn Rand provided a uniquely moral, ethical and epistemological
defence of capitalism. For her:
"The moral justification of capitalism does not lie in the altruist claim
that it represents the best way to achieve 'the common good'...the
moral justification of capitalism lies in the fact that it is the only system
consonant with man's rational nature, that it protects man's survival
qua man, and that its ruling principle is: Justlce.'?"
What makes Rand's promotion of capitalism and genuinely free markets
unique is - as Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen" have argued
- that it neither considers capitalism a necessary evil (as do many
Conservatives), nor does she attempt to defend it in terms of ends (as do
many economists). Instead, the essence of capitalism is individual rights: if
individual rights are respected, then that society is capitalist. To understand
Rand's theory of rights one must not only grasp her ethical doctrine, but also
her fundamental philosophy of man.
90 Friedrich von Hayek, (1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 2., The Mirage of Social Justice,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 70-71. . .
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Based on an essentially Aristotelian model of human action, Rand's
conception of man emphasises the creative power of the human mind. The
degree to which one's knowledge increases is argued to be a function of
one's ability to solve problems effectively. Against the claims of determinism
and the purveyors of over-socialised models of human action, Rand argues
there is no static set of rules that if followed will lead automatically to new
insights into a given problem. In both her fictional and non-fictional works the
creative mind is identified as the dynamic, inspirational force behind all human
progress:
"Men of genius in both the sciences and the arts are those who do not
allow themselves to be held down by received wisdom."93
Under Rand's philosophy, popularly known as Objectivism because of its
Aristotelian-realist epistemological and metaphysical views on objective
reality, the fundamental alternative facing living things is productive or
destructive action. In the case of human beings, those courses of action
necessary for the furtherance of our existence are not automatically
determined, but chosen. Because we have no automatic means for the
furtherance of our lives, we are forced to make choices about which course(s)
of action to take. Therefore, the volitional nature of Man's consciousness
implies a priori a principle of freedom. To act as if there is some substitute for
this volitional feature of human nature is to contradict a fundamental
metaphysical fact about our nature. Capitalism is not merely "a social system
based on the recognition of individual rights",94 but more importantly, "it is the
basic metaphysical fact of man's nature - the connection between his survival
and his use of reason - that capitalism recognises and protects".95
Rand defines reason as the ability to conceptualise material provided by the
senses. She argues that our very survival requires that we conceptually
attend to the empirical world. Ultimately, human choice rests upon whether to
93 Ibid., p. 166.
94 Rand, A., Capitalism the Unknown Ideal, op.cit., p. 322.
95 Ibid.
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direct our full attention to the situations we experience or to base perception
on whim; the universe according to Rand being intelligible and potentially
understandable.
In For the New Intellectual she uses two philosophical ideal types to depict the
enemies of rationality and therefore capitalism; the Witch Doctor and Attila.
"The essential characteristic of these two remain the same in all ages:
Attila, the man who rules by brute force, acts on the rage of the
moment, is concerned with nothing but the physical reality immediately
before him, respects nothing but man's muscles, and regards a fist, a
club or a gun as the only answer to any problem... 1196
The Witch Doctor, or the Kantian philosopher, wishes to avoid empirical
evidence and the world of demonstrable reality:
"[He is] the man who dreads physical reality, dreads the necessity of
practical action, and escapes into his emotions, into visions of some
practical realm where he wishes to enjoy a supernatural power
unlimited by the absolute of nature.?"
For Rand, both the Witch Doctor and AttHa exist with a "consciousness held
down to the perceptual method of functioning, an awareness that does not
choose to extend beyond the automatic, the immediate, the given, the
involuntary, which means: an animal's epistemology, or as near to it as a
human consciousness can come."98
"It is against the faculty of reason that Attila and the Witch Doctor rebel.
The key to both their souls is the longing for the effortless,
irresponsible, automatic consciousness of an animal. Both dread the
necessity, the risk and the responsibility of rational cognition. Both
96 Rand, A., (1961) For the New Intellectual, New York, Signet Books, p. 14.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
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dread the fact that 'nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.' Both
seek to exist, not by conquering nature, but by adjusting to the given,
the immediate, the known."gg
Rand's theory of rights is inextricably linked to her conception of human
nature. For her, "the source of rights is man's nature."100 "Rights are a
necessary condition of [man's] particular mode of survival.t"?'
"Thus for every individual, a right is the moral sanction of a positive of
his freedom to act on his own judgement, for his own goals, by his own
voluntary, uncoerced choice. As to his neighbours, his rights impose no
obligation on them except of a negative kind; to abstain from violating
his rights.,,102
Life and health is not guaranteed. In recognition of this metaphysical fact
Rand holds that rights are freedoms of action and not guarantees of anything.
Property rights are not conceived by her to be rights to things, but only the
freedom to pursue courses of action with respect to material goods. If certain
goods and services are to be guaranteed to individuals - as welfare rights
theorists demand - some people, by implication, must be coerced to provide
for others. Apart form the fact that what is guaranteed is conditional upon the
productivity of some (and hence no guarantee at all), there is in principle no
limit to what one could claim must be guaranteed.
"But this view of rights makes a mockery of the notion of a guarantee;
for if there is no object to which one may not claim a right, then we
could conceivably ask the state to guarantee all things equally, to
everyone. ,,1 03
99 Ibid., p. 15.
100 Rand, A., Capitalism the Unknown Ideal, op.cit., p. 322.
101 Ibid.
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In one fell swoop, the NHS and notions of state healthcare become not merely
ineffective - Hayek's ground for opposition - but actually a fraud. The NHS's
demand for 'more resources' can be dismissed as part of a gang of 'looters'
fighting over the pickings. To turn a Socialist slogan on its head - healthcare
is a privilege and not a right.
Moreover, libertarians complain that few reasons are ever given by welfare
theorists as to why the inherently coercive apparatus of the state should be
the vehicle for providing certain goods to classes. It is not enough to assume
blindly - a priori - that the state should, let alone could, provide the goods
demanded. For Randians the question is: why are acts of force by the state
not subject to the levels of moral condemnation we apply to individuals who
take such actions?
Here, the NHS and the welfare state's conception of rights is regarded as
being explicitly discriminatory:
"That conception of rights demands that the state treat some
individuals differently from others, depending on their particular status
in society at a particular time (e.g., whether they are rich or poor)."?'
Libertarians argue that, despite socialist and social democratic rhetoric,
welfare rights do not suppose that people possess rights. Rather, rights are
gifts of the state, and therefore this means that like all benefactors the state
possesses the power to remove its generosity when it so desires. Because
the state is ultimately is own arbiter it has no obligations to respond efficiently
to demand. Because in reality no natural, automatic guarantees are given that
mean people will lead successful lives, the NHS and other forms of state
welfare are identified as being metaphysical frauds. Modern consensual
health economics distorts the true nature of social existence.
104 Ibid.
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For Rand the best we can do is to establish conditions which will allow for
choices that are essential for the pursuit of life. To establish these conditions
without reference to anyone's particular circumstance is to treat each
individual equally.
Therefore, for her, property rights essentially mean the right to certain courses
of action - rather than to particular objects. Property rights are primarily
articulated as the right to life; the right of an individual to pursue specific
courses of action he thinks best, at any particular time; provided that he does
not interact coercively with others:
"The right to life is the source of all rights - and the right to property is
their only implementation. Without property rights, no other rights are
possible. Since man has to sustain his life by his own effort, the man
who has no right to the product of his effort has no means to sustain
his life. The man who produces while others dispose of his product is a
slave.,,105
Ayn Rand would no doubt agree, though from an opposing view-point, with
Mao's statement that 'all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'.
At the centre of her Objectivist paradigm is the view that because men are
physical entities who require material goods to sustain their very existence,
the creation, use and disposal of material things must be permitted. Rand
holds that as individuals alone act, and that therefore collectivities are by
definition antithetical constructs, collectivities posses no rights. Thus, as rights
specify freedom of action and collectivities do not act, property rights can be
possessed only by individuals. Although individuals can form groups, and
agree to be treated as if they were one, as in the case of a corporation, this
does not remove us from the truth that rights ultimately belong to individual
human beings. Therefore, property rights demand firstly that individuals must
lOS Rand, A., Capitalism the Unknown Ideal, op.cit., p. 20. See also: Den Uyl, D. and Rasmussen, D.
8., (eds) The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, op.cit, p. 174.
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not be kept from seeking material goods, and secondly that they must be free
to utilise the goods they have freely acquired.
For Rand, the fact that capitalism involves the pursuit of self-interest is not
only correct but morally virtuous. Objectivists and libertarians in general argue
that capitalism induces, through the process of individual rational self-interest,
material and conditional advancement.
"Whatever one's line of work, a competitive and free market tends to
push one toward the achievement of the best one is able to produce
within a given context. Because there are no guarantees that past
achievements will not be bettered, there are strong incentives to
continue to produce at the maximum level. Moreover, those who are
innovative and hard-working are not held to the level of the mediocre
and the slothful, since there is the full expectation of reaping the
rewards of one's efforts. In short, capitalism is a system directed
toward achievement.t'?"
Rand maintained that competition is not the law of the jungle. The motto "dog-
eat-dog", she wrote "is not applicable to capitalism nor to dogs". 107
"Competition is not a zero-sum game where someone wms and
another loses, such that there is no overall gain between parties.
Competition is rather a method of co-ordinating activities in which those
who are most efficient at utilising a given resource are in a position to
do so. A kind of human ecological balance is promoted by the market.
An economy of resources develops with the result that the appropriate
quantity of goods of optimal quality are directed into those areas where
they are most needed or desired.,,108
106 See: Rand, A., Capitalism the Unknown Ideal, op.cit., p. 20. See also: Den Uyl, D., and Rasmussen
D. 8., (eds) The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, op.cit.; p. 17~.
107 Rand A. (1964) The Virtue of Selfishness, New Amencan LIbrary, New York, p. 34.
108 Den Uyl: D., and Rasmussen D. B., (eds) The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, op.cit., pp. 174-
175.
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Countering the Marxist argument that progress under capitalism is the result
of exploiting the surplus labour of workers, Rand contends that capitalism
today removes sacrifice from human interaction. The popular belief that
capitalism exploits workers is contested in the strongest terms. Collectivism,
in whatever variety, is a system wherein some are sacrificed for the sake of
others. At the root of collectivism's sacrificial nature is the willingness to
operationalise the holistic 'needs of society' view and thereby override
individual interests:
"The social theory of ethics substitutes 'society' for God - and through
it claims that its chief concern is life on Earth, it is not the life of man,
not the life of an individual, but the life of a disembodied entity... the
collective. As far as the individual is concerned, his ethical duty is to be
the selfless, voiceless, rightless slave of any need, claim or demand
asserted by others.,,109
For Rand, surplus - or profit - is the product of individuals, not a class
phenomenon. In a capitalist society no one is coerced to associate with other
individuals if one finds it detrimental to personal interests. This is not to deny
that difficult choices or disagreeable situations cannot be avoided. But
capitalism holds the promise that the products of one's own efforts will not be
expropriated without one's agreement.
In British Conservative Party circles, reaction to Rand's philosophy mirrors an
ideological tension between two prominent post-war factions: traditionalists
(the old Tory right) and the free marketeers (the 'new right'). Traditionalists
who essentially regard Christianity as the moral basis of Western culture view
Rand's notions of self interest, ethical egoism and laissez-faire capitalism as
the highway to hell. These 'witch doctors' treat the free market as a natural
enemy of their worldview. In America, Rand's criticism of altruism and her
praise of capitalism have been considered as part of the anti-religious
message of philosophical materialism and therefore scorned by many
109 Rand, A., The Virtue of Selfishness, op.cit., p. 34.
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sections of the establishment - including some elements of the Conservative
right.
Going further than Rand, but largely based on her neo-Aristotelian natural-law
philosophy, the American anarcho-capitalist Murray Rothbard rejects all forms
of statism. Criticising democracy, he begins by arguing:
"... the identification of the State with society has been redoubled, until
it is common to hear sentiments expressed which violate virtually every
tenet of reason and common sense: such as 'we are the government'.
The useful collective term 'we' has enabled an ideological camouflage
to be thrown over the reality of political life... If 'we are the government,'
then anything a government does to an individual is not only just and
untyranical; it is also 'voluntary' on the part of the individual
concerned ... Under this reasoning, any Jews murdered by the Nazi
government were not murdered; instead, they must have 'committed
suicide', since they were the government (which was democratically
chosen), and therefore anything the government did to them was
voluntary on their part."!'?
In differentiating between politics (the State) and the market, Rothbard draws
upon the work of the German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer:
"[he] pointed out that there are two mutually exclusive ways of
acquiring wealth ... one he called the 'economic means'. The other way
is simpler in that it does not require productivity; it is the way of seizure
of another's goods or services by the use of force and violence. This is
the method of one sided confiscation, of theft of the property of others.
This is the method which Oppenheimer termed 'the political means'
to wealth. It should be clear that the peaceful use of one's reason and
energy in production is the 'natural' path for man: the means for his
survival and prosperity on earth. It should be equally clear that the
110 Rothbard, M. N., 'The Anatomy of the State' in Rampart Journal of Individualist Thought, Vol. I,
No.2, Summer, 1965.
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coercive, exploitative means is contrary to natural law; it is parasitic, for
instead of adding to production, it subtracts from it. The 'political
means' siphons production off to a parasitic and destructive individual
or group; and this siphoning not only subtracts from the number
producing, it also lowers the producer's incentive to produce beyond
his own subsistence. In the long run, the robber destroys his own
subsistence by dwindling or eliminating the source of his own supply.
But not only that; even in the short run, the predator is acting contrary
to his own true nature as a rnan.!"
For Rothbard, states and political systems have never been created by 'social
contract', they are born out of conquest and force. Yet he argues that to retain
power, rulers have to gain the support of a majority of subjects in the long run,
otherwise they run the risk of being out-weighed by the active resistance of
the majority. A state's support need not take the form of active enthusiasm. It
may well amount to passive resignation as if to an inevitable law of nature.
Transposing Marx's dominant ideology thesis, he argues that:
"... the chief task of the [State's] rulers is always to secure the active or
resigned acceptance of the majority of the cltizens."!"
And one method of obtaining it is through the creation of vested interest
groups:
"... the king alone cannot rule; he must have a sizable group of
followers who enjoy the prerequisites of rule, Le., the members of the
state apparatus, such as the full-time bureaucracy of the established
nobility. But this still secures only a minority of earlier supporters...the
majority must be persuaded by ideology that their government is good,
wise, and, at least, inevitable, and certainly better than other
conceivable alternatives. Promoting this ideology among the people is
the vital social task of the 'intellectuals'. For the masses of men do not
III Ibid. See also: Oppenheimer, F., (1926) The State, Vanguard Press, New York, pp. 24-27.
112 Ibid.
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create their own ideas, or indeed think through these ideas
independently; they follow passively the ideas adopted and
disseminated by the body of intellectuals. The intellectuals are
therefore the 'opinion-moulders' in society. And since it is precisely a
moulding of opinion formers that the state almost desperately needs,
the basis for the age-old alliance between the state and the
intellectuals becomes clear.,,113
In Rothbard's For a New Liberty, an 'anarcho-Capitalist manifesto' is
presented. It starts with the view that market economics does not emanate
from the Left or the Right. Because libertarians view conscription as a form of
mass slavery and believe in the individual's absolute right to be 'free' from
aggression, they stand foursquare with the 'civil liberties' left in supporting: the
freedom to speak, publish, assemble and engage in such 'victimless crimes'
as pornography, sexual deviation, and prostitution. On the other hand, since
libertarianism opposes the violation of property rights and emphatically
opposes government interference in the economy, this world view is
inextricably tied to a system of laissez-faire capitalism which is popularly
thought of as right wing.
In terms of political economy, Rothbard is an eclectic, yet coherent and
consistent thinker. He argues for nothing less than one global market, devoid
of states and formal political institutions.
As an anarcho-capitalist he rejects the statist institutions traditionally favoured
by many mainstream and consensual democratic politicians. For him, state
services such as health and education are nothing more than a 'middle class
hoax.!"
113 Ibid.
114 With state education, for example, Rothbard complains: "Part of the reason for this tyranny... is
misplaced altruism on the part of the educated midd~e class. ~e workers, or the 'lo~er classes' ', they
felt should have the opportunity to enjoy the schoolmg the middle classes value so highly. And If the
parents or the children of the masses should be so benighted as to balk at this glorious opportunity set
before them well, then a little coercion must be applied - 'for their own good, of course'." For him,
education is 'a lifelong process of learning that should be organised privately and therefore without state
coercion. See: Rothbard, M. N., (1973) For a New Liberty, The Macmillan Publishing Company, New
York, pp. 132-133.
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One follower of Rothbard and a fellow anarcho-capitalist, Hans-Hermann
Hoppe.!" produced a paper analysing market failure in health systems. It was
called 'A Four-Step Health-Care Solution'. 116 Arguing that the American health
care system is "a mess.!" and that "this demonstrates not market but
government failure",118 he commences by asserting:
"To cure the problem requires not different or more government
regulations and bureaucracies, as self-serving politicians want us to
believe, but the elimination of all existing government controls... It's
time to get serious about health care reform. Tax credits, vouchers,
and privatisation will go a long way towards decentralizing the system
and removing unnecessary burdens from business. But four additional
steps must also be taken."!"
For Hoppe, point one requires the abandonment of state regulatory controls
and market interventions in favour of a purer market driven by reputation and
meaningful competition.
"Eliminate all licensing requirements for medical schools, hospitals,
pharmacies, and medical doctors and other health care personnel.
Their supply would almost instantly increase, prices would fall, and a
greater variety of health care services would appear on the
market. ..Competing voluntary accreditation agencies would take the
place of compulsory government licensing. If health care providers
believe that such accreditation would enhance their own reputation,
lIS For Hoppe's main works see: Hoppe, H., (2002) Democracy: The God That Failed, Transaction,
New Brunswick, New Jersey; Hoppe, H., (1995) Economic Science and the Austrian Method, Ludwig
von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama. Hoppe, H., (1993) The Economics and Ethics of Private
Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. Hoppe,
H., (1989) A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics and Ethics, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Boston. Hoppe, H., (ed) (2002) The Myth of National Defense: Essays in the Theory and
History of Security Production, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama.
116 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, 'A Four-Step Health-Care Solution', The Free Market, April 1993, Volume
11, Number 4, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama.
117 Ibid., p.l.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
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and that their consumers care about reputation, and are willing to pay
for it. Because consumers would no longer be duped into believing that
there is such a thing as a "national standard" of health care, they will
increase their search costs and make more discriminating health care
choices.,,12o
Point two demands that the state completely withdraws from pharmaceuticals
and medical devices.
"Eliminate all government restrictions on the production and sale of
pharmaceutical products and medical devices. This means no more
Food and Drug Administration, which presently hinders innovation and
increases costs...Costs and prices would fall, and a wider variety of
better products would reach the market sooner. The market would
force consumers to act in accordance with their own - rather than the
government's - risk assessment. And competing drug and device
manufacturers and sellers, to safeguard against product liability suits
as much as to attract customers, would provide increasingly better
product descriptions and guarantees.,,121
Hoppe continues with point three which asserts that government should
completely deregulate and open up to real consumer choices the private
medical insurance market.
"Deregulate the health insurance industry. Private enterprise can offer
insurance against events over whose outcome the insured possesses
no control. One cannot insure oneself against suicide or bankruptcy, for
example, because it is in one's own hands to bring these events
about. ..Because a person's health, or lack of it, lies increasingly within
his own control, many, if not most health risks, are actually uninsurable.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
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"Insurance" against risks whose likelihood an individual can
systematically influence falls within that person's own responsibility.,,122
He continues:
"All insurance, moreover, involves the pooling of individual risks. It
implies that insurers pay more to some and less to others. But no one
knows in advance, and with certainty, who the "winners" and "losers"
will be. "Winners" and "losers" are distributed randomly, and the
resulting income redistribution is unsystematic. If "winners" or "losers"
could be systematically predicted, "losers" would not want to pool their
risk with "winners," but with other "losers", because this would lower
their insurance costs. I would not want to pool my personal accident
risks with those of professional football players, for instance, but
exclusively with those people in circumstances similar to my own, at
lower costS.,,123
In attacking the damaging failings of legislative favour in American health
insurance, Hoppe also highlights the distortions that lie behind this most
corporatist and politicised of sectors.
"Because of legal restrictions on the health insurers' right of refusal - to
exclude any individual risk as uninsurable - the present health-
insurance system is only partly concerned with insurance. The industry
cannot discriminate freely among different groups' risks...As a result,
health insurance cover a multitude of uninsurable risks, alongside, and
pooled with, genuine insurance risks. They do not discriminate among
various groups of people which pose significantly different insurance
risks. The industry thus runs a system of income redistribution -
benefiting irresponsible actors and high-risk groups at the expense of
responsible individuals and low risk groups. Accordingly the industry's
prices are high and ballooning. To deregulate the industry means to
122 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
123 Ibid., p.2.
63
restore it to unrestricted freedom of contract: to allow a health insurer
to offer any contract whatsoever, to include or exclude any risk, and to
discriminate among any groups of individuals. Uninsurable risks would
lose coverage, the variety of insurance policies for the remaining
coverage would increase, and price differentials would reflect genuine
insurance risks. On average, prices would drastically fall. And the
reform would restore individual responsibility in health care.,,124
Finally, Hoppe argues for the de-nationalisation of health and welfare funding
in an attempt to guard against the moral hazards associated with government
resources.
"Eliminate all subsidies to the sick or unhealthy. Subsidies create more
of whatever is being subsidized. Subsidies for the ill and disabled
breed illness and disease, and promote carelessness, indigence, and
dependency. If we eliminate them, we would strengthen the will to live
healthy lives and to work for a living. In the first instance, that means
abolishing Medicare and Medicaid.,,125
At the end of Hoppe's analysis and promotion of a real market in medicine
and health care, he asserts that:
"Only these four steps, although drastic, will restore a fully free market
in medical provision. Until they are adopted, the industry will have
. I d '11 't t ,,126senous prob ems, an so WI we, I s cus omers.
For David Friedman, the leading anarcho-capitalist and author of The
Machinery of Freedom,127 goods and services are produced and allocated in
several different ways. In addition to the market there is household production
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 David Friedman, (1978) The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism, Chicago,
Open Court Publishing.
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- which is the way in which children are reared, homes cleaned, clothes
washed, and most meals cooked. There is also political production.!"
While household production represents a substantial fraction of the economy,
and perhaps even of total medical services (for example, parents serving as
nurses for their sick children, grown children taking care of aging parents)
Friedman's work is primarily concerned with the production and allocation on
the market and production and allocation by government. The main question
he tries to answer is whether one form of production should be preferred, and
if so which? In his 'Should Medicine be a Commodity?' Friedman comments:
"Economic efficiency is a strong requirement for the outcome of any
real world system of institutions, since an outcome is efficient only if it
could not be improved by a bureaucrat god - a benevolent despot with
perfect information and unlimited power over individual actions. While it
may be seen as an upper bound on how well an economic system can
work, one might think that using that bound to judge real systems is as
appropriate as judging race cars by their ability to achieve their upper
bound - the speed of light".129
For him, it is one thing to show that there is something government could do
that would improve on the outcome of the unregulated market and another
entirely different and much more difficult matter to show that what government
would actually achieve given the power would improve on that outcome:
"That would require a theory of governmental behaviour comparable in
power and precision to the theory of market behaviour from which the
original efficiency theorem, and the inefficiencies due to failures of its
assumptions, were derived. No widely accepted theory of that sort
exists, and much of the large and growing literature that attempts to
128 Friedman speculates that it is even not clear that the market represents a larger part of the total
economy than alternative ways. .. .,..
129 David Friedman, 'Should Medicine be a Commodity? pubhshed on-hne at:
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Medicine_Commodity/Medicine_Commodity.htmISee
page 7.
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produce such a theory seems to suggest that government intervention
is more likely to worsen than to improve market outcomes.t"
He suggests that the best analysis available is 'public choice' - or the
economics of the political market. Public choice theory attempts to analyse
the political system by using the same approach by which ordinary economics
analyses the private market.
Crucially, public choice theory applies the techniques of economic analysis -
monopoly, competition, information costs - to political and bureaucratic
behaviour. It drops the traditional assumption that politicians and bureaucrats
try to serve only 'the public interest' and more realistically assumes that, as
elsewhere, they try to serve their own interests by re-election and empire-
building. The vote motive in politics is akin to the profit motive in lndustry.l"
For Friedman, the important question however is not whether the political
market works under conditions of zero transaction costs and perfect
information - under those assumptions the private market is also perfectly
efficient. The really interesting question is how badly each system breaks
down when the assumptions are relaxed?
Countering the claim that "health is too important to be left to the market,,132
he retorts:
"My response would be that the market is, generally speaking, the best
set of institutions we know of for producing and distributing things. The
more important the good is, the stronger the argument for having it
produced by the market.
"Both barbers and physicians are licensed; both professions
have for decades used licensing to keep their numbers down and their
130 Ibid. p.8. ., .
131 Gordon Tullock, (1976) The Vote Motive, London, Institute of Economic Affairs. James Buchanan
(1978) 'The Development of Public Choice', in The Economics of Politics, London, Institute of
Economic Affairs. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) The Calculus of Consent, University
of Michigan Press.
132 David Friedman, 'Should Medicine be a Commodity?', op.cit., p.42.
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salaries up. Government regulation of barbers makes haircuts more
expensive; one result, presumably, is that we have fewer haircuts and
longer hair. Government regulation of physicians makes medical care
more expensive; one result, presumably, is that we have less medical
care and shorter lives. Given the choice of deregulating one profession
or the other, I would choose the physicians.,,133
In Britain, Friedman's perspective IS echoed in the writings of Brian
Micklethwait mentioned in Chapter I. Like Friedman, Micklethwait describes
himself as an anarcho-capltanst!"
However, whereas in Britain mainstream health economists have traditionally
emphasised the particular - unique - nature of health care, arguing that
market failure is a real and unavoidable concern to be checked by
government, Micklethwait comments:
"Medicine is often described as special, and it is special. But so are all
businesses. Every kind of business has its own unique features which
make it unlike any other business. But that doesn't mean that it should
not be a business and should instead get special help from the
government. The world is full of interest groups who claim that they
should get special treatment - car producers, coal minors, lawyers
etc.135
Perhaps the most widely read free market health policy expert in Britain is Dr.
David Green. Formerly the head of the Institute of Economic Affair's Health
and Welfare Unit and now the Director of the London based think tank Civitas,
he has long championed the debunking of three types of market failure in
modern health economics.
133 Ibid.
134 Brian Micklethwait, (1992) Why I Call Myself a Free Market Anarchist and Why I Am One,
Political Notes No.67., London, Libertarian Alliance.
135 Brian Micklethwait in conversation with the author in 2005.
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Green argues that professional monopoly power is not inherent in health care,
but arises because governments either actively or passively accept it.
Professional bodies can exert considerable control when they are granted
legislative favour by statute and on behalf of the political class.
Concerning notions of consumer ignorance, Green argues that there is an
asymmetry of knowledge in any market where people are paying for the
expertise of others - for example, lawyers, mechanics and accountants. But
he points out that this does not necessarily preclude the operation of a viable
and sustainable market. Instead, he argues that much of the uncertainty faced
in health care - particularly in terms of outcomes - exists for clinicians as
much for patients. He also observes that consumer ignorance may - in major
measure - be due to the highly restrictive practices of health professionals
particularly when it comes to health information, advertising and sharing
knowledge with patients on issues of access to alternative options.
Concerning the issue of moral hazard, Green points out that in Britain health
care is in large measure provided by the public sector and therefore heavily
subsidised by the taxpayer. The public sector patient is therefore in the same
position as an insured private patient to the extent that payment at the point of
service understates the true cost of supplying the service. For Green, this
reality means that inflated demand will occur in either sector and that
therefore problems of moral hazard inevitably arise in both state and market
systems.
The idea however that government is in some way a superior agent, over and
above a spontaneous and free market, is increasingly being rejected. For
Green, Mises, Hayek, Rand, Rothbard, Hoppe, Friedman, and Micklethwait
the very idea of market failure is itself dubious for it imputes upon the market
a status of 'absolute perfectionism' that its defenders would never want to
claim.
To these writers, health economics can never be addressed in such fixed and
absolutist terms as 'failure' or 'success'. Instead, they believe the market is
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better and more accurately viewed as a superior process of discovery and of
trial and error.
For Friedman the notion of market failure in health economics and its
popularity with most opinion formers has arisen because most people:
"... interpret the problem in terms of fairness rather than efficiency. ,,136
Commenting on those people who - often unconsciously - adhere to
commonly held notions of market failure in health, he asserts:
"...they may be making the error of judging a system by the
comparison between its outcome and the best outcome that can be
described, rather than judging it by a comparison between its outcome
and the outcome that would actually be produced by the best
alternative system available. If, as seems likely, all possible sets of
institutions fall short of producing perfect outcomes, then a policy of
comparing observed outcomes to ideal ones will reject any existing
system."!"
In examining the psychology of the health policy debate and the negativity
that many people impute upon the market, Friedman concludes that exactly
the same concerns can be expressed when it comes to government
intervention.
"It is easy, and satisfying, to pick some unattractive outcome - a poor
man, actual or imaginary, turned away from the expensive private
hospital that could have cured his disease - and describe it as
"intolerable," "unacceptable," or some similar epithet designed to
prevent further discussion. This is, however, a game that any number
can play. It is equally easy... .for the defender of the market to orate
about the hundred thousand people who died of heart attacks because
136 David Friedman, 'Should Medicine be a Commodity'?, op.cit., p.42.
137 Ibid.
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the FDA refused to permit American physicians to prescribe beta
blockers to American patients. In a large and complicated society, it is
likely that any system for producing and allocating medical care - or
doing anything else difficult and important - will sometimes produce
outcomes that can plausibly be labelled as intolerable. ,,138
Warning against the political and economic psychology of market failure,
Friedman powerfully concludes:
"The question we should ask, and try to answer, is not what outcome
would be ideal but what outcome we can expect from each of various
alternative sets of institutions, and which, from that limited set of
alternatives, we prefer... My conclusion is that there is no good reason
to expect government involvement in the medical market, either the
extensive involvement that now exists or the still more extensive
involvement that many advocated, to produce desirable results.,,139
Notions of Market Failure in Today's NHS Debate
It was John Maynard Keynes who argued that politicians essentially follow in
the wake of intellectuals and academic pbilosophers."? In this context, it is
perhaps interesting to note a speech the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Gordon Brown, gave to the London based think tank, the Social Market
Foundation, in early February 2003.141
In it he argued that while the government should increasingly embrace the
free market to build a strong economy and a fairer society, healthcare had to
remain publicly funded and publicly provided.
138 Ibid., p.43.
139 Ibid.
140 John Maynard Keynes famously wrote: "The ideas of econom~sts and polit.ical philosophers ...a:e
more powerful than is co~monly.underst~o.d .. Indee~, the world IS ruled by \ttt.le els.e. Madmen In
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Breaking with traditional labour movement thinking to embrace the benefits of
a dynamic market economy, the Chancellor began:
"Instead of being suspicious of competition, we should embrace it,
recognising that without it vested interests accumulate.... Instead of
being lukewarm about free trade, free trade not protectionism is
essential to opportunity and security for all and instead of the old
protectionism we advocate open markets. Instead of being suspicious
of enterprise and entrepreneurs, we should celebrate the
entrepreneurial culture - encouraging, incentivising and rewarding the
dynamic and enthusing more people from all backgrounds and all
areas to start up businesses - here again enabling markets to work
better and strengthening the private economy. Instead of thinking the
state must take over responsibility where markets deliver insufficient
investment and short termisim in innovation, skills and environmental
protection we must enable markets to work better and for the longer
term.... Instead of the old centralisation that characterised industrial
policy - promoting 'national champions' or 'picking winners' or offering
subsidies to loss makers - our industrial policy should reject special
privileges for anyone.... lnstead of extending regulation unnecessarily
to restrict the scope of markets, we should systematically pinpoint
services where regulation does not serve the public interest."142
However, it was not long before Brown made it clear that there was a limit to
his enthusiasm for free markets. He declared that healthcare should not be
treated as a "commodity bought and sold like any other". 143
Arguing that 'essential public services' such as the NHS must remain under
the purview of the state he warned that if the market were ever allowed to
intervene Labour would be:
"... unable to deliver a Britain of opportunity and security for all". 144
142 Daily Mail, 'Brown goes for the free market (but not in the NHS)' 4 February 2003, p.2.
143 Ibid.
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Indeed, it was the passion of his resistance to free market reforms in the NHS
that stood out from this important speech.
Crucially, he argued that the government's promotion of markets must be
combined with a "clear and robust" recognition of their limits. And he
highlighted the provision of healthcare as being a primary sector where
market forces should not be allowed to operate. He asserted:
"In healthcare we know that the consumer is not sovereign: use of
healthcare is unpredictable and can never be planned by the consumer
in the way that, for example, weekly food consumption can. With the
consumer unable, as in a conventional market, to seek out the best
product at the lowest price, the results of a market failure for the patient
can be long-term and catastrophic and irreversible.,,145
He went on to conclude:
"If we were to go down the road of introducing markets wholesale into
our healthcare, we would be paying a very heavy price in efficiency and
equity and be unable to deliver a Britain of opportunity and security for
all.,,146
In Britain this speech, more than any other of recent times, serves to highlight
the popularity of market failure as a fundamental notion deeply embedded in
the contemporary healthcare and NHS debate. More than any other speech it
exposed for all to see the presumptions and biases of major swathes of the
political and intellectual class.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
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For the story of the development of notions of market failure in healthcare can
be viewed as the establishment of highly restrictive, artificial and ultimately
counter-productive boundaries on discourse and debate.
Whilst Tom Paine and Adam Smith might be shocked to learn that their
advocacy of state interventionism in education has contributed, in the context
of the history of ideas, to the legitimation of unprecedented interventionism in
healthcare, the record suggests this to be so.
When it comes to the history of British health care and the NHS, expanded
and popular notions of market failure have come to dominate popular mindset
and opinion.
Although there is now some evidence to suggest that ideas of 'government
failure' are on the ascendant - and might themselves come to triumph in the
future healthcare debate - there is clearly a long way to go.
As the historical record of British healthcare, both before the NHS and since
its inception suggests, the idea of the development of a real market in
healthcare seems a distant - almost utopian - notion itself.
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CHAPTER III
THE HISTORY, GROWTH AND EXPERIENCE OF
BRITISH HEALTHCARE BEFORE THE NHS
This chapter examines the history, growth and experience of British
healthcare prior to the creation of the National Health Service. Away from
modern notions of market failure and government intervention, it introduces a
much wider history of British healthcare. In beginning to test today's popular
and widely held notions of market failure, a wide range of historic evidence
and literature is reviewed.
The chapter argues that since Roman times, political elites in Britain have
always sought to plan, control and regulate the provision of health services.
Through the military, the church, the Royal Colleges, Parliament, and the
granting of professional legislative favour in the name of the 'public good', the
state has progressively and systematically encroached on every area and
facet of healthcare.
Bringing us up to date with the modern world and the inception of the NHS, it
argues that by the early 1940s the context in which nationalisation would
occur had become compelling and seemingly inevitable.
Tracing the early roots of British healthcare
In the prehistory of the British Isles, healthcare was mainly delivered by
various types of shaman or medicine men who were believed to possess
supernatural powers. Although there is some evidence that people in
prehistoric society were capable of treating minor injuries, such as broken
bones, it is also clear that their knowledge of health was extremely primitive.
Across the prehistoric and ancient worlds, the idea that gods and sprits
caused and cured disease was omnipresent. Unable to explain disease
74
rationally, through observation and experimentation, people instead chose to
invoke gods, demons and spirits in their popular beliefs.'
In many forms of medicine at this time, the power of healing was believed to
rest with the supernatural powers of the medicine man, who in turn was
believed to communicate with the spirit world through trance. Just as the
cause of most disease was therefore seen in explicitly supernatural terms, so
was its treatment. As a result, priests and temples eventually came to provide
the first doctors and hospltats,? and much of their work involved the
appeasement of the gods through prayer, sacrifice and spells.
Around 400BC, as Greek civilisation developed, notable scientists,
mathematicians and writers began to make their mark on the progress of
healthcare." Destined to have a profound impact on medicine throughout the
British Isles, the most important of these Greek thinkers was Hippocrates.
Even to this day he is still popularly referred to as the 'father of modern
medicine' .4
Hippocrates and his followers are important because they wrote more than
sixty medical books and they refused to accept a supernatural view of illness.
Instead, they used a secular rationality that stressed observation, diagnosis
and treatment.
Hippocrates pioneered a theory which asserted that the human body
contained four 'humours': black bile, yellow bile, phlegm and blood. He
believed that people became ill when one or more of these humours were out
of balance and frequently recommended fresh air, exercise and a sound diet
as a core part of treatment.5
I John Cule and Roy Porter (2000) The Timetables of Medicine: An Illustrated Chronology of the
History of Medicine from Prehistory to Present Times, New York,_Blackdog and Leventhal Publishers
Ltd; Roy Porter (ed) (1996) The Cambridge Illustrated History of Medicine, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
2 Cule and Porter, Ibid.
3 Irvine Loudon, (1997) Western Medicine: An Illustrated History, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
4 Herbert Sam Goldbery (1963) Hippocrates, Father of Medicine, London, Watts
s Ibid.
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His most important contribution to the development of medicine however was
his insistence that his students followed a strict code of ethics when they
became doctors. As such, they were made to swear an oath under which they
agreed to ensure patient confidentiality and welfare at all times. Even to this
day, doctors entering the medical profession in Britain still swear the
Hippocratic Oath and as such publicly assert:
"I swear by Apollo the physician and Aesculapius, and Health, and AII-
heal, and all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability
and judgment, I will keep this Oath and this stipulation to reckon him
who taught me this Art equally dear to me as my parents, to share my
substance with him, and relieve his necessities if required; to look upon
his offspring in the same footing as my own brothers, and to teach
them this art, if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or stipulation; and
that by precept, lecture, and every other mode of instruction.
"I will impart a knowledge of the Art to my own sons, and those
of my teachers, and to disciples bound by a stipulation and oath
according to the law of medicine, but to none others. I will follow that
system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgement, I
consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is
deleterious and mischievous.
"I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest
any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a
pessary to produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I will pass
my life and practice my Art. I will not cut persons labouring under the
stone, but will leave this to be done by men who are practitioners of
this work. Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the
benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief
and corruption; and, further, from the seduction of females or males, of
freemen and slaves. Whatever, in connection with my professional
service, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men,
which ought not to be spoken of abroad,
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"I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept
secret. While I continue to keep this Oath unviolated, may it be granted
to me to enjoy life and the practice of the art, respected by all men, in
all times. But should I trespass and violate this Oath, may the reverse
be my lot.116
The conjuncture of professional reputation and patient privacy has provided a
powerful ethical guide to the practice of medicine down through the ages -
although today there is increasing evidence to suggest that politicians and the
state are actively seeking to undermine this most sacred of healthcare
tradltlons.'
In Britain, it was the Romans who encouraged the dissemination of Greek
thinking in healthcare and who constructed the first public network of doctors."
Reliant on soldiers to maintain order, build roads and to construct settlements,
Rome's political elite understood that healthcare was a vital element in the
maintenance of political power and statecraft. Each Roman military fort in
Britain had its own medical staff - and sophisticated and sizeable hospitals
were built the length and breadth of the country."
However, with the decline of Rome, superstition and religion once again re-
emerged to dominate many aspects of public life and thinking. By the middle
ages, the Christian church was encouraging the - altruistic - view that it was
the duty of all believers to help the sick and needy, and it therefore
established a network of monasteries which also acted as hospitals.
6 For more on the full text see: http://www.crystalinks.com/gkmedicine.html
7 Tim Evans and Helen Evans (2001) Big Mother's Deadly New World: How the Government is Going
to Destroy Patitent's Health Records and Kill People, Legal Notes No.36, London, Libertarian
Alliance.
8 Lesley Adkins and Roy A. Adkins, (ed) (1994) Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome, New York,
Oxford University Press. Karl Christ, (1984) The Romans, translation by Christopher Holme. Los
Angeles, University of California Press. (1970) The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd Edition, Oxford,
Clarendon Press.
9 See 'Roman army hospitals' at:
http://www.bbc.co.ukleducationlmedicine/nonint/prehistfhtlprhtcs I.shtml
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Whilst most methods of treating disease remained limited, by 1200 the
training of doctors had become formally established. Across the church-
controlled universities of Britain and Western Europe, the work of Claudius
Galen10 was being translated from Greek to Arabic and then to Latin.
Galen's (c. AD129-216) work is important because it is indicative of an
underlying desire to view medicine through scientific inquiry. Influenced by the
work of Hippocrates, Galen discovered that blood moved in the body
(although he did not know it circulated) and that a patient's pulse could assist
diagnosis.
Nevertheless, throughout the middle ages the Christian church resisted any
fundamental degree of scientific explanation or inquiry in healthcare.
Dissection, for example, was forbidden until the fourteenth century and even
then was only allowed with the express permission of the establishment."
Away from science, the church promoted the idea that god and the devil had
direct control over people's health. Frightening epidemics such as the plague
or the death of a child were said to be god's punishment for 'sin'. Similarly,
disease was popularly believed to be a trial sent by God to cure people of
their 'pride'.
Throughout the middle ages, many doctors became increasingly convinced
that the movement of the planets directly affected people's health. At one
point, astrology became so popular it formed part of doctors' training and
when the Black Death struck in 1348, many believed it had been caused by
the position of the three planets: Saturn, Jupiter and Mars."
10 Jeanne Bendick (2002) Galen and the Gateway to Medicine, New York, Living History Library,
Bethlehem Books.
11 See: http://www.inftdels.orgllibrary/historicallandrewwhite/Chapter13.html
12 The Black Death of 1348-50 arrived on a ship that docked at the port of Melcombe in Dorset. On
this ship were flea-infested black rats th?t carried a ~isease that was to w.ipe ~ut almost a third of the
population of the British Isles. The episode also triggered repeated epidemics over the next three
hundred years.
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Whilst it was inevitable that such a devastating disease was bound to have a
significant impact on medieval society, above all else, the episode serves to
highlight the dominant religiosity of the age. This is an excerpt from the text of
a letter from the Prior of the Abbey of Christchurch, Canterbury, to the Bishop
of London dated 28th September 1348:
"God often allows plagues, miserable famines, wars and other forms of
suffering to arise, and uses them to terrify and torment men and so
drive out their sins. And thus the realm of England, because of the
growing pride and corruption of its subjects and their numberless sins
is to be punished by pestilence.v"
Most Christians during the middle ages believed that the Black Death was a
punishment from God for their sins. They believed that mercy would be given
if they could show god how sorry they were for their behaviour and by way of
self-punishment many indulged in flagellation. Robert of Avesbury was an
eyewitness to such an event. The following account relates to an incident he
witnessed in London in 1349:
"Over 600 men came to London from Flanders, Belgium. They made
two public appearances wearing [stockings] from the thigh to the ankle,
but otherwise stripped bare. Each wore a red cap with a red cross
[painted on it]. Each had in his right hand a scourge [whip] with three
tails, sometimes with sharp nails fixed in them. They marched naked in
a file and whipped themselves on their naked and bleeding bodies.
They would sing hymns and chant prayers as they hit themselves."!"
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries physicians were usually university
graduates and had a strong place in the church. The medieval church did not
approve of the shedding of blood and gave no encouragement to surgery. As
13 See: http://www.bbc.co.ukleducation/medicine/nonintlmiddle/dtlmadtcsl.shtml
14 Robert of Avesbury (1340) De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi Tertii, edited by Edward Maunde
Thompson, London, Rolls Series 1889orignial in Latin. Also see:
http://www.bbc.co.ukleducationlmedicine/nonintlmiddle/am/maamcs2.shtml
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a result, the practice of surgery evolved separately from that described as
'physic'.
There was also licensing by the Church. Legislation in 1421 provided that
physicians must be approved by universities and surgeons by guilds.15 Again,
in 1511 an Act required the examination of physicians and surgeons and
forbade practice by unlicensed persons."
From the late fifteenth century onwards a Renaissance or re-birth of interest in
science slowly spread from Italy, across Europe, to Britain. A re-discovery of
ancient Greek and Roman texts was combined with a new, more rigorous,
approach to the study of science. However, as medicine became more
rational and formalised, so its custodians sought to enhance their position in
society. This meant they frequently attempted to use the full authority of the
state to impose a uniformity of standards on training and qualification - as well
as to use other barriers to market entry.17
In Britain, advances in scientific and medical thinking fuelled the political
establishment's desire to control what as fast becoming a powerful and
influential range of disciplines.
With the invention of the printing press, detailed anatomical drawings were
being faithfully and economically published and reproduced. For the first time,
artists such as Leonardo da Vinci could accurately record their observations,
further underpinning and disseminating the scientific method of
experimentation .18
IS See: 'History of the Medical Profession' in Of Germs, Genes and Genocide, (1989) London, United
Kingdom Council on Human Rights, p.16.
16 Ibid.
17 Penelope J. Corfield, (2000) Power and the Professions, London, Routledge. Also see: David Green,
(1985) Which Doctor?: A Critical Analysis of the Professional Barriers to Competition in Health Care,
Research Monographs 40, London, Institute of Economic Affairs.
18 Joanne Snow-Smith, 'Leonardo da Vinci and Printed Ancient Medical Texts: History and Influence',
Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, Winter 2004, pp2-15.
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Throughout the sixteenth century, the scientific method spread and by its end
dominated medical thinking. Instead of explaining events and diseases by
invoking the supernatural, medical practitioners now began to rely on
empirical observation and the development of testable hypotheses.
As medical knowledge expanded, so its practitioners underwent an ever
increasing division of labour. This meant that by the end of the middle ages,
and the beginning of the renaissance, most surgery in Britain was performed
by a clearly identifiable group of specialists known as 'barber-surgeons'.
At the time, doctors were more expensive than barber-surgeons. Indeed,
doctors considered surgery to be a menial and inferior task. Home-grown self-
help surgery was largely precluded, due to a simple scarcity of sharp
instruments in everyday life.
In their everyday work, barber-surgeons used razors to cut people's hair and
shave beards. However, they also used these instruments to perform
operations such as the extraction of teeth, the lancing of boils, the letting of
blood and the setting of fractures. Unlike doctors however, they usually had
no formal institutional training and only dealt only with external - and more
superficial - problems.
To rectify this situation and to improve their market position, the Company of
Barber-Surgeons was created in 1540.19 It soon attempted to standardise
training and treatments - and thereby improve their professional status.
Nevertheless, people who could afford the best medical treatment in England
during the sixteenth century avoided these 'traders'. Instead, they went to a
member of the Royal College of Physicians, which had been established in
1518.20
19 Harold Ellis (2002) History of Surgery, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
20 Ibid.
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An Act in 1522 granted a monopoly on the practice of physic to those
examined and approved by the Royal College - or alternatively by the
Universities of Oxford and Oarnbridqe."
The man behind the Royal College of Physicians was Thomas Linacre. He
had been one of the few English doctors to travel abroad during this period
and had trained in the famous Italian medical centre at Padua - where he
eventually became the professor of anatomy.
When Linacre returned to England he became one of Henry VIII's physicians,
and it was then that he used his position to obtain a Royal Charter to establish
the Royal College. Following the continental model, it was partly a learned
academy and partly a guild.
Backed by the full - monopoly - authority of the English state, the college was
soon able to specify the qualifications that were required for someone to
practise as a physician and therefore what it meant to be one. From this point
on, to be a physician in London meant that you had to obtain a license from
the college. Indeed, it was not long before this statutory demand was
extended to cover physicians across the whole of the country.
In renaissance England, there were essentially three types of medical
practitioner: physicians, surgeons and apothecaries. Of these, it was the
physicians who used the full force of the state to underpin their market
position. Through the monopoly power of legislative favour, physicians were
empowered to impose a uniformity of rules and therefore to act explicitly in
their own self-interest.
Legislative favour enabled barriers of entry to be erected and soon the college
was insisting that their members undergo a rigorous training at university for
nothing less than fourteen years. While there was no ultimate guarantee that a
21 United Kingdom Council on Human Rights, op.cit, p.16.
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patient would receive any better treatment from a physician, the college spent
a great deal of time trying to discredit its competitors and non-members.
Despite an abundance of evidence that its own recommended treatments
were highly ineffective - more often than not, based on the ancient theory of
the four humours and blood letting - it is now clear that they frequently
exacerbated their patients' symptoms."
Indeed, at the time, their reputation was such that many believed that safer,
more effective treatments would be given by a 'wise woman'." Nicknames _
such as 'Dr. Slop' and 'Dr. Smell-fungus' - suggest a world that held them in
low esteem. In 1665, when the Plague broke out in London, the Royal College
of Physicians actually fled London - further undermining their reputation.
Commenting on the inauspicious early history of the College, Dr David Green
has noted:
"For many years the Royal College of Physicians did much to advance
medical knowledge, but by the end of the seventeenth century it had
lost its commitment to medical advance, and its affairs were being
conducted purely in the interests of its members.t"
He continues:
"By the late seventeenth century both the Royal College of Physicians
and the Barber-Surgeon Company were tending to act in a purely
selfish spirit. The great mass of people had no alternative but to turn to
the apothecaries. ,,25
22 For more on this see: http://www.bbc.co.ukleducation/medicine/nonint/renaiss/ht/rehtcs2.shtiml
23 Ibid. .. . If hi' B' .
24 David Green, (1985) Working Class PatIents and the .M~dlcal EstablIshment: Se - e p m ntam
from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1948, Gower Publishing, p.34
25 Ibid.
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In the seventeenth century, Charles II attempted to further encourage medical
advancement by granting a charter to the Royal Society in 1661. It soon
became the centre of scientific activity in London and oversaw an energetic
programme of meetings and publications. However, during this period,
medicine became even more restrictive. As the state's monopoly power
adapted to encompass ever more advances, so its leaders endeavoured to
legitimate ever greater political power.
In the world of the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
people increasingly turned to 'quack doctors' as the formal medical
professions became ever more regulated and therefore expensive. Quacks
were popular because, rather like the medical professionals of the day, they
too had little idea of what actually caused disease or constituted an effective
treatment. In a world that did not yet understand the need for hygiene, people
frequently died from surgery and treatment irrespective of who was providing
it or the length of the training they had received.
The word 'quack' comes from 'quacksalver', which means someone who sells
salves and other healing remedies by fast-talking patter or 'quacking'. Many
were not doctors in the eyes of statute but were instead travelling salesmen
who went from one village to another. In this world there were so many
different ideas about what caused illness that it was difficult to discredit
quacks and any other purveyor of poor practice.
It was finally the arrival of apothecaries that enabled people to access better
advice and to obtain more effective medical remedies. Quackery was finally
weakened when a market in apothecaries spread across the country and most
people could therefore gain access to better information on health and
medicines in their own communities. Arguably, chemist shops and the arrival
of the pharmaceutical industry did more to undermine the bad practice of
charlatans than any form of statute or monopoly regulation.26
26 Ibid.
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Throughout the latter stages of the nineteenth century scientific knowledge
continued to advance. As the commercial drugs industry sold scientifically
proven remedies to customers, so it thrived.
Ultimately, it was the conjuncture of scientific progress and market
competition that eroded many of the worst aspects of quackery. However,
knowledge, like any tradable commodity or service, is a process of discovery
and refinement." As such, there have been many dead-ends that people
have travelled down in the history of modern medicine.
For example, the Italian inventor, Luigi Galvani (1737-1798) discovered
'animal electricity'. He discovered that when an electrical charge was passed
through an animal's nerves its muscles twitched. Following this, the invention
of the electric battery in 1800 by Alessandro Volta brought about a whole
variety of popular medical treatments which used electricity. At the time, many
people believed that a powerful and 'invisible force' was at hand and that if
only it could be harnessed it would contain miraculous medicinal properties.
Whilst electricity can certainly have a beneficial effect in stimulating the heart
and pulse rate, early machines were accepted without any evidence of
producing positive results. Indeed, up until recent years, electrical shock
treatment has been used on many mentally ill patients. Whilst it helped to
produce some short-term relief, its longer term consequences seemed
negligible, and doctors had little understanding of what it actually did to the
brain.28
Whilst many developments in medicine come about as a result of professional
research, history also demonstrates that progress often comes from people
outside the established institutional arrangements.
27 Hayek, F. A., (1952) The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the abuse of reason, Glencoe,
Illinois, The Free Press.
28 Peter Breggin, (1991) Toxic Psychiatry, Why Therapy, Empathy and Love Must Replace the Dru~s,
Electroshock, and Biochemical Theories of the 'New Psychiatry', New York, New York, St. Martins
Press.
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In Britain, the main pioneer of inoculation for example was Lady Mary Wortley
Montague. She had no formal medical training and was instead the wife of the
British Ambassador Extraordinary to the Turkish court. She first saw
inoculation being successfully used in Istanbul and upon her return to England
campaigned for its practice to be adopted. A leading member of London high
society, she was able to gradually persuade friends - some of whom were
doctors - of the merits of the process. Whilst she was not perhaps a major
pioneer in medicine, her example nevertheless serves to underline the point
that progress can often come from unexpected quarters.
The first significant step in the fight against infectious disease came in 1796
with the discovery of a vaccine to prevent smallpox. Edward Jenner
discovered that milkmaids who had suffered from a mild illness known as
cowpox never went on to catch the more serious disease smallpox. To prove
the point he experimented on a child by introducing cowpox into its
bloodstream. Then, on exposure to the more virulent smallpox the child failed
to catch the disease."
Throughout all of this Jenner suffered systematic opposition from the
established medical profession." Protected by Royal Charters and barriers to
entry, most doctors were able to ignore his ideas and to continue to make
good incomes from more established practices of the age.
Similarly, Humphrey Davy in 1799 discovered that the gas nitrous oxide
(laughing gas) could dull pain and therefore make operations more
comfortable for people." He published a pamphlet to spread the word but to
his astonishment found that most surgeons elected simply to ignore his
findings.
29 Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and Malcolm Jack (ed.) (1993), Turkish Embassy ~etters, University
of Georgia Press; Cynthia Lowenthal, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1994) The Eighteenth-Century
Familiar Letter University of Georgia Press.
30 'Edward Jen~er' Microsoft (R) Encarta. Copyright (c) 1994 Microsoft Corporation.
31 David Abbot, (1983) Biographical Dictionary of Scientists - Chemists, New York, New York, Peter
Bedrick Books, pp. 35-36.
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It was only after a Massachusetts dentist, William Thomas Green Morton,32
painlessly removed a tumour from a man's neck after giving him ether in 1846
and after James Simpson." the professor of midwifery at Edinburgh
University, discovered chloroform in 1847, that the profession eventually
shifted their position.
Today, it is often said that British healthcare was organised according to
laissez-faire principles between 1830 and 1880. It is similarly held that as the
industrial revolution made its mark on society so medicine became an open,
market-led, process in which the principles of the anarchic market
dominated."
However, in reality, nothing could be further from the truth. Not only was the
medical profession seeking ever greater legislative favour from government
but the state was itself intervening in ever more areas of medical activity.
Power, Politics and Legislative Favour in the Nineteenth Century
More than in any other previous century, the nineteenth century witnessed an
accommodation between the interests of the state and the professions.
Essentially a self-reinforcing and mutually beneficial arrangement, the fact is,
as Wilding has observed:
"Professionals depend for their development on state action, whether
that action be the organisation of services, the provision of finance or
the creation of professional monopolies. Equally, the state needs
32 Grace Steele Woodward (1962) The Man Who Conquered Pain, a Biography of William Thomas,
Boston, Beacon Press.
33 Mander, R., (1998) A reappraisal of Simpson's Introduction of Chloroform, Department of Nursing
Studies, Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh.
34 E. J. Evans, (2003) The Forging of the Modem State: Early Industrial Britain, 1783-1870, London,
Longman; N. McCord, (1991) British History 1815-1906, Oxford, Oxford University Press; H. Perkin,
(1969) The Origins of Modem English Society 1780-1880, London, Routledge; A. Clayre (ed) (1977)
Nature and Industrialization, Oxford, Oxford University Press; J.M. Golby (ed.) (1988) Culture and
Society in Britain 1850-1890: A Source Book of Contemporary Writings, Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
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professionals to fulfil the responsibilities which modern governments
assume, to legitimate state power, to make available expertise....The
state and the professions need each other, their functions and powers
have grown side by side in an alliance at times firm and precarious,
explicit and implicit."35
In Britain, the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association (PMSA) was
founded in 1832 and later became the British Medical Association in 1855.36
The first organisation to bear the name 'British Medical Association' (BMA)
was a rival to the PMSA. The original BMA became defunct within a few years
of its foundation, but in the 1830s it was a major rival of the PMSA.
One of the earliest targets of the organised medical profession was the Poor
Law. After its reform in 1834 the general feeling among the Poor Law's
overseers was that it, and its attendant medical service, had been wastefully
administered. This in turn led to considerable tightening up of the system, to
which doctors took exception."
In response, the organised medical profession's campaign was led by the
original BMA which had two main objections to the new Poor Law.38 The first
was the introduction of tendering for Poor Law medical posts. The second was
the Poor Law commissioners' plan to establish independent medical clubs for
non-paupers.
Throughout the latter stages of the eighteenth and the early stages of the
nineteenth centuries an increasingly rich and diverse tapestry of institutional
arrangements developed to provide ordinary people with medical services.
They included works clubs, provident dispensaries, medical aid companies,
doctor's clubs, and friendly societies."
3S Paul Wilding (1982) Professional Power and Social Welfare, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
E· 112.
6 David Green, op.cit, p. 14.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., pp. 8-14.
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Each type of contract practice was based on the principle of the flat-rate
annual contribution, usually payable quarterly, but sometimes weekly or
fortnightly, entitling the contributor to any number of consultations during the
period covered. Some practices - or clubs - were based at factories while
others were organised by charities. Some were run on overtly commercial
lines, some by individual doctors, some by local associations of doctors and
some by trade union mutuals.
However, a scale of annual capitation fees was proposed in the Poor Law
Report of 1836 which substantial elements of the organised medical
profession found unacceptable: 3s per single person; 4s per man and wife; 6d
per child under sixteen.
The plans were implemented in some areas amidst professional outcry and in
many others the BMA persuaded the proponents of the medical clubs to
desist. As David Green has noted:
"One of the earliest professional objections to independent medical
clubs appeared in April 1837. In a leading article the Lancet opposed a
semi-charitable 'penny club' in the Cricklade and Wootton Bassett Poor
Law union. And in July the Lancet attacked the penny clubs and self
supporting dispensaries then being promoted by Mr. H. L. Smith of
Southam. These were objections to the semi-charitable clubs managed
on behalf of the poor by the well-to-do, and usually by clergymen.
Some doctors also objected to the self-managed friendly society
schemes. In 1839, for instance, the Leeds Oddfellows were in dispute
with their lodge surgeons, who felt that 2s 6d per year was too low. The
Oddfellows responded to the doctors' demands by advertising in
London for replacements. Sometimes doctors tried to boycott contract
practice altogether. In 1844 in Sunderland there were about sixty clubs
with 4,500 members, some paying 2s a year, others 3s. In a pattern
which was often to be repeated, thirty-five local GPs joined together to
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try and ban contract practice. They only needed two or more
colleagues to make the ban effective. But they failed.,J40
In the 1840s and 1850s the organised medical profession not only became
increasingly opposed to such clubs but they sought "considerable and
immediate reform"." They had two main objections. First, they thought the
clubs encouraged low pay. Secondly, they wanted to stop them from admitting
people who they thought could afford higher fees. On this latter point, doctors
sought to exclude the wealthy by imposing an income limit in their rules." In
1845 one correspondent to the Lancet complained that "well-nigh every
general practitioner is either immediately or indirectly affected" by the medical
clubs." As David Green asserts:
"The chief complaint of the doctors was that they were under-paid. In
the 1840s competition was often vigorous and blamed on the
overcrowded state of the profession. In Cheltenham in 1848, for
instance, one doctor undercut another by nearly 30 per cent, offering to
serve a club for 2s 6d per head per year instead of 3s 6d. The BMA put
the blame for competition, not on the younger doctor starting out, but
on the well-established and wealthy practitioner with a good income
who took on assistants to do the club work for a comparative
pittance.,,44
Throughout the 1850s strong competition continued between members of the
Society of Apothecaries, the Royal College of Surgeons and the graduates of
the medical schools. As the number of medical practitioners continued to rise,
so it proved more difficult to maintain effective 'professional comblnations'" at
local level.
40 Ibid., p. 14.
41 Ibid.,p. 15.
42 Ibid.
43 11; Lancet, (1851) p. 359.
44 David Green, op.cit., p. 16. Also see: The Lancet (1849) p. 102; Association Medical Journal, 23
February 1853, pp. 825-6.
4S David Green, op.cit, pp. 33-62.
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As such, many doctors became increasingly frustrated with the failure of their
efforts at local combination and instead began to argue for the more vigorous
use of the powers of the General Medical Council.
It is the negotiation between professional groups and the state - and the
compromises that often result in the heat of negotiation - that often forms
some of the most fascinating aspects of public policy. Commenting for
example on the 1858 Medical Act, which formally established the General
Medical Council, Porter has noted that ultimately it
"Proved an ingenious compromise, placating the reformers, protecting
the profession and ensuring that in the resultant readjustment of
territorial boundaries none of the regular profession came out as
losers.1146
The 1858 Medical Act created the General Medical Council not in place of the
existing licensing authorities, but above them. Initially, it had twenty three
members, nine nominated by the medical corporations, eight by the
universities, and six by the Crown. In 1886, the Crown representatives were
reduced to five and five more were added, elected by the general body of
practitioners. Usually, the successful candidates were those who enjoyed the
support of the SMA.47
The power of the GMC resided in the fact that it was required by statute to
register persons who could produce a license and pay the fee. The GMC
could, however, also remove a doctor from the register on certain grounds.48
Whilst the GMC was not responsible for training or examinations (and it had
no formal power over licensing authorities), if it disapproved of someone it
could make representations to the Privy Council which in turn could withdraw
its power to issue licenses.
% . 51Roy Porter, Op.Clt, p. .
47 David Green, op.cit.
48 Ibid.
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While it is popularly assumed that all professions are equal, in reality - and to
paraphrase George Orwell49 - some professions are more equal than others,
as David Gladstone has recently asserted:
"In the extensive literature on professions in modern society, it is the
medical profession which is seen as the profession par excellence and
whose defining characteristics - control of entry, specialist training in
instrumental skills and a high degree of self-regulation - have become
the yardstick against which other occupational groups aspiring to
professional status have been assessed.r'"
The 1858 Medical Act marked a turning point in the history of the British
medical profession because for the first time it essentially nationalised it. For
the first time ever, one single body - the General Medical Council - was
charged with overseeing the entire profession and therefore defining in law
what it meant to be a doctor. Commenting on this momentous step Nicky Hart
has commented:
"The power of the medical profession lies in its success in having
secured by political means, a legal monopoly over the practice of
healing in contemporary society. This made the doctor the official
expert on health and illness in modern society, a title enshrined in
written law. This is the legal-rational basis of medical power. It consists
of a monopoly granted by the state, giving the profession exclusive
occupational rights, freedom to control the process of recruitment,
training and practice and control over the conduct of individual
members who each enjoy the right of clinical autonomy. 1151
As British cities increased in size during the nineteenth century and ever more
wealth was created, so the social campaigner Edwin Chadwick popularised
49 David Gladstone, op.cit, p.2.
50 Ibid.
51 Nicky Heart, The Sociology of Health and Medicine, New York, New York, Causeway Books,
p.112.
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the notion that the market could never provide solutions in such areas as
medicine, sanitation and roads.52
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Chadwick's 1842 government report
into the health and living conditions of the poor urged a massive increase in
state intervention. Under the rubric of 'public health' Chadwick sowed
intellectual seeds that simultaneously encouraged a rapid growth in local
government and a demand for new forms of interventionism in such diverse
areas as drainage, refuse collection, and water purification. Crucially, he also
promoted the idea of having tax funded health officers in every British town
and city.53
In 1875 the government passed the Public Health Act. It demanded that all
towns introduce public sector sewerage systems and that they impose a
network of local medical officers.
Yet, in a world away from the reality of ever more professional monopoly
power and growing government interventionism, Chadwick and his associates
continued to argue that the nineteenth century was rampantly capitalist and
overtly free market." Seemingly in denial of state sponsored restrictive
practices - and such matters as the ever increasing power of the newly
formed GMC - they never commented on the potential damage wrought on
society by ever increasing state regulation and higher taxes.
Although there were countless examples of emergent private solutions in
water supply, sanitation, medicine and healthcare - they became increasingly
marginalised as Chadwick conspired with powerful elements of the political,
professional and upper-middle classes to further expand the power of political
authority.55
52 Anthony Brundage (1988) England's Prussian Minister: Edwin Chadwick and the politics of
~ovemmentgrowth 1832-1854, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press.
3 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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Wishing to assert a new moral vision and a uniformity of rules on society, a
new breed of municipal socialist emerged who chimed with the deepest
instincts of the medical profession's conservatism."
In the 1890s doctors began, in a repetition of past abuses of state power, to
try to put the powers of the GMC to work in the service of their own pecuniary
interests. As Green states:
"The chief attraction of the General Medical Council was that it had the
power to remove doctors from the medical register, which effectively
meant to put them out of business. It could do so on two main grounds:
(a) if they were guilty of a felony or a misdemeanour; or (b) if they were
guilty of 'infamous conduct in any professional respect'. There was no
appeal against its decisions.liS?
Section 29 of the 1858 Medical Act empowered the General Medical Council
as follows:
"If any registered medical practitioner...shall after due inquiry be judged
by the General Medical Council to have been guilty of infamous
conduct in any professional respect, the General Council may if they
see fit direct the Registrar to erase the name of such medical
practitioner from the Register."S8
The power was tempered by section 52:
"Provided always that nothing herein contained shall extend to
authorise Her Majesty to create any new restriction in the practice of
medicine or surgery, or to grant any of the said corporations any
powers or privileges contrary to the common law of the land."S9
56 John Bums, (1902) 'Municipal Socialism', London, The Clarion.
fl . 36David Green, Op.CIt., p. .
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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Given this, some doctors took the view that it constituted infamous conduct to
fail to cooperate with professional restrictive practices intended to limit
competition and raise fees. These doctors tried to use the General Medical
Council to get other colleagues struck off the Medical Register for failing to
engage in such restrictive trade practices. These moves began in earnest in
1892:
"[An] approach to the GMC was led by the Medical Defence Union
(MDU) and took the form of an attack on medical aid associations, a
term which included commercial medical aid companies, as well as
non-profit medical aid societies, provident dispensaries and friendly
society medical institutes. The British Medical Journal supported the
MDU, arguing that medical association doctors were 'practically'
"sweated" for the profit of the associations. The BMJ wanted the GMC
to declare employment by a medical aid association 'professionally
degrading,.,,6o
In their eagerness to find grounds which would permit the GMC to act the
MDU tried to draw an analogy with an earlier GMC ruling on covering for
unqualified persons:
"The GMC had ruled that for a registered practitioner to act as the
cover for an unqualified person in order that the unqualified individual
could carry on medical practice as if he were qualified was 'infamous
conduct in a professional respect', within the meaning of section 29 of
the 1858 Act. The MDU argued that medical aid association doctors
were covering in exactly the same way for the medical aid association
committee.,,61
However, even the BMJ pointed out that there was a very clear distinction.
The GMC's response was to appoint a committee which reported in June
1893.
60 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
61 British Medical Journal, 15 October 1892, p. 854.
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The criticisms of the MDU were answered by a doctor serving as the medical
officer of a friendly society medical institute. He refuted the view that medical
officers were 'sweated', and argued that on the contrary they had taken
positions as medical officers to escape previous sweating practised on them
by other doctors who had employed them as asslstants.f He pointed out that
all his colleagues had had to work harder for less pay as assistants to private
practitioners than they did for medical institutes. Most had been given
workloads at least twice as heavy when they were assistants, and some had
carried burdens three times as great. He denied that friendly societies made
profits from their work. If there was a surplus, it was reinvested to provide
security of incomes in the future:
"We are quite satisfied that our income should be thus secured, and we
do not lay claim to this money."63
His view was supported by a doctor from South Wales who pointed out that
that he received more pay from the 'Medical Aid' than he would have from the
miners' club: the main local alternative which was based on pay-packet
deductions." Another medical officer of a medical aid association pointed out
that if there was no association he would end up treating many of his patients
under the Poor Law for much less.65
A conference of twenty-one friendly societies memorialised the General
Medical Council in March 1893 emphasizing that friendly society medical
institutes could not be described as organisations for the profit of their
promoters and that they provided a service by mutual aid.
Simultaneously, a leading article in the Oddfellows Magazine pointed out that
there was no objection to doctors' combinations which sought to enforce a
minimum wage. But it was a very different matter to try to deny some doctors
62 David Green, op.cit., p. 37.
63 British Medical Journal, 22 October 1892, p. 920.
64 Ibid., p. 370
65 British Medical Journal, 5 November 1892, p. 1028.
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the choice of working for a medical aid association, or indeed to deny a doctor
the right to work for whoever he pleased. Summing up the view of the friendly
society movement, Green asserts:
"The friendly societies felt that the attempt to use the power of the state
(exercised by the GMC) represented an attempt to combine for
improper ends. To try and raise wages by combination they believed to
be legitimate; but to attempt to deny other doctors the right to work for
the friendly societies was wholly illegitimate."66
Throughout the nineteenth century the labour movement, the friendly societies
and the principles of mutuality and co-operation had become increasingly
powerful. Crucially, they stood in opposition to the notion of public ownership
being equated with state ownership. As Green has observed:
"Victorian Britain tends to be thought of as the heyday of laissez-faire.
In this view, welfare was the province of a restrictive Poor Law and
burgeoning private charity; and the production of goods and services
the province of profit-seeking commercial companies. But the Victorian
age was not only the heyday of 'bourgeois' values. Existing alongside
was a clear working-class alternative. aiming to replace the hated Poor
Law and the largesse of the well-to-do with the mutual aid of the
friendly society and the trade union branch.t'"
By striving to keep government control and elite politics out of people's lives,
friendly societies, mutuals and co-operatives all - in their own ways - formed
elements of a powerful, popular and broad based movement that promoted
the idea of people owning, controlling and developing their own institutions for
the delivery of health and welfare.
As the writer and journalist Stephen Pollard, a former research director of the
Fabian Society, has pointed out:
66 David Green, op.cit., p. 38.
67 Ibid., p. 1.
97
"Against a great deal of modern mythology, the nineteenth century
witnessed a variety of rapidly growing and highly successful institutions
aimed at elevating citizens out of hardship. Friendly societies and
savings banks played a key part in a broad movement which prided
itself on providing individuals with efficient, effective and sustainable
forms of welfare support.,,68
Nevertheless, a further attempt to use the power of the GMC was made in
1897 when Norwich doctors put forward a new proposal.69 The same doctors
also tried - unsuccessfully - to persuade the Royal College of Surgeons and
the Royal College of Physicians to forbid their members from accepting
positions in Friendly Society Medical Institutes (FSMI).
The Norwich FSMI has been established in 1872 and by 1897 had more than
10,000 members. There were two full-time salaried medical officers, a
consulting physician and a consulting surgeon, though the consultants had
just been successfully put under pressure to resign:
"The complaint of the Norwich doctors was that the FSMI was a 'trading
society conducted by laymen' for medical attendance. The annual
subscription of 3s was not all passed on to the medical officers. Instead
it was used to pay working expenses and to improve the premises. ,,70
The response of the GMC was to appoint a committee which did not report
until June 1899. The committee met with representatives of the friendly
societies and concluded that Medical Institutes:
68 Stephen Pollard, Terry Liddle, Bill Thompson, (1994) Towards a More Co-operative Society: Ideas
on the future of the British Labour Movement and Independent Healthcare, Independent Healthcare
Association, London, p. 8.
69 British Medical Journal, 24 July 1897, p. 238.
70 David Green, op.cit., p. 42. Also see: GMC Minutes, 1897. pp. 201-2.
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"... composed of bona fide members of friendly societies, and managed
on sound principles, are entitled to, and have always received, the
friendly consideration of the medical professlon.?"
At this stage, the organised medical profession directed their most vehement
criticism at the commercial medical aid companies, run mainly by the
insurance companies. No doctor, it was felt by some colleagues, should be
'the stalking horse' of these companies. According to the BMJ it was:
"...degrading to any medical man to allow his professional knowledge
to be used by a commercial company as its stock-in-trade."?
Whilst on this, there was to be "no compromise", fair remuneration was a
different matter. It was not a question of principle, but a matter in which a
balance must be struck between the relevant parties.
Eventually, the committee of the GMC recommended that its parent body
strongly disapprove of medical practitioners who associated with medical aid
associations which systematically canvassed and advertised for purpose of
procuring patients. The GMC unanimously resolved in favour of this
resolution. However, this still fell short of ruling that employment by a medical
aid society was 'infamous conduct'. The committee made it clear that this
resolution only applied to companies canvassing and advertising to push
insurance business intended to yield a profit.
Although the GMC's hostility to canvassing and advertising was confined to
the use of such methods by commercial companies, many within the
profession refused to apply any such limitation. Their intention was to stamp
out all competition by force as the following resolution passed in July 1899 by
the County of Durham Medical Union shows:
71 GMC, Minutes, 1898, pp. 91-2.
72 • 43David Green, Op.CIt., p. .
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"That when the Qualified Practitioners of any district make a combined
effort to raise the standard of their fees, and thereby the status of the
profession, it should be deemed infamous conduct in a professional
respect for any Registered Practitioner to attempt to frustrate their
efforts by opposing them at cheaper rates of payment, and canvassing
for patients ... ,,73
The union explained to the GMC that they had been trying to raise contract
medical fees in mining districts from 6d per fortnight to 9d. In some areas
miners had refused the increase and established medical associations to
employ doctors at a salary. These associations collected subscriptions and
canvassed for patients. If it was not 'illegal', the union told the GMC, then they
certainly thought it was 'scandalous'.
Many doctors clearly resented the GMC's refusal to intervene. One
Rotherham doctor, who believed they always broke down through fear of
outside doctors coming in, strongly criticized the General Medical Council. He
argued that, as things stood, the GMC was 'absolutely useless' to general
practltioners."
Pressure on the GMC continued and in November 1901, in a major turning
point, 'canvassing' was held to be infamous conduct. Then, a year later, came
a second equally important decision. In 1902 a resolution declaring
advertising to be 'infamous conduct' was finally resolved.
The landmark case concerned a doctor from Birmingham who had issued
handbills in a poor district of Birmingham:
"One circular had announced that he would provide a free service for
the poor, and a second that he would make a token charge of 3d. This
was issued because he had been inundated by the response to the first
circular. He said in his defence that his aim had been purely charitable.
73 Ibid., p. 44. Also see: GMC Minutes, 1899, p. 275.
74 Ibid.
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The Medical Defence Union, which had led the case against him, said
that the circulars had been issued with one intention only: to take
patients from other medical men. The GMC seem to have concurred
and told him that they took 'a serious view' of his conduct.t"
The decisions of 1901 and 1902 were the first occasions on which the power
of the GMC had been openly used to further the pecuniary interests of doctors
at the expense of patients.
The 1901 decision in particular, signalled the arrival of a new majority on the
GMC; a majority willing to abuse the power of the state for sectional ends. As
E. M. Little, the SMA's historian was to comment, the profession now found
weapons:
"... placed in its hands which it did not fail to use with effect"."
For Green, as the medical profession's effort to establish monopoly through
local combinations failed, so it resorted to capturing the state through the
GMC:
"As their efforts to establish [local] monopolies failed, we found not only
concerted efforts to combine in the marketplace, but also efforts being
made to use the power of the state to make financial gains at the
expense of consumers. The more extreme demands made by some
sections of the profession were not acceded to, but the limitations on
advertising and canvassing put considerable limits on competition. This
abuse of the powers of the General Medical Council significantly
increased the power of the profession at the expense of the
consumer."?
7S Ibid., p. 46. Also see: British Medical Journ.a~, 29 No~ember 190~, ~p. 1721-2. . . .
76 E. M. Little (1932) History of the BrItish Medical AssociatIOn 1832-1932, British Medical
Association, London, p. 205.
77· it 61David Green, QJ2:.f!!., p. .
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For Green, the evidence of the period suggests that professional gains at the
expense of the consumer tend to be greater, not in a free market, but:
"...when the professionals have at their disposal the coercive power of
the state.,,78
Mutuality and Co-operation in Healthcare
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the labour movement viewed
the notion of 'public ownership' as being oppositional to state ownership.
Indeed, the labour movement became a powerful mass movement in the
nineteenth century largely as a result of it aiding the material and conditional
liberation of working people in such areas as health and welfare. By
attempting to keep government control and elite politics out of people's lives,
friendly societies, mutuals and co-operatives all promoted the means by which
people could own, control and develop their own healthcare institutions. As
Stephen Pollard has pointed out:
"Against a great deal of modern mythology, the nineteenth century
witnessed a variety of rapidly growing and highly successful institutions
aimed at elevating citizens out of hardship. Friendly societies and
savings banks played a key part in the broad movement which prided
itself on providing individuals with efficient, effective and sustainable
forms of welfare support.,,79
Asked in 1892 what proportion of the working classes were insured against
sickness through a building society or through a trade union, the Chief
Registrar of Friendly Societies answered that of 7 million male industrial
workers, 3.86 million belonged to registered societies and another 3 million to
unregistered societies.f" At the end of the century, he wrote that:
78 Ibid., p. 62. .
79 Stephen Pollard, Terry Liddle, Bill Thompson, Op.Clt, p.8.
80 P.H.J.H Gosden, (1973) Self-Help, Voluntary Associations in Nineteenth Century England, London,
Longman, p.91.
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"... it remains one of the great glories of the Victorian era that. ..welfare
has been established in a very large degree by the labours and
sacrifices of working men themselves, and by the wise and judicious
legislation which has permitted and encouraged their endeavour in the
direction of self-help"."
By 1900 the total funds acquired by the various provident institutions
amounted to nearly £400,000,000 and by the 1911 between nine and nine
and a half million people were covered by various forms of insurance."
By 1910 there were 6.6 million members of registered friendly societies, quite
apart from those in the unregistered organisations. Significantly, their rate of
growth over the preceding thirty years had been rapid and was accelerannq."
In 1877, registered membership had been 2.75 million. A decade later it was
3.6 million and increasing at an average of 90,000 a year. In 1897
membership had reached 4.8 million, having increased on average by
120,000 a year. And by 1910 the figures had reached 6.6 million, having
increased at an average annual rate since 1897 of 140,000.84
Importantly, these were the figures known to the government which had
imposed a regulatory framework of registration and 'protection' for the
movement. But many societies preferred to avoid even the minimal
interference of the 19th century British state and failed to register.
However, as the increasing success of non-state forms of welfare provision
were accepted by large numbers of disparate groups who were happy to deal
with such diverse institutions as private banks and trade unions, the question
arises as to why this broadly based, populist movement went into decline?
81 Cited in P. H. J. H Gosden., (1973) Self Help: Voluntary Associations in Nineteenth Century Britain,
B. T. Batsford Ltd, London, p.259
82 Stephen Pollard, Terry Liddle, Bill Thompson, op.cit., pp.8-9.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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This is an important question not least because the evidence suggests that so
far as voluntary and co-operative health and welfare programmes went they
were both trusted and liked by their clients. As Green notes:
"Until the 1911 National Insurance Act every neighbourhood of every
town was dotted with friendly society branches, each with their own
doctor, who had usually been elected by a vote of all the members
assembled in the branch meeting. In most large towns the friendly
societies had also established medical institutes combining doctors'
living accommodation, surgery and a dispensary. These embryo health
centres employed full-time salaried medical practitioners, full-time
dispensers, and nursing staff under the management of a committee
elected by all members."
History also shows that the friendly societies were so successful that their
arrangements for social insurance and primary medical care were used as the
model for the early welfare state. However, this ironically was their undoing.
The 1911 National Insurance Act was initially seen by its instigator, Lloyd
George, as a means of extending the benefits of the friendly societies to a
wider population - and especially the poor. But the combination of the two
most powerful interests - the organised medical profession and the
commercial insurance companies (which together formed a powerful trade
association known as the 'Combine') - mounted an extremely effective
lobbying campaign and succeeded in transforming the shape of the Bill as it
progressed through the House of Commons.
Outlining the campaign in this seminal work 'Working Class Patients and the
Medical Establishment', David Green points out:
"The BMA and the Combine formed a temporary alliance to extract
concessions from the government at the expense of the friendly
societies. The essence of working-class social insurance was
democratic self-organisation; amendments to the Bill obtained by the
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BMA and the Combine undermined it. Doctors' pay had kept within the
limits that ordinary manual workers could afford: under pressure, the
government doubled doctors' incomes and financed this transfer of
wealth from insured workers to the medical profession by means of a
regressive poll tax, flat-rate National Insurance contributions.,,85
By the time of the Labour Party's formation in the early 1900s the British
Socialist movement was a broadly based coalition containing many different
shades of opinion: the utopians, the co-operatives, the friendly societies and
the trade unions - all distrustful of a strong centralising state.
However, in line with a great deal of sociological thought at the time,86 a new
strand of Socialism began to emerge which argued for the establishment of
new moral communities based on occupational membership. Bolstered by the
earlier work of Chadwick, from the 1860s onwards a new generation of middle
class, Fabian and Marxian Socialist began to influence the wider Labour
movement, and pull it towards the ideas of a new welfare state."
Indeed, towards the end of the Victorian era, British Socialism began to take
on a more continental flavour and the Labour movement began to accept the
ideas of state collectivism and the centralisation of power.
Arguably, the idea of non-state mutuality and co-operation in British
healthcare was dealt its first major intellectual blow at the Socialist
International of September 1872. For it was here that the two main proponents
of nineteenth century socialism clashed.
85 David Green, (1985) Working Class Patients and the Medical Establishment, Gower/Maurice
Temple Smith, Aldershot, op.cit p.2
86 See: Stephen Pollard, Terry Liddle, Bill Thompson, op.cit., p.l O.
87 Indeed at the time there was an alliance between statist Toryism and statist Socialism. See: Semmel,,
8., (1960) Imperialism and Social Refonn: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914, Cambridge
MA, Harvard University Press. On the foundations of the welfare state also see Searle, G. R., (1971)
The Ouest for National Efficiency, Oxford, Oxford University Press and (1986) S.ocial Hy~iene in
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On one side was the anti-state individualist tradition represented by Michael
Bakunin and on the other the statist stream lead by Karl Marx.88
Although Bakunin's side formally lost the debate, it is interesting to remember
his prophetic words against a socialism built upon a monopoly state. In 1868
he warned:
"... Equality without freedom is the despotism of the State.... the most
fatal combination that could possibly be formed, would be to unite
socialism to absolutism; to unite the aspiration of the people for
material well-being ...with the dictatorship or the concentration of all
political and social power in the State....We must seek full economic
and social justice only by way of freedom. There can be nothing living
or human outside of liberty, and a socialism that does not accept
freedom as its only creative principle...will inevitably... lead to slavery
and brutality".89
At the end of the nineteenth century, and in addition to Marx, Europe saw
another powerful statist emerge who was to have a profound impact on British
political thinking and who greatly encouraged the establishment of a top-down
welfare state.
Count Otto von Bismark was brought to power through the demands of
military spending. In 1862, Wilhelm I of Prussia was on the verge of abdication
after the demand that to approve his increase of taxation he would have to
accept parliamentary control of the executive. As a final move, Wilhelm
recalled Bismarck from being ambassador to France and appointed him as
Minister President - the equivalent of Prime Minister.90
Bismarck's policy for Germany was clear. Increase the army from 500,000 to
750,000. Extend conscription from two to four years. And increase taxation to
88 Sam Dolgoff, (1973) Bakunin on Anarchy, Greorge Allen and Unwin.
89 Ibid., pA . . .. .
90 Paul Marks (1992) Bismarck: The Harm Done by one IndIvIdual to the Cause of IndIvIdualIsm,
Historical Notes No.19, London, Libertarian Alliance.
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cover the costs, without conceding any power to the taxpayers in exchanqe."
The liberals talked of revolt but failed to match their words with actions - and
Bismarck called their bluff.
From entering office, Bismarck purged the liberals in the Prussian civil service
and censored the press. After 1866, he used large sums stolen from the blind
King of Hanover to bribe journalists and others to support him.92
Bismarck undermined the liberal agenda in other ways. Firstly, he helped to
split them between the 'progressives' and the 'National Liberals' who
supported his policy of war mongering. Secondly, he secretly subsidised state
Socialists such as Ferdinand l.assalle'" to win workers away from the liberals,
to support the state.
In 1879 Bismarck took advantage of severe economic problems to break the
power of the National Liberals who had supported him. In 1884, he moved the
state forward again and introduced compulsory sickness 'insurance'
(compulsory contributions from employers and employees), accident
'insurance' (from employers only) and in 1899 old age pensions (with
contributions from employers, employees and general taxation)."
These schemes grew rapidly and 'progressive' income tax arrived in 1891. By
helping to spread the belief that 'capital' and 'labour' had different interests, by
stirring up 'the masses' against industrialists and making industrialists fear 'the
masses', and by making both sides look to the state, Bismarck set the scene
for the destruction of traditional liberties, freedoms and the self help
movement.
91 Ibid., p.2.
92 Ibid., p.3.
93 As Nietche and others knew, the official anti-socialist stance of the state was a fraud. Liberalism was
the true enemy of the state as taken to its final conclusions it would ultimately erode the state itself. See
Nietzche's 'A Glance at the State' in his Human All Too Human, 1878 pp.472-473.
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Over time, his policies had a huge impact not only on the political class of
Germany but many other European countries." In Britain, the early welfare
state followed an essentially Bismarkian model and began with the 1911
National Insurance Act.
It provided a safety net against both sickness and unemployment, and, with
some important exceptions, covered all those between the ages of 16 and 70
who were manual workers, earned less than £160 per year or worked in
industries "known to be subject to severe and recurrent unemployment"." The
scheme was funded by weekly contributions from the insured worker, from the
employer and from the Government. The basic weekly sickness benefit was
10s for men and 7s 6d for women. In addition to direct payments, the Act also
provided for the setting up of general medical and pharmaceutical services.
In addition to enhancing the power of the medical establishment, as stated
above, the 1911 Act introduced a compulsory insurance system which
undermined the working class self help movement. Workers no longer needed
to arrange their own affairs as best they could: the state would do that for
them.
While the 1911 Act agreed to administer the new system through friendly
societies, it did so only through those that had been 'approved'. However, to
be approved, a society was required to have at least 10,000 members, and to
conduct its business under far closer state supervision than ever before.97
The result was that the sickness and unemployment insurance of the working
classes was effectively monopolised by the state, which had handed the
business to a few favoured societies - increasingly virtual government
agencies. Not surprisingly, thousands of small and unregistered societies
soon found themselves left searching for what little business remained and
most inevitably died.
9S Ibid.
96 Stephen Pollard, Terry Liddle, Bill Thompson, op.cit., p.l O.
97 Ibid.
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The inside story of how this came about was eventually told by W.J.
Braithwaite, who was one of the officials connected with the National
Insurance Bill:
liThe reception of the bill had been very friendly. There had, however,
been one discordant note from ... the spokesman in the House [of
Commons] of the Industrial Insurance interest, far the most formidable
interest affected by the bill. Interests are a very real force in Parliament.
They are alive and active. The public interest which should come
before them is inert and dead compared with them, and had no
spokesman or representative... The history of the bill is how they were
bought off, conciliated, and in very few instances over-ruled. L[loyd]
G[eorge] made promise after promise, did one doge after another. ..
"...The Industrial storm had already blown up. It was very cleverly
worked, and I suppose that Kingsley Wood [legal adviser to the
insurance interests] was at the bottom of it. At any rate he said to me
one day when the storm was in full blast. 'We have got L.G. there'
(putting this thumb on the desk) , and shall get our own terms"."
The health and welfare legislation of the 1940s can arguably be seen as a
logical extension of ideas first floated at the first international in 1872 and in
Bismark's Germany during the 1880s. Sparked in Britain by the National
Insurance Act of 1911 and hugely advanced by the crises of the Great War,
the subsequent inter-war slump, and finally the Second World War, it ended
with legislation from a Labour Government as far divorced as can be imagined
from the ideals of the labour movement's historic roots and from crucial
market sensivities.
In many ways policy developments of the late 1940s and the arrival of the
NHS were simply a logical next-step of the ideas and interests of the previous
and increasingly statist decades.
98 Sir Henry N. Sunbury (ed) Lloyd George's Ambulance Wagon, The Memoirs of William J.
Braithwaite, Methuen Ltd, London 1957, pp.161-168.
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British hospitals before the NHS
To further highlight the gathering statism of the age one can examine the
history and experience of the British voluntary hospital movement during the
latter stages of the nineteenth century, up to the early 1940s.
By the turn of the twentieth century the term voluntary hospital denoted three
key features. Income was not drawn from the public purse but from
philanthropy. Management was in the hands of a voluntary governing body
which was accountable only to the subscribers, and medical care was
primarily provided by honorary consultants who were not paid by the
hospital."
In the first half of the nineteenth century, general hospitals opened in most
large towns, while specialist institutions covering such areas as
ophthalmology, maternity and ear, nose and throat, also emerged. The latter
stages of the century saw this trend continue, along with the arrival of the
rurally based cottage hospital rnovement.l'" From early on, medical education
was a feature of the largest voluntary hospitals, with honorary consultants
supplementing their income by apprenticeship fees for clinical teaching. 101
Links with medical schools were subsequently formalised. By the early zo"
century, the transition of hospitals from primarily philanthropic to primarily
medical institutions was apparent.l'"
The 31 teaching hospitals were centres of medical research and scientific
progress. Honorary staff held positions in local university medical schools, and
99 British Hospitals Association (BHA), Report of the Voluntary Hospitals Commission (London,
1937); Political and Economic Planning (PEP) Report on the British health services (London, 1937),
pp. 16-17, 230-240; 1. E Stone, Hospital Organisation and management (London, 1927), p.12.
Importantly, the first wave of voluntary foundations in London and the provincial cities took place
during the 18th century, when the popularity of subscriber charity superseded the philanthropic trend of
the endowed trust. The rhetoric of early hospital appeals suggests donors' motives could range from a
sense of religious duty to a desire for moral reform.
100 S. Cherry, 'Change and continuity in the cottage hospitals c. 1859-1948', Medical History, (1992),
pps.36, 271-89.
161 M. E. Fissell, (1991) Patients, power and poor in eighteenth century Bristol, Chapter 7; B. Abel-
Smith, (1964) The Hospitals 1800-1948, London, pp. 16-31.
102 K. Waddington (2000) Charity and the London Hospitals 1850-1898, Woodbridge.
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the introduction of bacteriology and pathology laboratories started to shift both
clinical training and diagnostic practice from bedside to bench.l'" Not all
hospital beds were in the voluntary sector. Indeed, in the run up to 1948, they
remained a minority, increasingly overshadowed by publicly funded provision.
The Poor Law had of course historically performed a medical role, wherein
Victorian workhouses accommodated the sick alongside the aged, the 'lunatic'
and the 'destitute'. By the early zo" century only 20 per cent of Poor Law beds
were in separate infirmaries."?' Importantly, the standard of care they provided
was generally inferior to that available in the voluntary sector. Staff to patient
ratios were worse and the practice of delegating nursing care to untrained
pauper inmates was slow to change.105 Moreover, in line with the creeping
intellectual statism of the age, local authorities had since 1867 built publicly
funded hospitals to address infectious diseases - in particular, isolation
hospitals for scarlet fever, diphtheria and tuberculosis.
In 1929 public provision was again expanded and restructured. This time the
Local Government Act broke up the Poor Law and brought its institutions
under the purview of local authorities. This Act also forced councils to open
municipal general hospitals, whose ambit included the non-pauperised acute
and maternity patients who hitherto had been treated in the voluntary
sector.'?" Precise estimates of the sectorial shares of beds are hard to asses.
However, Pinker's analysis of sporadic official records provides an overview
for the period 1891 and 1938.107
The gathering dominance of the public sector is evident, with an ever-
increasing proportion of beds located in the local authority hospitals;
particularly by 1938 when the Local Government Act had begun to take effect.
103 S. Sturdy and R. Cooter, 'Science, scientific management and the transformation of medicine in
Britain 1870-1950', History of Science (1998), xxxvi, pp.421-66.
104 M. A. Crowther (1981) The Workhouse System 1834-1929, London, p. 186.
105 A. Digby, (1978) Pauper Palaces, London, pp. 171-2. Also see M. A. Crowther, ibid., pp. 162-6,
182-90.
106 M. Powell (1964) 'An Expanding Service: Municipal Acute Medicine in the 1930s'. in Twentieth
Century British History (1997) pps., 8, 334-57.
107 R. Pinker, (1966) English Hospital Statistics 1861-1938, London, pp. 61-2.
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It is also clear that the inter-war period was a time of considerable expansion
for the voluntary units, whose share of total bed numbers had increased (see
Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The distribution of hospital beds in the public and voluntary sector'S, England and Wales 1891-1938
Given the expansion in bed numbers, it is not surprising that income also grew
impressively between 1900 and 1938.
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The total annual income of British voluntary hospitals in 1901 was £2.1 million,
rising to £15.4 million by 1938. Or, if adjusted to take account of price
changes: £6 million rising to £27 million, at 1948 prices.'?"
In London, where about one quarter of the nation's hospital beds were
located, annual income grew from £2.6 million in 1921 to £4.7 million in 1938
- or £3 million to £8 million at 1948 prices.l'"
This was by no means an easy process, and in the immediate years after the
First World War many came to believe that state funding would have to
supersede voluntary sources if the hospitals were going to survive. Financial
pressures were at their greatest when a conjuncture of forces impacted on the
hospitals. Philanthropy was undermined not least because the better off were
now liable for unprecedented levels of income taxation including death duties.
Post-war inflation also took its toll, pushing up the price of fuel and provisions.
Moreover, essential building and maintenance work had been postponed
during the war and now had to be addressed. Finally, and to compound all
these pressures, the influenza pandemic placed additional - unprecedented -
pressures on staff and resources."?
In response to this situation, the government established in 1921 the Cave
Committee to report on the hospitals' plight and to recommend solutions. The
result was a Treasury grant of £500,000, dependent on matching funding
being obtained from voluntary sources.'!' This was duly found and allocated
and by the mid-1920s the crisis had passed: the voluntary system had been
partially preserved.
However, the First World War was a turning point and the subsequent growth
in income was sustained by a changed mix of funding sources.
108 John Mohan and Martin Gorsky (2001) Don't Look Back? Voluntary and Charitable Finance of
Hospitals in Britain, Past and Present, Office of Health Economics, London, p. 40.
109 Ibid.
110 B. Abel-Smith, op.cit, pp. 307-9, 232-4.
111 J. E. Stone (1927) Hospital Organisation and Management, London, pp.45-8.
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Figure 2. illustrates the composition of annual income in British voluntary
hospitals, based on the returns of current data reported in three series of
hospital year-books.!"
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Figure 2. Composition of voluntary hospital incomes England, Scotland and Wales, 1901-1941.
London is not included in this illustration since after 1923 the capital's
statistics were drawn from the King's Fund abstracts which did not
disaggregate charitable income to the same level of detail.
The categories of 'subscription' (an annual pledged sum) and 'charity'
(donations, legacies, church collections, fund-raising events) had been the
original mainstay of income. However, they underwent a long-run decline, first
clearly noticeable at the time of the 1914-18 war, and broken only with a brief
112 These are Burdett's Hospitals and Charities, the Hospitals Yearbook and the Order of S1. John' s
Annual Reports on the Voluntary Hospitals of Great Britain.
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resurgence in the early 1920s when renewed philanthropic benevolence was
crucial in overcoming the post-war crisis.
The category of 'patients', which after 1914 bulked ever larger, is composed of
both direct payment by patients and income from mass contributory schemes.
Direct payment took the form either of a charge made on the better off
patients for the cost of hospitalisation, or of a sum levied by the hospital
almoner according to the patient's capacity.
The contributory schemes had developed from workplace funds supported by
small subscriptions, but flourished from the 1920s when they were promoted
by the hospitals themselves in a bid to broaden their base of support during
the funding crisis of 1918-21.
'Interest' refers to annual yields on assets, mostly gilts and equities, but
sometimes property too; this remained a stable proportion of total income.
'Services' includes income earned from home nursing and fees paid by local
and national government. Growth in this category after 1921 represents the
local authority subventions mentioned above, and the increase in 1941
reflects the state payments made under the wartime Emergency Medical
Service.
During the 1920s and 1930s, while charity had not actually gone into decline,
it clearly failed to expand at the rate required to meet expenditure demands. In
the provinces income from patients far surpassed that of charity, and was the
key to the growth of the system.
In London it also grew significantly over the period, but here charitable
finance, though broadly static, remained the dominant factor. This was despite
the fact that the country's largest contributory scheme, the Hospital Saving
Association (HSA), was based in the capital.
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Started in 1923 with a grant from the King's Fund, the HSA gathered regular
contributions of 3d per week from families on 'limited incomes' which,
guaranteed them exemption from charges or means-testing for hospital
treatment. However, its impact was dissipated amongst the large number of
institutions in London. Traditional modes of charity were also more robust,
with fund-raising activities remaining a vital part of the social round of the
metropolitan elite.113
However, throughout the 1920s and 1930s new forms of infrastructure
demanded considerable capital expenditure. In addition to new wards, this
included the equipping of specialist departments and laboratories, X-ray and
radiology appliances, as well as telephone systems, electrification, lifts and
steam laundrles.!"
Another, more significant, long-run trend was the rising share of the budget
spent on staffing - which by 1941 accounted for 48 per cent of main
expenditure.
This increase is not simply accounted for by the greater cost of salaried
doctors, although by this time it had become common place for even the
smaller hospitals to employ medical residents. The more important factor was
the improved pay and conditions for nurses and ancillary workers. With higher
wages, pensions and shorter hours, expenditure rose cramatlcally.!" Even
though nurses' pay and conditions remained less attractive than in other white
blouse occupations, their growing professional assertiveness, coupled with
and a tight labour market and rising salaries in the public hospitals, won them
a larger share of the staff budget.
113 M. Gorsky and J. Mohan, 'London's Voluntary Hospitals in the Inter-War Period: Growth,
Transformation or Crisis?', Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 2001
114 John Mohan and Martin Gorsky (2001) Don't Look Back? Voluntary and Charitable Finance of
Hospitals in Britain, Past and Present, Office of Health Economics, London, pp. 44-46.
lIS Ibid, p. 46.
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Additional pressure was applied by the advance of specialist treatments,
ranging from orthopaedic clinics to radiology departments which required a
higher degree of training and hence remuneration.
Overall, consideration of Britain's voluntary hospitals during this time reveals a
broad trend of growing financial hardship throughout the 1930s. As John
Mohan and Martin Gorsky have recently concluded:
"After rising during 1929-32, the years of economic slump, the
proportion of hospitals in deficit fell until the mid-1930s, before rising
again up to 1939, at which point more than one third of all the hospitals
in the set reported deficits. The situation was eased only with the onset
of the wartime emergency scheme, when state support brought the
proportion in deficit down to a lower level than at any time since
1929.,,116
In 1938 the British Hospitals Association (BHA), the voluntary sector's
mouthpiece, noted that:
"...the position of hospitals with persistent annual deficits (was) one of
particular urqency."!"
A "deteriorating financial base"!" in the late 1930s means that In overall
terms:
"...the inter-war period saw growth, transition and persistent difficulties
in the financing of voluntary hospitals. Costs were driven up by the
massive expansion in provision, the burgeoning staffing budget, the
modernisation of the institutional fabric and the need to exploit new
medical technologies. Traditional modes of hierarchical charity were
116 Ibid, p. 48. . . .
117 British Hospitals Association, (1937) Report of the Voluntary HospItals CommIssIon, London, p.
27.
118 See: John Mohan and Martin Gorsky (2001) Don't Look Back? Voluntary and Charitable Finance of
Hospitals in Britain, Past and Present, Office of Health Economics, London, p. 49.
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insufficient to sustain these demands. Personal taxation had risen to
unprecedented levels, while the emergence of tax-funded municipal
general hospitals after 1929 further undermined the philanthropic
impulses; this in turn eroded the asset base. Survival therefore
depended on a creative and flexible response by voluntary fund-
raisers. This took the form of a new reliance on private payment and a
shift to mass contributory arrangements; whose success was founded
upon the local loyalties which voluntary hospitals inspired. However,
the late 1930s saw financial crisis looming, as current account deficits
multiplied and some institutions sank seriously into debt. For many
hospitals the problems of reconciling charitable insufficiency with public
expectation proved too great, and were resolved only by government
aid in the wartime emergency."!"
On the eve of World War II the voluntary sector provided 95,000 non-
psychiatric hospital beds in England and Wales, out of a total - including local
authority and Poor Law hospitals of 295,000 beds."?
Though the public sector was clearly dominant, this reflected its significance in
providing long-stay hospitals and isolation facilities. Voluntary hospitals
provided a majority of general hospital beds - 70,000, compared to 60,000
beds in local authority hospitals.l"
When it comes to pre-war waiting lists the picture is sketchier. Not only was
no such data available nationally prior to the Hospital Surveys but such
information should not be used un-critically.
Although many hospitals often proved to be immensely popular they had not
always been founded in response to a pre-existing articulation of popular
demand for institutional care. Instead, the desire for hospitals (what
119 Ibid, pp.52-3.
120 Ibid, p.60.
121 Ibid.
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contemporaries called the 'hospital habit') often followed the arrival and
spread of the institution.
By the early zo" century normative expectations of hospital provision had
decisively shifted, reflecting public appreciation of the more specialised skills
of physicians and surgeons, the importance of easy access in accident and
emergency cases, and of the technological facilities offered; such as X-ray
machines, operating theatres and in the 1930s radium treatment for cancer.
In addition, need for hospital care, then as now, varied from place to place
according to factors such as the occupational and age structure of the
population.
These in turn necessitate different responses from hospitals: a greater
preponderance of geriatric beds in one place, more resources devoted to
maternity care in another.
However, hospital establishment depended largely on the motivations of local
elites: doctors, church-leaders, businessmen and professionals with an
interest in civic affairs. This market was not driven by the profit motive but the
view that voluntary altruism was the way forward. As such, Voluntary:
"Foundations were typically the initiative of wealthy citizens, perhaps
eager to emulate the institutional glories of other cities, or animated by
personal or family experience of ill health and recovery which prompted
direct benevolence to a hospital. The first step was the constitution of a
trustee body and the organisation of an initial round of subscription and
donation to raise funds for the building. Alternatively, this might be led
by medical men arguing that the prevalence of disease necessitated
h i t tl 122suc In erven Ion.
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In some locations the concern of industrialists to protect their labour force was
the key issue. In other places the tenor of local politics could playa part, either
when factions of party and sect used philanthropy to advance their own
position, or when joint philanthropic projects were initiated to promote civic
unity over factionalism.F''
Disparities in provision had first raised alarm bells in London when, during the
1860s, the public had expressed a concern that hospital accommodation was
concentrated in the centre and West End of the city.
In 1902 the King's Fund, which had been established as a central agency to
rationalise voluntary fund-raising in the capital, began to target its gifts so as
to provide incentives for relocation to these areas.!"
Despite this, the persistence in the 1930s of substantial variations in provision
was used by the London County Council to justify its policy of opening rate-
funded municipal general hospitals to deliver acute care.
By the late-1930s and early 1940s the notion that regional diversity was a
weakness of voluntarism to be addressed by state planning and
interventionism had gained broad acceptance, as evidenced by the influential
'PEP' Report on the British Health Services and by wartime hospital surveys
carried out by the Ministry of Health.125
When presenting the NHS Bill to the House of Commons Aneurin Bevan
noted that owing to the "caprice of charity" the best endowed areas were
those:
123 A. Wilson 'Conflict, consensus and charity: politics and the provincial voluntary hospitals in the
eighteenth century', English Historical Review, cxi, 599-619.
124 G. Rivett (1986) The Development of the London Hospital System 1823-1982, London, pp. 94-102,
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"Where the well-to-do live while, in very many other of our industrial
and rural districts there is inadequate hospital accommodation."126
Although the Second World War was a significant contributory factor to the
creation of the National Health Service, there seemed to be an inexorable
,
inevitable, passage towards the welfare state and the full blown
nationalisation of health care.
Now, another half a century on and historians are increasingly looking back to
the late eighteenth century when the voluntary hospitals first emerged in 'civil
society'. That is, a 'public sphere' which developed autonomously from the
activities and organisations of the state and the market. Today, the popular
perception is that:
"Its key feature was the efflorescence of charitable, educational and
cultural institutions which rapidly became a ubiquitous feature of urban
living. Unlike the closed vestries and corporations of unreformed Britain
their membership was open to all, and principles of transparency and
accountability were fundamental to their procedures."!"
In many ways the voluntary hospital movement epitomised many of the
aspects of this new associtionalism, and as such may be seen as a beacon of
citizen participation. Public accountability was ensured through printed annual
reports, which contained audited accounts, patient statistics, current rules and
even the names and contribution of each subscriber, and all of which was
available to the local press.
Payment of an annual subscription entitled donors to exercise various
managerial prerogatives. These included the right to admit patients and to
vote at general meetings held a least once a year.
126 HC Deb. 5th Series, v. 422, c. 46-7.
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In the nineteenth century the subscribers' franchise could also extend to the
election of the medical staff, obliging doctors seeking honorary posts to
canvass publicly on behalf of their candidates. Subscribers also elected from
amongst their number the volunteer members of the hospital, and the hospital
'visitors' who offered pastoral care to patients.
By the early twentieth century the administrative role of the voluntary
subscriber was significantly reduced. Middle-class enthusiasm for involvement
in local hospital affairs did not grow at the same rate as the burgeoning middle
class. As the public sector grew so an increasingly significant free rider effect
became apparent in the voluntary sector. Many citizens who could afford to
subscribe to the voluntary sector decided not to and instead chose to allow
their more public spirited neighbours to shoulder the increasing burden.
In Bristol in 1931 for example the number of private subscribers to the two
main voluntary hospitals stood at 6,000. At the time, the city had a population
of more than 400,000 people. 128
Similarly, Newcastle's Royal Victoria Infirmary had only 400 charitable
subscribers although it inhabited an area populated by more than one million
people.129
As the formal involvement of lay volunteers and subscribers waned so the
power of the medical men was waxing. Alongside the capture of ever greater
political power, doctors were now able to take advantage of the new age of
expanding hospital accommodation. For one thing, this gave them discretion
to admit non-emergency patients without a subscriber's letter.
In many hospitals the balance tilted rapidly from predominantly charitable to
predominantly medical admissions. This process was hastened by the
growing assertiveness of honorary medical staff who, though motivated by
128 Ibid., p. 80.
129Ibid.
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goodwill, also viewed the hospital as a place of research, teaching and
scientific expertise.
"Direct election of consultants was abandoned by the late nineteenth
century in favour of selection by an appointments committee. In large
hospitals medical committees were constituted to act as a forum for the
development of the medical policy and to articulate doctors' needs to
the lay governors. Thus despite some notorious clashes between
medical representatives and voluntary administrators... the managerial
role of doctors was generally enhanced.t"?
Although the decline of subscriber power did not entirely inhibit lay voluntary
control, the growth of workplace contributions did manage to broaden public
participation somewhat.
In financial terms the dwindling of private subscription was amply
compensated by the sums which mass contributory schemes generated.
Although these schemes had been greatly undermined by the 1911 National
Insurance Act, the inter-war period did witness a brief re-emergence not least
for the larger health plans.
The Cave Committee report of 1921 - which examined hospital finance - had
advocated mass contribution as a solution to post-war funding shortfalls and
many hospitals independently established their own local schemes so as to
ease financial pressures.
Some hospitals regarded this form of income as a quasi-charitable voluntary
gift, while others treated it as a form of low-cost insurance, with payment
formally entitling those covered to remission of charges.
The upshot was that in some areas the numbers of voluntary hospital
contributors increased:
130 Ibid., p. 81.
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"In Newcastle's Royal Victoria Infirmary for instance, over 50,000
belonged to the scheme in 1938, providing 58%> of total mcorne."!"
To some extent this expansion of contribution reinvigorated a degree of
popular participation in hospital affairs. The constitution of management
committees was gradually changed to accommodate representatives of the
schemes, though even in hospitals where mass contribution was a vital
income source the numbers of such representatives remained a minority.
Continuing with the example of Newcastle and the Royal Victoria Infirmary's
44 committee members in 1901, only 12 were nominated by the workmen
governors, and this minority persisted into the inter-war period. Despite this,
there is little doubt that contribution strengthened ties of loyalty and support
from workers for their hospital. In many cases this took the form of the
purchase of essential equipment, the endowment of a bed, the organisation of
fund-raising activities and gifts 'in kind', such as clothes made by sewing
clubs.
In summary, although there were elements of openness, subscriber
democracy and accountability in voluntary hospitals since their inception,
participation was initially limited to middle-class contributors. The role of
private subscribers subsequently diminished and the decision-making roles of
medical professionals and lay governing bodies were enhanced.
The transition to mass contribution schemes briefly strengthened popular
support for the institutions. However, management remained in the hands of
traditional elites who were reluctant to adopt constitutions that either opened
the hospitals up to market forces and 'profit' or further enhanced local
democratic participation.
131 Voluntary Hospitals Committee (Chainnan: Lord Cave), Final Report, 1921, Command 1335, p. 19.
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Indeed, the prejudice and conservatism of the age was summed up by
Bevan's experience, as asserted in the second reading of the NHS Bill:
"In the mining districts, in the textile districts, in the districts where there
are heavy industries it is the industrial population who pay the weekly
contributions ....When I was a miner I used to find that situation when I
was on the hospital committee. We had an annual meeting and a
cordial vote of thanks was passed to the manager of the colliery
company for his generosity towards the hospital; and when I looked at
the balance sheet I saw that 97.50/0 of the revenues were provided by
the miners' own contributions; but nobody passed a vote of thanks to
the miners.,,132
Throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s the emerging consensus amongst
opinion formers, medical professionals and politicians was in favour of greater
centralised planning and 'co-ordination' of health services.
During the inter-war period, the popular challenge for policy makers and
hospital managers was to secure, what they believed would be, the benefits of
an integrated system through a partnership of public and non-profit providers.
In line with the increasingly statist thinking of previous decades the Nuffield
Hospital Surveys stated in 1946 that "there is no hospital system now" and
condemned "the results of uncoordinated development in the past".133
Looking back, it is now clear that the 1920s began with a clear belief in a more
'coherent' - governmentally - planned health system built around joint
committees representing voluntary hospital leaders and public officials. As
such, the benefits envisaged were cost savings through joint purchasing, co-
ordination of fund-raising, the elimination of competition and therefore the
132 He Debs, 5th Series, v. 422, c. 47. .
133 Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, (1946) The HospItal Surveys: The Domesday Book of the
Hospital Services, Oxford, pA.
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duplication of services, a planned provision of accommodation, and
improvement of research and teaching.
At the same time the newly formed Ministry of Health134 advocated closer links
between amalgamated groups of voluntary hospitals and university medical
schools, whose full-time staff would take over clinical teaching.
The Local Government Act of 1929 embodied a more determined attempt to
promote Statism and top-down planning. Section 13 of the Act provided for
the establishment of joint public/voluntary committees which would organise
the respective contributions of the two sectors.
Importantly, six years after the 1929 Act's inception, the Ministry of Health
surveyed the progress of this measure and discovered that while joint
committees had been established in 43 out of 78 English boroughs, 23 had
made no formal arrangements and 12 had taken no action at all.
In many places the gulf of interest and ideology between the municipal
socialist and the voluntary hospital movements was simply too great. In
London for example, where formal arrangements had been rapidly put in
place:
"... the antipathy between municipal socialists on the London County
Council and aristocratic voluntary hospital patrons had fostered a state
of 'cold war' in which genuine co-operation remained limited.,,135
Importantly, where a degree of system integration did emerge in the 1930s it
was usually as a result of the broadening coverage of the mass contributory
schemes.
134 The Ministry of Health had only been formed in 1919. . .
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The principle of restricting treatment of contributors to a single local hospital
proved to be inadequate in the age of the motor car and ever better
communications. Mutual agreements to treat members of other schemes were
therefore soon established between public and voluntary hospitals, and
between large and small voluntaries in response to market demand.136 This in
turn created pressure for more product integration from one place to another -
and encouraged a world of emerging, uniform and trusted health brands.
However, they were never as successful as they could have been. For in
reality the momentum towards full blown Nationalisation had already been
established both intellectually and institutionally.
By the early 1940s the context in which nationalisation would occur had
become compelling and seemingly inevitable. After all, healthcare had never
been provided by an unfettered market - even in ancient times.
Since Roman times, political elites in Britain have increasingly sought to plan,
control and regulate the provision of health services. Through the military, the
church, the Royal Colleges, Parliament, and the granting of professional
legislative favour in the name of the 'public good', the state has progressively
encroached on every area and facet of healthcare. Today, there are even
those who argue that the political elite are seeking to undermine the traditional
relationship of the doctor and the patient by eroding patient privacy and
therefore the Hippocratic Oath.137
It is in this broader historic context that the establishment of a National Health
Service can be seen to be more than simply the product of any single
government - or party political tribe.
136 J. Mohan and M. Gorsky, Ibid., pp. 88-89.
137 Tim Evans and Helen Evans (2001) Big Mother's Deadly New World: How the Government is
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Alliance.
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Instead, it can be viewed as the historic culmination of deeply rooted
intellectual and institutional prejudices which have gathered momentum and
influence over long periods of time.
In the modern world, the political control of healthcare is invariably legitimated
by egalitarian notions of 'public service', 'public ownership' and 'equality'.
Today, more than half a century on from the inception of the NHS, one is able
to examine its record and judge it against its own legitimating rubrics. One can
examine the impact health nationalisation has had on British healthcare and
explore some of its inevitable - and often unintended - consequences.
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CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACT, REALITY AND FAILURE OF
STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITISH HEALTHCARE
Chapter four explores the history and record of the NHS. Analysing the
service's roots and early aspirations, it goes on to examine its record
concerning rationing, investment, class, employment and care. Ultimately, the
chapter presents a comparative overview of the performance of the service in
relation to the aspirations of its founding fathers and their guiding - egalitarian
and statist - principles. In doing so it challenges conventional notions of
market failure in health economics by raising the demonstrable spectre of
government failure.
The Promise of the NHS
The idea of a free health service for all had first been mooted in Britain by
Beatrice Webb in her minority report of the Poor Law inquiry of 1909.1
However, it fell to Sir William Beveridge to articulate fully such a plan and to
lay the foundations for such a service in his 1942 paper Social Insurance and
Allied Services?
Beveridge was the son of a British judge in India. Born in 1879 into a house
staffed by twenty six servants, he was schooled at Charterhouse, studied
mathematics and classics at Oxford and, in 1903 - at the age of twenty-four -
became in effect an Edwardian social worker and researcher at Toynbee Hall
- the university foundation for the poor in the East End of London.'
Oxford and Toynbee Hall triggered in Beveridge a lifelong interest in
unemployment, state planning and social engineering. Beveridge later
I Nicholas Timmins, (2001) The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State, Harper Collins,
London, p. 15.
2 Social Insurance and Allied Services, Report by Sir William Beveridge, HMSO, 1942.
3 Timmins, N., op.cit., p.12.
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characterised his own progress at the time as being from "Oxford to
Whitechapel, Whitechapel to Fleet Street, Fleet Street to Whitehall".4
Early on in this journey he visited Germany in 1907, where he studied the
systems of compulsory social insurance for pensions and sickness which
Bismarck had introduced in the 1880s. This venture proved to be a seminal
moment in is life and one that was to have profound consequences for Britain.
In 1905 Beveridge became a leader writer at the Tory aligned Morning Post, a
newspaper which later merged with the Daily Telegraph. Whilst there, he
wrote on social policy issues advocating a national network of labour
exchanges and state unemployment insurance."
It was here that he first came to the attention of Winston Churchill who in 1908
brought him into the Board of Trade as a full time civil servant. During the next
three years, Beveridge played a crucial role in the creation of a national
network of labour exchanges of which he became the first director, and then
in the formation of the world's first statutory insurance scheme against
unemployment.6
With the arrival of the First World War, Beveridge moved to the Ministry of
Munitions, where he was involved in deeply controversial moves to mobilise
manpower and where he worked directly with Lloyd George. In 1916 he was
moved to the Ministry of Food, becoming one of the chief architects of
rationing and price control?
Peace saw him leave the civil service to become the first director of the
London School of Econornica' During a spell as Vice Chancellor of London
4 See the titles of Chapters I to III in: Beveridge, Lord, (1968) Power and Influence, Hodder &
Stoughton.
S Timmins, N., op.cit., p.13.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p.14.
8 Ibid.
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University he commissioned its totalitarian yet impressive Senate House - the
building which Hitler earmarked to be his London headquarters."
Although in 1937 he went back to Oxford as Master of University College, "his
academic appointments did not remove him entirely from power and
influence"." In 1934 he was appointed chairman of the Unemployment
Statutory Committee, whose job it was to keep the insurance fund solvent,
and in 1936 he was brought back into Whitehall to help devise the rationing
that operated from 1940.
Beveridge was well connected with Britain's collectivist elite. R. H. Tawney,
the Christian socialist thinker, was his brother-in-law and friend." He knew
well Sidney and Beatrice Webb, founders of the Fabian Society - who had
also introduced him to Churchill." Clement Attlee and Hugh Dalton, two men
to whom would fall the job of finding the cash for Beveridge's plan, had been
lecturers on his staff at the LSE.13 Dalton was to be Attlee's first Chancellor of
the Exchequer in 1945. As well as having worked with Churchill, Beveridge
was a friend of John Maynard Keynes - whose new economics were to
provide an intellectual justification for an ever expanding welfare state. He
also knew Seebohm Rowntree." And at Oxford his research assistant was a
bright young economist called Harold Wilson. 15
With the arrival of the Second World War Beveridge was eager to use his
talent and past experience in government. Along with other veterans of First
World War administration, he gravitated to Keyne's Bloomsbury house during
the autumn and winter of 1939.16
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
II Ibid. p.IS.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., pp.16-17. For more information see: Harris, 1.. (1977) William Beveridge. A Biography, Open
University Press.
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When Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940, Beveridge wrote to
remind him of their 'old association' and to offer his talents. He followed up
with letters to Clement AUlee, Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison, the key
Labour ministers in the newly formed coalition government. In July, Bevin
asked him to carry out a brief survey - in a firmly non-executive capacity - of
wartime manpower requirements." Finally, Beveridge was doing the work he
wanted to do.
The survey done, in December he again became a full-time civil servant as
under-secretary for the military service department at the Ministry of Labour.
In February 1941 the Trade Union Congress had been to government to lobby
about the chaotic and often contradictory array of government sickness and
disability schemes that were on offer to workers. As a result an inter-
departmental committee was proposed to Cabinet in April and Bevin offered
its chairmanship to Beveridge.
On initial inspection, the terms of reference sounded modest:
"To undertake, with special reference to the inter-relation of the
schemes, a survey of the existing national schemes of social insurance
and allied services, including workmen's compensation, and to make
recommendations. ,,18
However, Home Office and Ministry of Health officials had higher hopes and
wanted a broader examination. The Treasury on the other had saw the
committee in much more limited terms, and acting merely as a 'tidying up
operation'.
Beveridge sided with the Home Office and the Ministry of Health. He too
wanted a broader more visionary study and that is certainly what he set out to
construct.
17Timmins, N., op.cit., p.17. Also see: Harris, J0' op.cit.
18 Ibid., p.18.
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In all, 127 pieces of written evidence were to be received, and more than 50
private evidence sessions held with witnesses." But only one piece of written
evidence had arrived by December 1941 when Beveridge circulated a paper
entitled 'Heads of a Scheme' which contained the essence of the final report
to appear a year later.
The initial paper opened with the key statement that was to stretch the original
terms of reference up to and beyond their limit.
"1 No satisfactory scheme for social security can be devised [without
the] following assumptions.
A A national health service for prevention and comprehensive
treatment available to all members of the community.
B Universal children's allowances for all children up to 14 or if in full-
time education up to 16.
C Full use of powers of the state to maintain employment and to
reduce unemployment to seasonal, cyclical and interval
unemployment, that is to say to unemployment suitable for treatment
by cash allowances. ,,20
Work on the committee proceeded at a pace during 1942 as witnesses were
called and evidence taken. However, the credit for the report's popular impact
may need to go as much to Janet Mair as to Beveridge himself. As Nicholas
Timmins explains in his seminal The Five Giants - A Biography of the Welfare
State:
19 Ibid., p.20. . . . Co
20 Much of this paper was reproduced in Fraser, D., (1973) The EvolutIOn of the British Welfare State.
Macmillan, p. 265.
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"Jessy, as Janet Mair was known, was the wife of David Mair, a
somewhat austere mathematician and civil servant who was
Beveridge's cousin. She and Sir William had become close before the
First World War, Mrs Mair sharing... Beveridge's 'dreams and
ambitions'. A powerful personality in her own right, she and Beveridge
were to marry a fortnight after the report was published. They had,
however, already scandalised the 'lady censors of the University world'
when Mrs Mair moved into the Master's lodgings at University College
at the outbreak of war.,,21
During the crucial stages of the report's compilation in the spring and summer
of 1942, Jessy was staying with relatives in Scotland. According to
Beveridge's biographer, Jose Harris, it was she who had greatly encouraged
Beveridge not just to rationalise the existing insurance system but to lay down
long-term goals in many areas of social policy.22
When the report was finally published on 1 December 1942 its reception was
ecstatic. On the night before there were queues to buy it outside Her
Majesty's Stationary Office's headquarters in London's Kingsway. The first
60,000 copies of the full report at 2s. Od. a time were sold rapidly. Sales
topped 100,000 within a month and more than 200,000 by the end of 1944.
Although it is hard to believe that a majority of those who bought it made it
through to the end - much of this 200,OOO-word document was heavy going,
high on technical terms and detail - it was to have a profound impact on the
course of history and the continuing rise of the British state.
What made its reputation and provided its impact was the twenty page
introduction and the concluding twenty-page summary, separately published
in a cut-down version at 3d. Combined with the full report this took sales of
600,000.23
21 Timmins, N., op.cit., p.22.
22 Harris, J., op.cit., p. 387.
23 Addison, P., (1975) The Road to 1945, Jonathon Cape, p. 2 17.
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Overnight Beveridge became a popular national figure. However, if the
report's impact at home was spectacular, it was also pushed heavily overseas
by an initially enthusiastic Ministry of Information. Details of 'The Beveridge
Plan' were broadcast by the BBC from dawn on 1 December in twenty-two
languages. Copies were circulated to the troops, and sent to the United States
where the Treasury made a $5,000 profit on sales."
More copies were dropped into France and other parts of Nazi-occupied
Europe where they caused concern at the highest level.
With his experience of journalism, government and academia, Beveridge
made for a formidably intelligent and effective propagandist. Through
broadcasts, articles and half-leaks - he was an occasional member of the
massively influential radio 'Brains Trust' - he made very certain "that the world
knew it was coming".25
As early as April 1942, a Home Intelligence report noted:
"Sir William Beveridge's proposals for an "all-in" social security scheme
are said to be popular.?"
In the Autumn another Home Intelligence report stated that:
"Three years ago, the term social security was almost unknown to the
public as a whole. It now appears to be generally accepted as an
urgent post-war need. It is commonly defined as "a decent minimum
standard of living for all".,,27
In October, Brenden Bracken, the Minister of Information, wrote to Churchill:
24 Cootes, R, J., (1984) The Making of the Welfare State, Longman, p. 79.
2S Timmins, N., op.cit., pAD.
26 Ibid., pAl.
27 Addison, P., op.cit., pp. 215-216.
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"I have good reason to believe that some of Beveridge's friends are
playing politics and that when the report appears there will be an
immense amount of ballyhoo about the importance of implementing the
recommendations without delay.,,28
He was right, Beveridge and his friends were playing politics and doing
everything they could to expand the state. Whether consciously or otherwise,
there is clear evidence that Beveridge understood the implications of his
arguments and tactics. For example, in mid-November 1942, just a few weeks
before the report's publication, he told the Daily Telegraph that his proposals
would take Britain:
"... half-way to Moscow"."
Significantly, after the war, two papers marked 'secret' and providing a
detailed commentary of Beveridge's plan were found in Hitler's bunker. One
ordered that publicity should be avoided, but if mentioned the report should be
used as:
'... obvious proof that our enemies are taking over national-socialist
ideas,.3o
The other report provided an official assessment of the plans as no 'botch -
up':
"... a consistent system... of remarkable simplicity... superior to the
current German social insurance in almost all points"."
Although members of parliament from across the Labour, Liberal and
Communist parties were clearly in favour of Beveridge's plans - and in
particular the idea of a National Health Service - Churchill reacted on 21
28 Ibid., p. 216.
29 Timmins, N., op.cit., pAl.
30 Ibid., p.25.
31 Fritz Grunder, Beveridge Meets Bismarck, York Papers, Vol. I., p.69.
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March 1943. In a broadcast entitled 'After the War' - his first major broadcast
to concentrate on the home front - he promised:
II ••• national compulsory insurance for all classes for all purposes from
the cradle to the grave."32
It was therefore Churchill, rather than Beveridge, who defined the plans in
terms of running 'from the cradle to the grave' as he signed the wartime
coalition up to it.
In February 1944 the government published White Papers on a National
Health Service and Employment Policy. It set up a Ministry of National
Insurance, and delivered the 1944 Education Act. A housing White Paper
followed in March 1945 and on 11 June, as virtually the final act of the
coalition government, the Family Allowances Act became law.
From the outset the health White Paper, A National Health Service, was seen
as bold, far reaching and crystal clear. It made clear that everybody:
II' ••• irrespective of means, age, sex, or occupation shall have equal
opportunity to benefit from the best and most up-to-date medical and
allied services available'; that the service should be 'comprehensive'
for all who wanted it; that it should be 'free of charge', and that it should
promote good health 'rather than only the treatment of bad,."33
As such, it was now certain that a National Health Service, largely tax-
financed, free at the point of use, and comprehensive, covering family
doctors, dentists, hospitals and more would be made a reality.
32 For more information see: Addison, op.cit., p.228.
33 Foot, Michael, Aneurin Bevan, A Biography. Vol. One: 1879-1945,Vo.l Two 1945-60, Four Square,
1966, 1973, p. 131.
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Following the 1945 General Election, Labour's 146 majority was the largest
the party had ever known. Upon arrival, Labour MPs horrified the
Conservative benches by singing 'The Red Flag' in the Commons chamber."
The appointment of Aneurin Bevan to the Ministry of Health by Prime Minister
Clement Attlee was a gamble. Bevan was one of only two Cabinet ministers
who had not served in the wartime coalition. "A stormy petrel" with "a magic all
of his own", he was one of "the most hated - if also the most idolized -
politicians of his time"." Above all else, this forty-five-year-old ex-miner,
however, proved himself at the Ministry of Health to be:
"...an artist in the uses of power"."
Bevan was to capitalise not only on the intellectual and institutional tides of
previous decades - and in particular the all important work of Sir William
Beveridge - but he also established the National Health Service in the wake of
a greatly expanded war-time state. As Nicholas Timmins has commented:
"By October 1939 the government had provided nearly 1000 new
operating theatres, millions of bandages and dressings, and tens of
thousands of extra beds in 'hutted annexes' some of which remained in
use for more than two decades after the war. A national blood
transfusion service had been created. As the war progressed, free
treatment under the emergency scheme had gradually to be extended
from direct war casualties to war workers, child evacuees, firemen and
so on, until a sixty-two page booklet was needed to define who was
eligible. Although the elderly and others remained excluded, between
1939 and 1945 'a growing section of the population enjoyed the
benefits of the first truly "national" hospital service"."
34 Timmins, N., op.cit., p. 102.
35 Ibid.
36 Morgan, K., 0, (1992) Labour People - Hardie to Kinnock, Oxford Paperbacks, Oxford University
Press, pp.204-5.
37 Calder, A., (1969) The People's War, Jonathon Cape, pp. 538-9; Addison, op.cit, p. 179.
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By March 1946, Bevan had drawn up proposals that were to form the National
Health Service Bill. On the question of what to do with local municipal and
independent voluntary hospitals his idea was 'revolutionary' and seemingly
'inevitable':
"His answer. ..was to take the lot... into public ownership... ,,38
As a sign of the times, when the Bill was published in March 1946, it was not
the idea of nationalising the hospitals but Bevan's proposals for general
practitioners that caused the greatest reaction.
Bevan proposed that family doctors should be paid a basic salary and
capitation fees on top. However, on this point, the BMA "exploded"." Doctors
were concerned that the plans would over time lead to a full-time salaried
service under either state or local government. As such, doctors would be
reduced to civil servants, and clinical independence and freedom of speech
gravely threatened. One commentator, Dr. Alfred Cox, a former secretary of
the BMA wrote to the British Medical Journal declaring:
"I have examined the Bill and it looks to me uncommonly like the first
step, and a big one, towards National Socialism as practised in
Germany. The medical service there was early put under the
dictatorship of a "medical Fuehrer". This Bill will establish the Minister
of Health in that capacity."?
Dr. Cox's views were shared by a high proportion of the profession. At a
meeting of a thousand doctors in Wimbledon Town Hall shortly after the Bill
was published, Bevan was called 'a dictator' and 'an autocrat'. "This Bill"
argued one doctor:
38 Timmins, N., op.cit., p.I13.
39 Ibid., p.IIS.
40 Ibid., p.119.
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"... is strongly suggestive of the Hitlerite regime now being destroyed in
Germany.?"
Another person denounced the hospital proposals as:
"... the greatest seizure of property since Henry VIII confiscated the
monasteries"."
Throughout the dispute ridden months between April 1946 and the appointed
day on 5th July 1948 when the National Health Service would begin, the
argument was repeatedly heard that Bevan's plans on health and in particular
for the GPs were the "thin end of the wedge".43
As part of the process of Bevan's negotiations with the Royal Colleges, he
eventually became persuaded that part-time consultants should continue to
practice privately in NHS 'pay beds'. Without this concession on the part of
the government there was a real risk that specialists would refuse to join the
new state service and in Bevan's own words leave to establish "a rash of
private nursing homes all over the country"."
Moreover, Bevan was also persuaded to provide merit awards - in addition to
consultant's basic salaries, for those doctors whom their peers judged worthy.
A decade later, Bevan at a private dinner in the House of Commons boasted
in one of his famous asides that to create the NHS and with reference to the
medical profession:
"I stuffed their mouths with gold".45
41 Ibid., p. 119.
42 Foot, M., op.cit., p.143.
43 Timmins, N., op.cit., p.l12.
44 Webster, C; (l988)The Health Services Since the War, Volume I: Problems of Health Care. The
National Health Success, Association of Community Health Councils, p.?3.
45 Charles Webster, Aneurin Bevan on the National Health Service, Welcome Unit for the History of
Medicine, Oxford, pp. 219-22.
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In 1948 just prior to the appointed day, the government issued a leaflet to
every home in the country. It contained - in black and white - the promise that
was the NHS. Extolling the virtues of the new National Health Service it
assured the reader that the NHS:
"...will provide you with all medical, dental and nursing care. Everyone
- rich or poor - can use it.,,46
The key word here was the word all. The state was going to offer
comprehensive, universal and unlimited healthcare for everyone, whatever
their need.
In early July 1948 the Daily Mail stated:
"On Monday morning you will wake up in a new Britain, in a state which
'takes over' its citizens six months before they are born, providing care
and free services for their birth, for their early years, their schooling,
sickness, workless days, widowhood and retirement. All this with free
doctoring, dentistry and medicine - free bath-chairs, too, if needed -
for 4/11d out of your weekly pay packet. You begin paying next
Friday.,,47
The Reality of Rationing
Today, more half a century on, it is arguable that the NHS has never delivered
upon its early promise. Beyond the simplistic world of media impression,
rationing through a number of means has always been rife in the NHS and
with patients often being denied the high quality treatment and care they
require.
In reality, it did not take the 1945 Labour government long to realise that the
NHS was not going to keep up with - or reduce as some had suggested -
46 Department of Health leaflet announcing the NHS, July 1948.
47 Daily Mail, 3 July, 1948.
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people's demand for healthcare." As Celia Hall, medical editor of the
Independent recalled in 1989:
"I remember a Medical Officer of Health in Birmingham, now dead,
telling me they were so terrified that there would be a stampede for
everything free on the day that the staff arrived early and literally
barricaded themselves into their offices, peering out. Needless to say,
this being Britain, soon after 9 o'clock a neat, orderly and not very long
queue of mothers and babies formed up outside.r"
While a number of experts had popularised the view that there might be an
'initial surge' in demand for spectacles and false teeth and then demand
would decrease it soon became clear that such theorising was wrong.
Within eighteen months of the service having been established, Bevan was
himself admitting that there were problems:
"I shudder to think of the ceaseless cascade of medicine which IS
pouring down British throats at this time."so
While he had been aware of the unpredictability of the costs of the service in
advance, telling Dalton that it would take a full year's experience to know
them, he had also initially insisted that the NHS's high costs would fall as the
backlog of disease was treated."
Back in 1944, Bevan's White paper, A National Health Service, estimated that
the service would cost taxpayers £132 million per year. However, this was
revised upwards to £152 million in 1946 and again to £230 million just before
the Act came into force in July 1948.
48 Rudolf Klein, The Politics of the National Health Service, Longman, London, 2nd edition, 1989, p.35.
49 Alice Law, recalling 5 July 1948; Peter Hennessy, (1992) Never Again, Britain 1945-51, Jonathan
Cape, p. 174.
50 Webster, Health Services Since the War, p. 145.
51 Timmins, N., op.cit., p. 132.
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In its first full year of operation - 1949-1950 - the NHS actually ended up
costing £305 million and required a supplementary estimate of £98 million.52
The early estimates of expenditure were ultimately inaccurate not only
because the government assumed that the service would account for a small
and stable share of public expenditure but because their projections were
based on extrapolations of pre-war spending levels which were mainly on
cheaper preventative measures.
The inaccuracy of the estimates can be attributed to a number of factors. The
first was that the early projections of cost assumed that demand would remain
roughly constant, despite there being no price constraints on demand - the
service being 'free' at the point of use.
Secondly, contemporary social and medical developments exacerbated the
problems created by an absence of any price constraints on demand, not
least because medial advances at the time meant that there was a dramatic
expansion in the type and range of health services which could be made
available. As Timmins has noted:
"Streptomycin was not the only medical advance that became
available. In the twenty-first century it is easily forgotten that the NHS
has always had to absorb such costs to survive. In the service's first
eighteen months other new antibiotics became available. So did
tubocurarine, the muscle relaxant still in use today which rapidly
widened the types of surgery which could be performed. Pernicious
anaemia became treatable for the first time, new prophylactics became
available for diphtheria, while cortisone, the first effective treatment for
rheumatoid arthritis, was discovered. Many of these new treatments
were both scarce and horrendously expensive. It was evidently
impossible instantly to 'universalise the best'. It was, however, possible
rationally to extend it by limiting the new treatments initially to specialist
52 Rudolf Klein (1989) The Politics of the National Health Service, Longman, London, 2nd Edition,
p.34.
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centres before falling prices allowed their more general use: the NHS's
first - and perennial - answer to the rationing issue."53
In many ways the NHS was designed to provide a style of health care that
was more appropriate to the 19th century rather than the 20th century. Previous
improvements in health had been brought about through large scale
immunisation and better sanitation and nutrition. These measures had been
relatively inexpensive, easy to administer and subject to large economies of
scale.
The zo" century, however, characteristically saw the development of
treatments for a range of degenerative conditions and most of these have
tended to require a range of costly individual actions and medications.
Crucially, effective treatments for degenerative conditions have not lowered
health costs in the way that the eradication of conditions like smallpox once
did.54
The number of people most likely to suffer these degenerative conditions has
steadily increased as life expectancy rates have improved, placing further
pressures on healthcare. In 1901, for example, people over the age of 50
comprised just 14.8 per cent of the United Kingdom's population, whereas by
1951 they accounted for 27.6 per cent. By 1981 the figure had reached 31.8
per cent and continues to rise.55
Government realised early on that it could not afford a health service that was
entirely free at the point of use. Although this was one of the founding
principles of Bevan's NHS, it was actually abandoned within five years of the
53 Timmins, N., op.cit., pp. 131-132
54 Jim Bourlet (1994) Rationing and the Future of UK Healthcare, London, Independent Healthcare
Association, pp.2-3. . th
55 David and Gareth Butler, British Political Facts 1900-1985, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 6
edition, 1986, p.235.
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1944 White Paper. In 1949, an amending Act was passed to allow the levying
of a one shilling charge on prescnptlons."
By 1950 the system was under such pressure that one commentator, Cecile
Palmer, went so far as to state in his seminal The British Socialist III-Faire
State:
"Today, Great Britain is short of doctors and nurses. Our hospital
services are being drastically economised, and building new ones to
relieve the pressure of public demand is virtually suspended in
consequence of largely inevitable cuts in our capital expenditure
programmes. The much-publicised new clinics, which we were led to
believe would solve most of the doctors' domestic and professional
problems and incontestably make miserable patients happy, have not
materialised and never will do so in a constipated socialist economy
that is constantly under the necessity of robbing Peter to pay Paul.,,57
After the Conservative election victory of 1951, further charges were
introduced for prescriptions, spectacles and dental treatment. Indeed, it was
as far back as 1956 that the system of levying prescription charges by the
number of items prescribed was first introduced.
The aim of these charging mechanisms was to simultaneously open a new
source of funding revenue for the NHS whilst also deterring 'frivolous' demand
for healthcare. But these measures proved to be grossly inadequate. For
while there was some slowing in the rate of increase in the prescriptions
issued, the revenue raised was never as significant as the Treasury would
have liked.
In 1950-51, charges contributed less than one per cent to the NHS budget
and even their largest contribution later in the decade was only 5.3 per cent."
S6 Jim Bourlet, op.cit., p.3.
S7 Royal Commission on the National Health Service, Cmnd 7615,1979, p. 436.
S8 Klein, op.cit., p.39.
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Another check to demand was a more deliberate rationing of supply - through
scarcity rather than price. While doctors who worked in NHS hospitals had
been encouraged at first to treat their patients according to need, and not to
be deterred by financial considerations, the imposition of cash limits soon
turned them into allocators of scarce resources.
More than minimal care was denied to cases where there was little chance of
successful recovery, particularly to young children or the elderly with serious
conditions. Indeed, health care for everyone else was provided sparingly by
international standards. In the late 1970s for example coronary artery by-pass
operations were performed about ten times more frequently pro rata in
America than in Britain. And where these did not increase life expectancy,
they tended to reduce adverse symptoms such as pain. While American
doctors responded to complaints about pain, British doctors have tended to
pay more attention to the probable increases in life expectancy, or the
improvements in a 'quality of life' not always synonymous with an absence of
serious discomfort.59
The supply of health care has again been rationed still further by queuing.
Crowded waiting rooms are common in most general practices and out-
patient departments. And queues have become a fact of life for in-patients,
often with long waiting periods for those operations given priority. Even in the
1980s and 1990s, after years of reforms designed to cut waiting lists, the
median time to have a hernia repaired was more than 10 weeks and 14 for
having a cataract treated." The waiting times for many other less urgent
procedures have usually been measured in months.
Certain health services have never been provided by the NHS, reducing the
demand on its resources still further. Most forms of cosmetic surgery have
rarely been available and face lifts, liposuction, hair transplants and sex
59 Henry J Aron and William R. Schwartz, The Painful Prescription: Rationing Hosptial Care,
Brookings Institute, Wahsington DC, 1984, p.67.
60 Klein, op.cit., p.155.
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change operations have never been provided except where they have been
deemed necessary for reasons of health or as part of some other form of
treatment. Other services have been provided on a minimal basis too. Much
psychiatry, the treatment of infertility and substance misuse services remain
cases in point.
Against the popular view that the NHS exists to provide 'free' and virtually
unlimited healthcare, history demonstrates that the supply of NHS services
has always been limited in significant ways. In reality, people have never had
an absolute right to free and equal treatment on demand in the NHS. What
they have had - in the main - is an unlimited right of access to a waiting list
from which - with a few exceptions - they will not be excluded.
This right of access is not equivalent to a right to treatment, as any notional
right to treatment has little value in practice if it is only available at the end of a
two year waiting time. The right to healthcare is unlimited in the long term, but
is strictly limited in the short term when healthcare is actually required, at the
very least, to relieve pain or discomfort.
The Reality of Investment
As part of the 1946 Act's nationalisation process, NHS hospital building was
to be financed by central government grants and funded out of general
taxation and national insurance contributions.
However, in the early years, the government made very little investment in its
nationalised health estate. Not until the mid-1950s did a gradual release of
funding allow new hospital building in some areas - and only then on a very
limited basis.
Then, in July 1960, Enoch Powell became the Minister of Health. He arrived
at a time of growing economic concern which in government circles
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culminated in the 1961 Plowden report." It attempted to reconcile the
Treasury's requirement for an annual budget in order to control spending with
the demands of state welfare policy, including the NHS. The result was a five-
year rolling programme which was approved each year by the Expenditure
Survey Committee but was then subject to revision in each annual bid - the
so-called PESC round.
It was this work that started to address the fundamental issue of expenditure
and the NHS's problems concerning capital investment. For during the first
decade of the NHS, not a single new hospital had been built. None had even
been approved until 1956.62
In the early 1960s the hospital estate that was in use was either that inherited
from the independent sector or from local government. To address the
problem Powell raised a number of NHS charges:
"... including a doubling of the prescription charge from 1s. od. To 2s
od (10p) an item.,,63
The higher charges were in part to finance the great 'Hospital Plan' which was
finally launched in January 1962. It aimed at a £500 million programme over a
decade to build 90 new hospitals, drastically remodel 134 more and provide
356 further improvement schemes - each costing over £100,000.
While there had been a few hospital extensions, new theatres, out-patient
departments and other refurbishments, in the thirteen years from 1948 only
£157 million had been spent nationally: well under a third of the figure now
being proposed.
Explaining the parlous situation Timmins has observed:
61 Report on the Control of Public Expenditure (The Plowden Report), Cmnd 1432, HMSO, 1961.
62 A Hospital Plan for England and Wales, Cmnd 1604,1962, pp. 1-2,13.
63 Timmins, N., op.cit. p. 208.
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"NHS hospitals had, quite simply, lost out to new schools and housing.
In the fourteen New Towns, for example, new schools had to be
provided for children; patients, however, could still be told to travel for
treatment and in 1953 they had boasted 'not a hospital between
them'.,,64
In his 1956 work, The Future of Socialism, Anthony Crossland argued that:
"The voters, now convinced that full employment, generous services
and social stability can quite well be preserved, will certainly not
relinquish them. Any Government which tampered seriously with the
basic structure of the...Welfare State would meet with a sharp reverse
at the polls.,,65
However, less than a decade later, the unimaginable was being thought of as
a serious option. As Britain's economic performance failed to keep pace with
politician's promises - and rising public expectations - so views began to
polarise on the post-war settlement and the NHS.
In 1957 the Institute of Economic Affairs (lEA) had been founded. An
independent think tank dedicated to the promotion of classical libertarian
ideas, by the early to mid-1960s it was promoting what were later to be
become seminal ideas concerning the necessary break up of state provision
through various forms of tax relief, privatisation and private insurance.
Throughout the 1960s the ideas and influence of the lEA began to permeate
British political consciousness.
In 1961 the lEA published Health Through Choice by D. S. Lees, an
economics lecturer at what was later to become the University of Keele. He
argued that medical care was essentially a consumer good 'not markedly
different' from others'." And he went on:
64 Ibid., pp. 209-210.
65 Anthony Crosland, (1956) The Future of Socialism, Cape, p. 61.
66 Timmins, N., op.cit., 250-251.
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"Spending on the NHS had probably been lower than consumers
themselves would have chosen precisely because politicians rather
than the market made the decisions.,,67
The answer he prescribed was for the state to:
"... move away from taxation and free services to private insurance and
fees. ,,68
Lees argued for tax concessions to be granted to those who could afford to
provide for themselves and for means-tested assistance to be given to the
"dwindling minority" who could not.
By the mid-1960s the lEA was promoting the idea of vouchers for healthcare
and openly expounding the virtues of private provision. Although such ideas
were judged to be politically unacceptable at the time by those in the political
mainstream, such views did slowly permeate Britain's political conversation.
From the mid-1960s onwards evidence mounted that the consensual
pragmatism of the post-war settlement was under strain. As Britain's
economic performance declined - and academics, journalists and other
opinion formers questioned its overall direction - so government's ability to
keep up with required NHS investment particularly in terms of capital
expenditure came under pressure.
The 1964 balance of payments crisis; the sterling crisis of 1965 and 1966; the
devaluation of the pound in 1967; the industrial strife of the early 1970s; the
International Monetary Fund loan of 1976; the winter of discontent in 1978-9.
All these milestones act as a testimony to the fact that the ambitions of the
political class were no longer being met given the parlous realities of the
nation's economy.
67 Ibid., p. 250.
68 Ibid.
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"By the mid-1970s, the wave of capital investment that had inaugurated
the hospital plan for the NHS was effectively at an end. The squeeze
on capital was reflected across all government departments in which,
between 1974 and 1998, total net annual capital expenditure fell from
£28.8bn to 3.3bn in 1998 prices."s9
Today, much of the NHS estate that people see was inherited in the late
1940s and therefore remains largely unchanged:
"Today, the infrastructure still retains many pre-NHS features and a
significant proportion of the stock predates the First World War. Capital
spending has been insufficient to either replace or maintain outworn
and outmoded buildings.,,7o
This reality is significant because Beveridge had originally believed that the
NHS would raise the general level of health and fitness of the nation - and
increase national prosperity through a reduction of sickness absence - to
such a point that it would fundamentally raise people's productivity.
As such, he believed the NHS would broadly pay for itself - or at the very
least not be subject to endlessly rising costs. In his 1942 report he had
asserted:
"... there will actually be some development of the service, and as a
consequence of this development a reduction in the number of cases
requiring it".71
69 Gaffuey, D., Pollock, A. M., Price, D., Shaoul, 1., NHS Capital Expenditure and the Private Finance
Initiative - expenditure, (1999) HM Treasury, Financial Statement and Budget Report 1999-2000.
London, HMSO.
69 Gaffuey, D., et al., Ibid.
69 See Timmins, N., op.cit. p. 260.Expansion or Contraction, British Medical Journal, 3 July 1999,
31:48-51. Also see: Table B28: Historical series of government expenditure, (1999) HM Treasury,
Financial Statement and Budget Report 1999-2000. London, HMSO.
70 Gaffuey, D., et al., Ibid.
71 See Timmins, N., op.cit. p. 260.
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Most importantly of all, he even went so far as to assume that the NHS would
actually cost the same amount of money in 1965 as he tentatively assumed it
would cost in 1945 - £175m.72
In reality, the economic crisis of the 1960s and 1970s led to attempts to find
sources of financing other than government borrowing. And in 1973, regional
health authorities were allowed for the first time to use the proceeds from land
sales for investment.73
As a result of gradual and persistent economic decline - and as Declan
Gaffney, Allyson Pollock, David Price and Jean Shaoul have pointed out -
although the principle of major hospital investment was initially adopted in the
NHS under Powell's 1962 hospital plan, even in the 1990s:
"The plan...remains unfulfilled, with only a third of the projected 224
schemes completed, and a third not yet started"?"
Despite depressed prices in the late 1980s, land sales have become an
increasingly important source of capital funding over recent decades. By
1998-9, they accounted for over a third of NHS capital expenditure."
Since 1992, most new capital investment in the NHS has been arranged
under a scheme somewhat ironically known as the private finance initiative
(PFI). Here the private sector designs, builds, finances, owns and operates
key areas of NHS provision - including some services." Although this policy
was initially adopted by John Major's Conservative government, it has since
been actively embraced by Tony Blair's Labour administration:
72 Cmnd 6404, p. 105; S. P. W. Care in Oxford Textboo of Public Health Vol. 1.,1984, pp. 13.14.
73 Meara, R., (1991) Unfreezing the assets: NHS estate management in the 1980s, King's Fund Institute
Research Report 11, London, Kings Fund.
74 Gaffney., D., et al., op.cit.
75 Ibid.
76 For more see: Ibid.
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"In the absence of new capital, NHS trusts have no other recourse but
to pursue the private finance initiative to finance new mvestment."?
In recent years, under the general rubric of public private partnership (PPP)
the government has championed a whole raft of market-oriented NHS
reforms. In 2000 the Secretary of State for Health, Alan Milburn, signed a
Concordat with the representative body of Britain's, by now re-emergent,
independent health and social care sector - the Independent Healthcare
Association (IHA).78 Under this agreement, the NHS could send its patients to
independent hospitals and clinics for treatment and care."
Between 2000 and 2003 more than 250,000 NHS funded patients received
treatment and care in the independent sector and others were sent to private
hospitals abroad.
In 2001, the government made it clear that it wanted the private sector to
design, build and operate a new generation of Diagnostic and Treatment
Centres (DTCs) for the benefit of NHS funded patients. More recently, the
government named the private companies that would bid for the contracts. All
of them were foreign new market entrants - thereby underlining a new era of
competition in healthcare provision."
Again in 2001, the government also made it clear that it wanted to establish a
new generation of independent Foundation Hospitals. As such, it wanted the
best NHS hospitals to be "set free" from Whitehall control and to have a
greater say over how they developed and from where they raised their
capital."
77 Ibid.
78 The Independent Healthcare Association was the main representative body of the UK's independent
health and social care sector. After more than fifty years of work it closed in 2004.
79 For a detailed overview of the Concordat and how it came about see: Allyson M., Pollock, (2004)
NHS pic: The Privatisation of Our Healthcare, London, Verso, pp.66-68.
80 Ibid., pp.68-71.
81 Ibid., pp.71-77.
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Overall, the historic direction of travel in the NHS is clear. Selling off NHS
land, PFI, PPPs, the Concordat with the IHA, orcs and Foundation hospitals
point to an increasingly privatised future. Slowly, the NHS is being redefined
as a funder of healthcare but not as a provider - or owner - of the facilities in
which the services are delivered.
The Reality of Class
In theory the National Health Service exists to treat the whole population and
people of all social classes in an equitable manner, and according to need.
However, in practice the historical evidence suggests that this has rarely
happened.
Clearly, the health of the population as a whole has improved in recent
decades. By the early 1990s, a baby boy could expect to live to seventy-three
and a girl to seventy-nme." More than 50 per cent of boys and more than 60
per cent of girls now have a life expectancy of eighty.83 Measures such as
height, nutrition and dental care are all similarly improved.
However, while such facts are loudly trumpeted by politicians as
achievements of the NHS, such views often deceive as much as they
enlighten:
"Lower occupational groups have been found to experience more
illness which is both chronic and incapacitating. Although it is taken for
granted that sickness will happen to almost everyone sooner or later, it
seems that lower occupational groups experience it earlier and this
must be seen as a major inequality in a welfare society. Other indirect
measures of affluence and poverty, such as household-based
82 NHS Statistical Bulletin, 18 August 1995.
83 Michael Benzeval, Ken Judge and Margaret Whitehead, Tackling Inequalities in Health, Kings Fund,
London, p. 10.
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classifications and employment status, also highlight inequalities In
health."84
Almost all health indicators confirm the persistent association between the
prevalence of ill health and poor social and economic circumstances. The
1981 census revealed, for instance, that the premature death rate was twice
as high in the lowest social class as in the highest.
Using the Registrar General's classification, the life expectancy for a child with
parents in social class V - unskilled manual - is over seven years less than for
a child whose parents are in social class I - professional. Male manual
workers have premature death rates 45 per cent higher than non-manual
workers." The number of premature deaths connected with manual work is
greater than the total number of deaths from strokes, infectious diseases,
accidents, lung cancer and other respiratory diseases combined."
Significantly, the socio-economic differences in mortality are not simply
confined to a few isolated diseases associated with particular occupations or
lifestyles. Of the sixty-six 'major list' causes of death among men, sixty-two
are more common in social groups IV and V than among all others. And of the
seventy major causes for women, sixty-four are more common in groups IV
and V.8?
Equally important in all of this is the persistence, despite the existence of the
NHS, of inequalities in access to health care. For example, a study in
Newcastle in 1985 showed that dental services were more widely available to
residents of affluent areas than to those of the poor areas designated 'priority'
by the Department of Health."
84 Margaret Whitehead (1992) The Health Divide, Penguin, London, p. 263.
8.5 Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard (1997) A Class Act: The Myth of Britain's Classless Society,
London, Hamish Hamilton, p.171.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., p.172.
88 Ibid., p.278.
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Analyses of GP consultations have shown that higher social class patients
invariably receive more sophisticated explanations and details of their
treatment than lower social class patients." And that the middle classes
spend more time on average with their GP than those with working-class
backgrounds." There is also clear evidence that classes I and II are more
likely to be referred to specialists by their GP than classes IV and V.91
In 1993, there were 8.4 full-time GPs per 10,000 patients in Manchester,
compared with only 5.6 in Rotherharn."
Julian Le Grand has shown that - relative to need - professional and
managerial groups receive more than 40 per cent more NHS spending per
illness episode than those people in semi - and unskilled jobs. Those in the
highest income groups who report their health as 'not good' use 2 per cent
more GP services and 17 per cent more in-patient services than those in the
lowest groups.93
It is much the same for primary care. Individuals from areas with high
deprivation have a low uptake of imrnunization'" and there is a lower
utilization of health promotion clinics among poorer social and economic
groups.
Researchers in Glasgow even discovered that clinical investigations for heart
disease were performed more frequently on patients from more affluent
neighbourhoods - despite their having a lower incidence of such disease."
89 Ibid.
90 Michael Benzeval, Ken Judge and Margaret Whitehead, (1995) Tackling Inequalities in Health,
London, Kings Fund, p.1 04.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid,. p.99.
93 Ibid., p.l 02.
94 Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard, op.cit., p.179.
9S Ibid.
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Commenting on the NHS's legitimacy Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard
concluded in their 1998 book, A Class Act The Myth of Britain's Classless
Society:
"... in reality the NHS owes its effectiveness and popularity in large part
to the fact that it is not egalitarian. The comfortably off revere the NHS
in no small part because they get a good bargain out of it, and are thus
happy to feel good about themselves by continuing to pay for what they
are told is a subsidy to the poor.,,96
The Reality of Employment
More than half a century on from its inception the NHS faithfully exhibits the
full range and dynamics of Britain's class hierarchy. As the largest employer in
the country, and the single most important pillar of the welfare state, the
service employs around 1 million people - or 3.5 per cent of all those in
work." A microcosm of class structure, Adonis and Pollard, assert:
"At the top of the NHS are the hospital-based consultants (at the very
top are the consultants of the London teachings hospitals)... Below the
consultants is the upper middle class of the medical profession - the
senior managers, who may earn as much as the consultants but who
are the nouveaux riches of the service. Next comes the middle middle
class, the GPs - some through choice, some because they have not
quite made it. An increasing number of these are female - often
because women realise pretty soon that they are unlikely to make it up
the hospital career ladder. There is then a dramatic drop to the skilled,
lower middle class: the nurses, therapists, technologists and
technicians, who are mainly female. And below them is the proletariat -
the auxiliary, ancillary and service personnel, who are overwhelmingly
female.,,98
96 Ibid., p.180.
97 Ibid., p.155.
98 Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard, op.cit., pp.155-156.
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Over 250 hospital consultants earn from the NHS alone £102,240 per
annum" And above that are those who are employed for specific talents that
are in short supply in an area and who, according to one trust, earn "up to
£20,000 above the NHS maxlrnum".'?" Brian Hanson, chairman of Hartlepool
and Peterlee Hospital Trust, has described the inflation in consultants' pay:
"It is a common problem nationwide that hospitals have in getting
suitably qualified staff. Some trusts have hired consultants at double
the going rate.,,101
In 1996, NHS consultants were contracted with a basic salary from £42,000 to
£54,000 a year. But any consultant who took home only his basic salary
would be a very disappointed man (and man is what 82 per cent of them are).
For, in what Ray Rowden, the former director of the Institute of Health
Services Management has described as 'the biggest fraud since the Mafia',
consultants award each other merit payments of up to another £51,710.102
"Not bonus payments for good work, determined annually as in most
comparable walks of life; but merit payments, approved once, and
awarded for the rest of the career. And they do this through a system
which, since its inception with the coming of the NHS, has remained
secret, with unpublished criteria. ,,103
Doctors from ethnic minority backgrounds are far less likely to be given
consultant jobs than whites. After examining 418 vacancies in forty-five NHS
Trusts, in 1991 and 1992, in three specialities where ethnic minorities were
rare (general medicine, surgery and geriatrics), the Commission for Racial
Equality (CRE) found that out of 147 consultant vacancies, 53 per cent of
applicants were from ethnic minorities and 27 per cent of the appointments,
99 TheTimes, lOth January 1996.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard, op.cit., p.164.
103 Ibid., p.l 64.
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and of 130 senior registrar vacancies, 37 per cent of applicants were from
ethnic minorities and only 17 per cent of appointments. The CRE concluded:
"The disparities in success rates ...were so marked and consistent, and
the omission of procedural safeguards too routine, that the possibility of
discrimination cannot be ignored.,,104
Below the elite of consultants comes the medical middle class - the GPs.
From the beginning of the NHS, GPs used their influence to avoid a salaried
service. Instead, they have preferred to keep the benefits of self-employment
and payment on the basis of fees and allowances.
The government sets an 'intended annual net remuneration' of £44,770, and
expects to take-home pay to average out at £59,410. But as a guide to real
pay the official figure is often of limited use. For instance, in 1995 10 per cent
of GPs took home less than £24,000. So, just as there is a hierarchy of
consultants, so there is with GPs. As one in-house guide to the medial
profession - Official Doctor/Patient Handbook - puts it:
"The range of pay is enormous, probably varying from as low as
£20,000 for the struggling, often foreign, inner-city single-handed
doctor with a very small list to as high as £100,000 for the slick, Home
Counties, business oriented doctor who is running three nursing
homes."!"
Pay is supposedly determined by the number of patients on a GPs list,
together with a multitude of 'weighing' factors such as patients' age.
"But for those lucky enough to work in a large rural area, dispensing
their own presriptions and with long car journeys (to take advantage of
104 Appointing NHS Consultants and Senior Registrars: Report of a Formal Investigation, Commission
for Racial Equality, April 1996.
lOS Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard, op.cit., p.166.
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generous mileage allowances), income can increase by around 25 per
cent.,,106
Today, the NHS is no longer run just by its doctors. Managers' power has
increased dramatically in recent years - as has their pay. As Adonis and
Pollard again note:
"Before the NHS reforms of 1988 and the introduction of trusts, each
unit had a general manager on about £35,000 p.a. Cleaners earned
just under £6,000. Now, the average chief executive's pay is about
£60,000, with some on over £100,000. Cleaners' pay has also
increased. It is now just over £6,000. Since 1979 the pay of medical
practitioners and nurses has improved, with doctors starting from an
already high base. From an already low base, the position of porters
and orderlies has deteriorated far more than that of the unskilled in the
economy as a whole."!"
Half of the people who work in the NHS are nurses. Nine out of ten of these
are women. Nurse salaries account for 27 per cent of total NHS spending.108
For many years nurses were thought of as being just a step up from porters
and orderlies, and quite distinct from the medical professions. While the
doctors' car park is considered essential, nurses need only travel by bus.
In recent years, the traditional view of nursing has begun to change and
nurses have asserted their case for higher status within the NHS.
"The modern teaching hospital nurse, with her new education - her A
levels and sometimes a degree, and her state of the art training
undertaken through a college of higher education - is too qualified to
106 Ibid., p.166.
107 Ibid., p.167.
108 Ibid., p.168.
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waste her time on emptying bedpans, dressing wounds and preventing
bedsores. That is now for the ancillary staff.,,1 09
The nurse, according to the Official Doctor/Patient Handbook:
"...who should be doing the nursing sits at the nursing station
pretending to be a doctor...The nurses...are sitting at their consoles
pretending to read ECGs and to interpret complex biochemical
investigations. They do not take responsibility for these
"interpretations", but drive the doctors mad with their helpful
suggestions."11 0
The NHS has more women employees than any similar organisation. Women
represent more than 75 per cent of non-medical staff and 45 per cent of
general managers. Yet they account only for 28 per cent of chief executives
and senior managers and 18 per cent of consultants. Importantly, there are
almost no black or ethnic minority managers. The women who do make it to
the top jobs have, as a group, far fewer family ties than their male
counterparts. Among top NHS managers, 50 per cent of women have no
children, whereas for men, this is true only for some 7 per cent.
Again, among support staff, 85.9 per cent of clerical workers and more than
60 per cent of ancillary staff are female.
If one looks at the NHS from the inside, however it is staffed and organised,
the reality is clear.
"... if we look at how it is structured, and at those who work in it - we
can see that it is indeed a fair microcosm of Britain's class structure.
Just as the classless society is itself a myth, so too is the comforting
classless NHS.,,111
109Ibid., pp.168-169.
110 John Duckworth, (1994) The Official DoctorlPatient Handbook, London, Harriman House, p.142.
111 Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard, op.cit., p.169.
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The Reality of Care
Today, the NHS has one million people on waiting lists and around another
200,000 people trying to get onto them.112
In NHS hospitals, more than 10 per cent of patients pick up infections and
illnesses they did not have prior to being admitted.!"
And according to the Malnutrition Advisory Group up to 60 per cent of NHS
hospital patients are under-nourished during inpatient stays.!"
In many areas, it is increasingly difficult for people to get an appointment with
an NHS GP - or to even find an NHS denttst.!"
The old are particular victims of the NHS. A recent King's Fund study, based
on a survey of managers in hospitals, primary care groups, community trusts
and social services departments, found evidence of persistent ageism in the
way the NHS allocates resources and priorities treatments.!" An American
study found that:
"British elders are frequently denied access to expensive technologies
from which they are likely to benetlt".""
The interim Wanless Report into NHS financing confirmed the low priority
status of services for the old, including the lack of effective and integrated
support for many patients.!"
112 Estimate from the Independent Healthcare Association, May 2002.
113 Department of Public Health & Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, Research
Briefmg: Hospital Acquired Infections, No.5, London, 2001.
114 See: http://www.nhs.uk/nhsmagazine/archive/apr/features/this16.htm The MAG's report was
released on II November 2003.
lIS Alison Hardie and Ian Johnston, 1 February 2005, 'Vicious circle of blame over dental crisis' The
Scotsman. Also see: Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard, op.cit., p.179.
116 January 2002, Old Habits Die Hard, London, Kings Fund.
117 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxton, Mortality, Income and Income Inequality Overtime in Britain
and the United States, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 8534, Issued in
October 200 I. See: http://www.nber.orgidigestijan02/w8534.html
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Again, according to one major study, patients who have major surgery in the
NHS are four times as likely to die as those in America."? The comparison of
care, which reveals a sevenfold difference in mortality rates in one set of
patients, concluded that hospital waiting lists, a shortage of specialists and a
lack of intensive care beds are to blame.
"Mounting evidence suggests that patients who are most at risk of
complications after an operation are not being seen by specialists, and
are not reaching intensive care units in time to save them.,,12o
A team from University College London (UCL) and a team from Columbia
University in New York jointly studied the medical fortunes of more than 1,000
patients at the Mount Sinai Hospital in Manhattan and compared them with
nearly 1,100 patients who had undergone the same type of major surgery at
the Queen Alexandra Hospital in Portsmouth. The results:
"... showed that 2.5 per cent of the American patients died in hospital
after major surgery, compared with just under 1a per cent of British
patients. They found that there was a sevenfold difference in mortality
rates when a subgroup of patients - the most seriously ill - were
compared."!"
Commenting on the results, Professor David Bennett, head of intensive care
at St Georges NHS Hospital in London, said:
"There are substantial number of patients each year who die, who
might otherwise have survived had they got the appropriate kind of
care after surgery.,,122
118 Derek Wanless, November 2001, Securing Our Future Health: Taking a Long-Term View, London,
HM Treasury.
119 Tim Utton, 8 September2003, 'NHS deathrates four times than US', Daily Mail, London.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
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Back to the Future: The Rediscovery of Independent Healthcare
One cannot open a newspaper today without reading about the pressures,
strains and failures of the NHS. Higher expectations, new technology and the
manifest failings of an overly-politicised monopoly service mean that
politicians are eager to move away from the old methods of top-down
governmental control in health and across 123welfare. As a recent Secretary of
State for Health, Alan Milburn, commented:
"For fifty years the NHS has been subject to day-to-day running from
Whitehall. The whole system is top down. There is little freedom for
local innovation or risk taking....A million strong health service cannot
be run from Whitehall. Indeed, it should not be run from Whitehall. For
patient choice to thrive it needs a different environment. One in which
there is greater diversity and plurality in local services which have the
freedom to innovate and respond to patient needs. Our reforms are
about redefining what we mean by the National Health Service.
Changing it form a monolithic, centrally-run, monopoly provider of
services to a values-based system where different health care
providers - In the public, private and voluntary sectors - provide
comprehensive services to NHS patients... Who provides the service
becomes less important than the service that is provided.,,124
Today, the NHS seems destined to remain a key funder and regulator of
health services for the foreseeable future but, significantly, it no longer seems
destined to remain the owner of the facilities in which healthcare is provided.
Rekindling notions of consumer choice, political statements across the party
political spectrum increasingly stress that healthcare should be delivered by a
123 Marsland, D., (1996) Welfare or Welfare State?: Contradictions and Dilemmas in Social Policy,
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan
124 The Secretary of State for Health, the Rt. Hon. Alan Milburn MP, speech to New Health Network,
London, 15 January 2002.
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pluralistic range of providers who offer genuine diversity. As Alan Milburn
again asserted:
"...just because patients might be treated in a BUPA hospital today or a
Foundation Hospital tomorrow that does not mean they cease to be
NHS patients. Quite the reverse, patients remain NHS patients treated
on NHS principles with care that is free and available according to
need. The NHS is not its bricks and mortar. It is not a set of structures.
It is fundamentally a set of values. An ethos if you like. We should be
resolute in our defence of the values of the NHS but not of its outdated
structures. ,,125
There are many economic, technological, and cultural forces undermining the
service as it was traditionally conceived. Nevertheless, as patients'
expectations continue to rise alongside ever higher living standards so larger
numbers of people are finding the unresponsive nature of the old state system
unacceptable.
As people have become less tolerant of poor service, and less willing to act as
passive recipients 'grateful for what they receive', what is now true in so many
areas of life is rapidly becoming apparent in healthcare. Dr. Tim Evans of the
Independent Healthcare Association commented, considering recent
government health reforms:
"After years of shunning liberal, market based, solutions in healthcare it
is this Labour government that has introduced a concordat with the
independent sector, whereby NHS-funded patients can receive
treatment in independent hospitals. It is this government that is
mobilising private hospitals on the continent for the benefit of NHS-
patients. And it is Labour that is now planning to return NHS hospitals
to the pre-1948 world of genuine independence from the state under
the rubric of not-for-profit Foundation Hospitals."!"
125 Ibid.
126 Quote from a recorded interview with the author in April 2002.
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In many ways, people's attitudes to healthcare have already changed. In a
less deferential age where ever larger numbers of people have university
educations, and consumer information flows freely on the internet, people are
more aware of their choices - and their powers of exit. On the funding front,
Evans continues:
"Perhaps most importantly of all, it is this government which is
overseeing a funding revolution in private health spending which, as
yet, has not been fully explored... ,,127
In 2003, Labour politicians publicly claimed that it is only the Conservatives
who want to encourage various forms of private health funding. Yet under
Labour's governance, seven million people have private medical insurance
and another seven million people are covered by private health cash plans.
Millions more choose from a wide range of other options such as acute self-
funding and paying privately for a range of alternative therapies.
"In the year 2000, more than a quarter of a million people chose to self-
fund for independent acute hospital surgery and treatment without any
Insurance at all. Instead, they simply paid cash or via their credit
cards.,,128
In contrast to the original promise that the NHS "would provide all medical,
dental and nursing care,,129 :
"In dentistry, more than a third of the population has now abandoned
the NHS and relies solely on independent sector treatment. And more
than eight million people pay privately for a range of complimentary
medical therapies every year".130
127 Quote from a recorded interview with the author in April 2002.
128 Data from the Independent Healthcare Association.
129 This quote is from a leaflet describing the role of the NHS delivered to every British home in July
1948. It was produced by the Ministry of Health.
130 Independent Healthcare Association data May 2002.
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According to research published in the Daily Telegraph131, more than 3.5
million trade unionists - more than 50 per cent of the Trade Union Congress's
6.8 million members - now enjoy the benefits of private health cash and
medical insurance schemes. The movement reportedly even has its own web
site at www.tradeunion-privatehealth.org.uk 132
At a time when the country's political class is trying to get itself off the hook of
past political promises in health by exploiting the rhetoric of public private
partnerships, many independent sector organisations already have formal
agreements with trade unions or have large numbers of trade unionists in their
memberships.
Some schemes offer private medical, permanent health or critical illness
cover. Others offer private health cash plans that pay for services that include
items such as dentistry, ophthalmics, physiotherapy, chiropody, podiatry,
maternity services, allergy testing, hospital in-patient stays, nursing home
stays, hospital day case admissions, convalescence, home help, mental
health and psychiatric treatment, and even the use of an ambulance.
Today, independent sector healthcare schemes abound and most are in the
not-for-profit tradition. A cursory survey includes the following organisations:
The Benenden Hospital - www.thesociety.co.uk - friendly society scheme
serves 1 million British Telecom, Post Office and Civil Service workers and
their families. Established in 1905, the Benenden is one of the largest
independent hospitals in the country. It works in partnership with a national
network of other not-for-profit independent hospitals and has a close
relationship with many tens of thousands of trade unionists.
131 Daniel Kruger, 11 September 2001, 'Why half trade union members have private health', London,
Daily Telegraph.
132 This web site existed between 2001 and 2004.
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The Bristol Contributory Welfare Association is a not-for-profit organisation
established in 1935. It offers a range of private health cash benefits and
private medical insurance products.
BUPA - www.bupa.com - is a mutual offering a wide range of private medical
insurance and health cash benefits. It has a national network of more than 35
hospitals and 200 care homes. Established in 1947, the British United
Provident Association is the amalgamation of seventeen historic provident
associations and today covers more than 3 million people - many of whom are
trade union members.l'"
The Birmingham Hospital Saturday Fund is a mutual that specialises in
private health cash benefits. It has 150,000 workers in membership, a high
proportion of whom are trade unionists. It has a formal partnership
arrangement with Standard Life Healthcare
www.standardlifehealthcare.com
The Civil Service Healthcare Society - www.cshealthcare.co.uk - was founded
in the 1920s. It has more than 25,000 people in membership. A mutual
offering private medical insurance, its members are primarily workers in the
public sector.
The Communication Workers Friendly Society - www.cwfs.co.uk - is a mutual
offering private sickness benefits. Having a special relationship with union
members in the postal and telecommunications industries, it is strongly
aligned with the Communications Workers Union.!"
Dentists Provident Society - www.dps-Itd.co.uk - is a mutual offering
permanent health insurance, private health cash benefits and accident and
sickness benefits. Most members are dental surgeons - many of whom have
traditionally worked in the NHS.
133 BUPA estimate that some 10 per cent of their members are in trades unions and professional
associations.
134 The Communications Workers Friendly Society is open about this relationship on its web site:
www.cwfs.co.uk
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Exeter Friendly Society - www.exeterfriendly.co.uk - offers private medical
insurance and is one of the best known healthcare friendly societies working
in Britain.
Health Shield - www.healthshield.co.uk - is a friendly society with more than
120 years of experience. It offers a range of private health cash benefits.
Health Sure Group - www.healthsure.org.uk - is a mutual offering private
health cash benefits. It has many members of the Unison trade union in its
membership.
Holloway Friendly Society - www.holloway.co.uk - specialises in permanent
health insurance and sickness benefits. Traditionally, it has a close
relationship with trade unionists in customs and excise. 135
The Hospital Savings Association www.hsa.co.uk is a mutual organisation
that offers private health cash benefits to more than 3 million people many of
whom are members of trade unions.F"
The Independent Order of Odd Fellows Manchester Unity
www.oddfellows.co.uk - is a friendly society that works in partnership with the
Hospital Savings Association (mentioned above). It offers sickness benefits,
permanent health insurance and medical cash benefits.
Medicash - www.medicash.org.uk - is a mutual organisation that offers private
health cash benefits and has many trade unionists as members. It workes
particularly closely with the police and fire services and even has a formal
agreement with Unison. It traditionally makes charitable donations to the NHS
and has more than 230,000 workers in rnernbership.l'"
13S This information is from an interview with the author in 2001.
136 H.S.A estimate that some 30 per cent of their members are in trades unions.
137 This is the figure for the financial year 2002-2003.
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Nuffield Hospitals - www.nuffieldhospitals.org.uk - is a charitable organisation
that offers a national network of 44 not-for-profit hospitals. Nuffield Hospitals
Centre for Education and Clinical Effectiveness offers training to a wide range
of private sector and NHS nurses, physiotherapists and other health
professionals.l'" Nuffield Hospitals has close links with a wide range of worker
groups and actively welcomes trade unionists into membership.
Rechabite Friendly Society - www.rechabite.co.uk - is a friendly society
offering sickness benefits, permanent health insurance and private health
cash benefits.
Shepherds Friendly Society - www.shepherds.co.uk - is a friendly society
offering sickness benefits and permanent health insurance. It welcomes trade
unionists into membership and "has links with several trade unions".139
Simplyhealth - www.simplyhealth.uk.com - is officially endorsed by the Trades
Union Congress. It offers private medical insurance and health cash benefits
to 100,000 workers. And has close and historic links to Unison and the
Transport and General Workers Union."?
Standard Life Healthcare - www.standardlife.co.uk - is a part of the Standard
Life group and therefore part of one of the Europe's wealthiest mutual
organisations. Standard Life Healthcare is one of Britain's leading private
medical insurers. It also works closely with the Birmingham Hospital Saturday
fund which provides private health cash benefits.
138 Nuffield Hospitals Centre for Education and Clinical Effectiveness offers a wide range of clinical
courses for healthcare staff. Through strong links with the University of Central England and
Middlesex University, most of the courses are accredited with academic points at diploma, degree or
Masters Level, which can aid students in pursuing Higher Education awards and career progression.
These links with the Universities also facilitate developments in Evidence-Based practice and
assistance in Clinical Research projects. NVQs for Theatres and Health Care Assistants in the wards
are also available and have been integrated as a Skills Escalator. One of the many advantages the
Centre provides is the opportunity for all students to obtain professional and academic qualifications,
whilst still in full-time employment through Distance Learning and Work-based programmes. The
programme managers from the Education Centre provide outreach courses in divisions, via Satellite
Centres as well as in hospitals.
139 This information is from an interview with the author in 2001.
140SimplyHealth was purchased by H.S.A in 2003. However, traditionally this ~rivate healthca~e brand
has worked closely with the former GMB Union and the TGWU. Also see: Daniel Kruger, Op.Clt.
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Wakefield Health Scheme - www.wdhcs.com - offers private health cash
benefits and has more than 50,000 workers in membership. Many of them are
current or former trade unionists.!"
Western Provident Association - www.wpa.org.uk - is a mutual organisation
that offers a wide range of private medical insurance and health cash benefits.
Westfield Contributory Health Scheme - www.westfield.org.uk - offers private
health cash benefits. It has many trade unionists in membership and has a
particularly close relationship with members of the Transport and General
Workers Union. It has more than 250,000 workers in membership and
traditionally has an exhibition stand at the annual Labour Party conference.
As is clear from this list, many public sector trade unions such as Unison and
the Transport and General Workers Union have formal links with private
medical insurers and even private health cash schemes such as Simplyhealth
and Medicash.
"Today, independent sector not-for-profit organisations such as the
Benenden Hospital, Bristol Contributory Welfare Association, BUPA,
Civil Service Healthcare Society, Hospitals Savings Association,
Simplyhealth, Standard Life Healthcare, Wakefield Health Scheme,
Westfield Contributory Health Scheme and dozens of other similar
bodies have millions of trade unionists in their combined,
memberships.
"Many public sector trade unions such as Unison even have
formal links with private health cash schemes such as Medicash and
promote them on their internet sites. These schemes are an important
and growing source of revenue for the independent sector and add to
the diversity of the overall health market."142
141 This information is from an interview with the author in 2001.
142 Edward Vaizey (ed) (2002) The Blue Book On Health: Radical Thinking on the Future of the NHS,
London, Politicos Publishing, p.99.
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According to the IHA it would require the equivalent of 4 to 5 pence in the
pound on the basic rate of income tax to simply replace current private
spending on independent healthcare services.143 To fully replace the
independent sector's entire contribution - including private health cash
benefits and social care - would cost the exchequer much more.144
In the other European democracies, there is a long established recognition
that partnership working is good for health and welfare services. The idea that
the state should own all of a nation's health facilities is treated with derision
and has remained off the political agenda. In Belgium two thirds of hospital
beds are in the independent sector.!" In Germany and Spain half the hospital
beds are independent.!" In Austria, France, Greece and Italy, more than one
third of all hospital beds are in the independent sector.147
Perhaps it was with these facts in mind that the government entered into its
agreement with the Independent Healthcare Association in the autumn of
2000 and signed the Concordat, which gave formal permission for NHS
patients to be sent to independent sector hospitals.
Between 1 January and 31 August 2001, more than 65,000 NHS patients had
been treated under the Concordat in independent sector hospitals. By the end
of the year they had treated more than 100,000 NHS patients.l" Overall, this
level of partnership working represents a three-to-four fold increase over
anything that had gone before and it continues to rise. 149
143 Independent Healthcare Association Written Evidence submitted to the House of Commons Health
Select Committee Inquiry into the Role of the Private Sector in the NH~: October200I. . .
144 (1994) Health 2000 The Health and Wealth of the Nation in the 21 Century: A ContrIbutIOn from
the Independent Healthcare Association to the Labour Party, London, Independent Healthcare
Association, pp.3-4. . ..
145 (1993) Hospital Committee of the European Community, Hospital Services m the European
Community, Leuven (Belgium), p.29. . .
146 Stephen Pollard, Terry Liddle, Dr. Bill Thompson (1994) Towards a More Cooperative SocIety:
Ideas on the Future of the British Labour Movement and Independent Healthcare, London, Independent
Healthcare Association, pp.13-14.
147 Ibid. . .
148 Independent Healthcare Association information taken from monthly Concordat morutonng data
supplied to the Department of Health in 2001 and seen by the author.
149 Ibid.
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In line with other European countries, NHS-funded patients are no longer
confined to receiving treatment and care in state owned hospitals. Today, they
are increasingly accessing hospital and care services provided in independent
- charitable, mutual and commercially owned - facilities.
There are now more than 200 independent acute medical and surgical
hospitals across the country. With more than 600 operating theatres, 800
critical illness beds and over 10,000 acute medical/surgical beds, their
numbers and quality are impressive."? Delivering more than 1 million surgical
procedures a year and seeing more than 4 million people in out-patient
appointments the sector's hospitals offer substantial capacity to help ease
pressures on the NHS.
In mental health, the Mental Health Act Commission points out that
independent sector providers now deliver more than 55% of the NHS's
medium secure provlslon."" Offering innovative and pioneering services in
high quality surroundings, independent providers have demonstrated in recent
years that partnership can work and can hugely benefit the lives of patients.!"
Independent providers of acute mental health and substance misuse services
now offer more than 70 facilities up and down the country.153 Providing more
than three thousand beds, they deliver around a quarter of the country's
combined acute mental health provlslon.!'" Providing 31 specialist units for
treating eating disorders, the sector also provides more than 80 per cent of
the country's acquired brain injury rehabilitation and delivers a majority of the
country's substance misuse care.!"
ISO Data from the Independent Healthcare Association Acute Hosptial Survey 1999-2000, London,
Independent Healthcare Association.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
ISS Ibid.
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Independent nursing and residential care homes provide at least 420,000
beds and more than one hundred and fifty million nights of care each year.
Mainly used by older people who require long or short-term care they are an
integral part of the nation's wider health and social care system.156
Today, the independent health and social care sector is amongst the country's
ten largest employers. With a workforce of more than 750,000 people it
accounts for nearly 3% of the total workforce. 660,000 people work in
independent social care provision, while thousands more work in its acute
medical, surgical and mental health hospitals. Still more work for independent
nursing agencies, pathology laboratories and a host of other health and social
care companles.!"
While it is often argued that the independent sector makes no contribution to
the training and development of medical and health professionals, in reality,
the evidence suggests otherwise. Today, the independent sector helps to train
large number of nurses and allied health professionals by providing clinical
placements, vocational qualifications to care workers and post-graduate
education for doctors.l"
In partnership with the NHS. many thousands of student nurses now spend
anything up to several months at a time in independent hospitals and nursing
homes where they learn about a wide range of specialities. With the sector
taking a lead on care for the elderly, it offers a particular wealth of expertise in
the healthcare of older people.
The independent sector offers post-graduate training for thousands of
registered nurses and allied health professionals. Here. training covers
theatres, neurosurgery, critical care, and cardiac, renal, infection control, risk
management, care of the elderly and continence manaqement.l'" Also
supporting management training courses for nurses, the independent sector
156 (2000) Caring Solutions, London, Independent Healthcare Association.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
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supports dozens of management and leadership programmes up and down
the country.160
The independent sector helps to train post-graduate doctors. In the area of
mental health, the sector offers courses and up-dates on adult psychiatry,
brain injury rehabilitation, and child and adolescent care.161 Independent
acute hospitals also run accredited post-graduate study courses for
thousands of doctors. Encouraging peer review, they particularly provide
general practitioners with valuable up-dates.162
Employing many hundreds of thousands of care workers, the sector's nursing
and residential care homes offer many National Vocational Qualifications for
care assistants.
Arguably, the greatest myth concerning the independent sector is that it steals
nurses away from the NHS.163 Yet, in recent years less than 4% of nurses
who left the NHS moved to work in the independent sector.'?" The vast
majority - more than 96% - simply left nursing altogether.
Having pioneered flexible working practices for many years and now
supporting return to nursing courses, staff retention levels are not only higher
in the independent sector,165 but it believes it can offer the NHS proven
human resource strateqies.l'" Increased career and training opportunities in
the independent sector not only aid its own high standards but bolster
professional's commitment to the UK's wider health and social care systern.!"
Assessing the historic re-emergence of the independent healthcare sector, Dr.
Evans stated in 2002:
160 David Lucas (ed) (2000 ) Independent Perspectives on Health and Social Care, London,
Independent Healthcare Association, pp.22-23.
161 Ibid,
162 Ibid.
163-C ' S I . .armg 0 utions, Op.Clt.
164 Ibid.
16S Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
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"For the first time in the history of the NHS, the independent sector is
well placed to offer the state sector one million treatments over the life
of a parliament. Imagine for instance that for every working day of the
year each independent hospital was asked to deliver four extra
operations for the NHS. That would be an additional 1,040 operations
in each hospital every year. With more than 200 hospitals in the sector,
the total would be more than 200,000 episodes of care a year: more
than one million over the life of a five-year parliament. If the
government agrees to the independent sector building and operating
some of the NHS's new fast-track surgery centres, then this number
could turn out to be conservative.T"
Significantly, it had been Tony Blair had who pointed out at a speech at the
Institute of Economic Affairs on 24 May 1994 that:
"The history of workers co-operatives, the friendly societies and the
unions from which the Labour Party sprang is one of individuals coming
together for self-improvement and to improve peoples potential through
collective action. We need to recreate for the 21st century the civil
society to which these movements gave birth".169
Eight years on, Dr. Evans asserted on behalf of the independent sector that:
"Today, the NHS is slowly accepting the re-emergence of a sizeable
independent sector which can complement it for capacity, services,
capital and expertise. Having been born of an independent sector
estate that was founded with in the establishment of St Bartholomew's
Hospital in 1123, British healthcare is once again turning to the
independent sector for provision and funding. With private expenditure
on healthcare growing in diverse and innovative ways healthcare is
slowly going back to the future.
168 Dr. Tim Evans in a recorded interview with the author in 2002.
169 Tony Blair quoted in The Guardian, 25th May 1994.
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"Perhaps the fact that this is continuing a pace under a Labour
government should not surprise us. Just as Conservatives were trusted
by the electorate in the 1980s with 'industry' so it is a Labour
government that is trusted with the 'human services' of health and
welfare.
"Today, politically enshrined producer capture in healthcare is
giving way to a rediscovery of diverse and market based institutional
arrangements - many of which reside in civil soclety."!"
Mapping out the new terrain of debate, Evans continued:
"Some will see the changes now afoot as being controversial.
However, such conservatives are always sceptical of change and
adept at whinging about most forms of progress. Their squeals and
squawks are to be expected in any open society.
"In reality, the changes now afoot in British healthcare provide
unprecedented opportunities for mutuaIs, cooperatives and commercial
enterprises alike. By encouraging a rich and diverse tapestry of various
forms of non-state ownership and investment, healthcare can again be
reconnected to the capital-infrastructure, professional self-esteem and
consumer focus that has for so long been required."!"
Attacking the history of the politicisation of healthcare and the failings of
government interventionism, Evans continued:
"For far too long, politicians of all parties have stood in the way of
investment and imposed deadening uniformities of rule that undermine
experimentation and achievement. For decades, powerful interest
groups have been allowed to compete with each other in healthcare for
various forms of legislative favour and central direction. Instead of
promoting co-operative working and patient focus the system has taken
170 Dr. TimEvans in a recorded interview with the author in 2002.
171 Dr. Tim Evans in a recorded interview with the author in 2002.
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the idea of the gentleman in Whitehall knowing best to absurd and
murderous lengths.
"Today, we stand at the gateway of a different century. A
century that will increasingly judge nationalised healthcare for being a
highly elitist project which unnecessarily subjected millions of people to
primitive forms of health rationing and hardship.
"As consumer expectations continue to out pace the state's
capacity to satisfy demand so healthcare will continue to change. The
age of utopian top-down command and control has already past and a
mixed economy has taken its place.,,172
He continued with the following warning:
"Yet, even at a time when progressive politicians of all parties attempt
to describe this modern era under the auspices of 'partnership' so they
too will find it will not be a resting place for long.
"As consumers become ever more demanding and economically
empowered so they will continue to drive forward a real and highly
diverse market in health. And it is in this context that politicians will
continue find themselves mere corks bobbing on a tide of history. A
tide which ultimately finds them to be the problem and not the solution
in peoples Iives.,,173
The Political Economy of Government Failure
More than fifty years on from the inception of the NHS it is possible to judge
the service by its deeds. One can scrutinise its rationing, its low levels of
investment, and its inequitable and inadequate comparative results. One can
profile its internal structure by class, race and gender - and one can analyse
the ways in which its political masters are increasingly endeavouring to 'crisis
manage' by allowing the rediscovery of various forms of private healthcare.
172 Dr. Tim Evans in a recorded interview with the author in 2002.
173 Dr. Tim Evans in a recorded interview with the author in 2002.
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As politicians of all parties arguably turn full circle and look to the independent
sector for solutions in terms of the private finance initiative (PFI), capacity (the
Concordat, independent Foundation Hospitals, private Diagnostic and
Treatment Centres) and organisational ideas (public private partnerships, best
value, 'earned autonomy', private management of failing NHS hospitals), one
does not only find the re-emergence of the independent sector, but one
quickly encounters the re-discovery of non-state self-help in important areas
of healthcare funding (private medical insurance, private health cash plans,
acute self-funding, private dentistry, private critical illness plans and a wide
range of private alternative therapies).
In the last article he wrote for the Daily Telegraph before he died in 1996, Sir
Keith Joseph argued that market based institutions in civil society should be
rediscovered and applied to health and welfare. Prophetically, he wrote:
"My own favourite strategy to give every home a stake in the economy
is to allow Friendly Societies to recover much of the role they
relinquished over this century. No pension fund, state or corporate,
conveys a sense of ownership or participation. I believe the small
mutual status of Friendly Societies helps the quality of co-operative
intimacy.,,174
Six years on from this statement, Alan Milburn stated:
"Last month, I met with the chief executives of the three star [NHS]
Trusts. They had a list of further specific restrictions that they wanted to
have removed from them and we are now considering how best to do
so. But they also asked us to go further. If they were as good as we
agreed they were, why could they not become independent not-for-
174 Sir Keith Joseph, Why the Tories are the real party of the stakeholder, Daily Telegraph, 12 January
1996.
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profit institutions with just an annual cash for performance contract and
no further form of performance management from the centre?"!"
In outlining the government's ideas for genuinely independent 'Foundation
Hospitals' the then Secretary of State continued:
"The middle ground between state-run public and shareholder-led
private structures is where there has been growing interest in recent
years. Both the Right - through organisations like the Institute of
Directors - and the Left - through the Co-operative Movement - have
been examining the case for new forms of organisation such as
mutuals or public interest companies... ,,176
Keith Joseph had warned of such politics emanating from New Labour back in
1996. He well understood that the race to capture such terrain was on
between the two major parties. He wrote in his Daily Telegraph article:
"I wonder if the Labour Party hungry for radical ideas, might steal such
notions and apply them first. I regard Frank Field MP as our most
dangerous opponent as he treats liberal market ideas as serious
options, and not merely as misanthropy"."?
Capturing traditionally Conservative and classical liberal terrain In one fell
swoop, Milburn concluded:
"In many other European countries there are many not-for-profit
voluntary or charity-run hospitals all providing care to the public health
care system. There are private sector organisations doing the same.
Similar steps are already starting here. We are in negotiation with
BUPA... ,,178
17.5 TheSecretary of State for Health, the Rt. Hon. Alan Milburn MP, speech to New Health Network,
15 January 2002.
176 Ibid.
177-S' K ith h .ir et Josep, Op.Clt.
178 Rt. Hon. Alan Milburn MP, op.cit.
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Clearly, the scene is now set for the gradual withdrawal of the NHS from the
business of provision. Already, by 2008, the government wants between 10
and 15 per cent of all acute surgery to be delivered in independently owned
facilities - with the NHS simply acting as the funder and regulator of
services.179
Already, there are suggestions that some of these facilities (for example, the
new Diagnostic and Treatment Centres) will be allowed to accept privately
funded patients as well as those funded by the NHS. Perhaps in time the NHS
will become simply the regulator of a new and diverse market of wholly private
providers.
The idea of the NHS re-positioning itself as the regulatory overseer of a
market of private providers over the next decade is plausible enough. It is also
possible that the NHS might over time become the health funder of last resort;
as opposed, that is, to the funder of "all medical, dental and nursing care" for
"everyone - rich and poor... " as stated in the late 1940s.180
Nevertheless, it remains doubtful that such a world would amount to a
genuine market in healthcare. What would more likely emerge would be a re-
discovery of the complex medical corporatism of previous centuries. A world
of private health provision and funding that is again predicated on a set of
professional monopoly powers gained through legislative favour.
As in earlier eras of medical history what seems most likely is a quasi-market
driven by the political economy of regulation. Not a real market based on the
principles of consumer sovereignty and producer reputation.
"In every advanced industrial society the medical profession enjoys
monopoly privileges in the labour market. .. its practitioners are highly
paid, highly respected and they enjoy a great deal of control over the
179 The 2005 LabourParty Manifesto, London, The Labour Party.
180 The National Health Service, leaflet sent to every home in July 1948 by the Ministry of Health.
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conditions of their work, even to the point of being insulated from
criticism and accountability.v'"
For all the manifest failings of the NHS and the growing acceptance of a
limited range of private solutions, there is still little in pubic discourse to
fundamentally challenge the statist notions that underpin professional
monopoly power in health. While commentators such as Stacey describe 'the
central tension' in medical professional accountability in the following terms
and assert with regards to the General Medical Council (GMC):
"Individual professionals are accountable to their individual patients...a
professional body is responsible for seeing that the collectivity of
individual practitioners perform appropriately. That body is ultimately
accountable to the state through Parliament which set it up in the first
place and from which it has derived its powers. However, the GMC is
independent, self-financing and constitutionally directly responsible
only to the Privy Council.,,182
Few commentators challenge such illusory notions of independence. Or go on
to question the fundamental nature and impact of statutory regulation and
monopoly power on health.
One of the few to do so is Professor David Gladstone.l'" For him the GMC is
far from being an independent regulator. Maintaining its monopoly power in
statute, he argues that throughout its history it has shunned consumer control
and always sought domination from within the profession as well as the wider
establishment. Commenting on the organisation's structure in 1992 he noted:
"Of a total membership of 102 some 54 are doctors elected from Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, 35 are medical academics appointed by
Universities and Royal Colleges, and 13 are nominated by the Queen
181 Nicky Heart (1985) The Sociology of Health and Medicine, New York, Causeway Books, p.112.
182 Margaret Stacey (1988) The Sociology of Health and Healing, London, Unwin Hyman, p.15
183 Dr. David Gladstone (1992) OpeningUp the Medical Monopoly, London, Adam Smith Institute.
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on advice of the Privy Council. Of the 13 independent members, only 9
can be said to be truly 'lay' members - mostly a mixture of MPs, JPs
and lawyers. Moreover, many of the members of the GMC are
sponsored by the British Medical Association (BMA), the main political
lobby for both hospital doctors and general practitioners. It is hard to
resist the conclusion that this 'shadowy body, autocratic and
punitive...whose deeply conservative stance is increasingly out of step
with the needs of patients' has become a politicised organisation
designed to defend the interests of the medical profession against both
public scrutiny and government interference.,,184
Gladstone spelled out the adverse impact of such arrangements in an article
he wrote and published in The Times:
"... Ionger than necessary training, intolerable conditions for those
beneath the consultant level, a system of patronage and personal
recommendation for appointments, limits on the number of consultancy
appointments. ,,185
The idea that doctors should be accountable to their patients seems at face
value to be clear. However, the 'central tension' as Stacey calls it, exists
because ultimately the GMC was formed to ensure not only that the ethical
standards of the profession were maintained but also that doctors should
remain accountable to the state. In other words, through the Medical Act of
1858:
"... the state ratified medicine's claims to be an autonomous self-
governing ethical professiorr.l'"
In reality, the act was the product of a highly charged and protracted political
and parliamentary debate. Yet once agreed, it ultimately:
184 tbld
_1.,p.7.
18S David Gladstone 2 March 1992, 'The Doctor's Dilemma', London, The Times.
186 Roy Porter (1987> Disease, Medicine and Society in England 1550-1860, London, Macmillan, p.52.
183
"... charged the Council to regulate the medical profession on behalf of
the state, to oversee medical education and to maintain a register of
qualified medical practitloners."?"
Central to this process and the GMC's remit of professional control, is its
register.
"The significance of the register lay, of course, in those it excluded. For
all ranks of regular practitioners now appeared as "insiders" lined up
against all "outsiders" the unqualified homeopaths, medical botanists,
quacks, bone-setters and the like, who are automatically constituted by
exclusion, into the "fringe". Parliament had achieved what the doctors
never could; it had - symbolically at least - united the much divided
medical profession, by defining them over and against a common
Other.,,188
In 1975, the Merrison Report again pointed out the significance of the GMC's
power and in particular its register. It commented:
"... the body maintaining the Register has... two duties to discharge.
First, it will have to assure itself that those admitted to the register are
competent. Secondly, it will have to remove those practitioners unfit to
practice."189
Of the GMC's two main functions, it is the second that is perhaps the better
known; that is, its ability to remove those practitioners deemed unfit to
practice. The criteria it operates to assess unprofessional conduct were up-
dated in 1983 and defined as:
187 Stacey, op.cit., p.85.
188 P . 52orter, Op.Clt., p. .
189 Report of the committeeof Inquiry into the Regulation of the Medical Profession (1978) HMSO,
pJ.
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"(a) Neglect or disregard by doctors of their professional responsibilities
to patients for their care and treatment.
"(b) Abuse of professional privileges or skills
"(c) Personal behaviour: conduct derogatory to the reputation of the
medical profession.
"(d) Advertising, canvassing and related professional offences.r"?
In more recent years however, commentators have increasingly argued that
the GMC has systematically failed in its responsibility to the public interest not
least because it has been seemingly incapable of tackling even less serious
offences. As one article in the British Medical Journal stated:
"There is a long standing unhappiness with the council's seeming
inability to respond to doctors who are incompetent or rude but who
have not been guilty of acts which the council would judge to be
serious professional misconduct."!"
Whilst the GMC is not formally responsible for the supply of medical
education, nor has formal control over the number of people who may train,
the supervision of medical education is nevertheless one of the principal tasks
Parliament assigned to it. It not only has a role in the content of the medical
curriculum, but more importantly offers legitimacy to those who have qualified.
The nature of the information contained on the Register - and therefore of
medical training and professional qualification - has been the subject of
prolonged debate and legal action over the years. For example, in 1968 the
Todd Report on Medical Education recommended that the GMC registered
individual's specialisations in addition to basic medical qualificatton.l"
190 General Medical Council (1983) Professional Conduct and Discipline: Fitness to Practice.
191 British Medical Journal, editorial, 15 May 1992.
192 Royal Commission on Medical Education (1968) HMSO.
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In the 1990s, the related issues of registration and accreditation and the
nature of consultants and specialists became the subject of legal action in the
name of Dr. Anthony Goldstein.193 One aspect of this case brought against
the GMC was that the information it provided on its Medical Register did not
enable the public to distinguish between doctors who have completed an
appropriate training programme based on supervised clinical experience and
those who have spent the major part of their training period in research and
academic work therefore have little if any clinical responsibility.
Another element of the case related to European Community law. For it was
argued that the GMC acted both unfairly and in a discriminatory manner in
relation to the system of specialist medical training and the appointment of UK
consultants.
In 1975 a European Community Medical Directive governing the mutual
recognition of qualifications was passed which then came into force in 1977. It
was designed to ensure that fully qualified doctors, whether general
practitioners or specialists, could practice anywhere in the European
Community - including Britain.
However, in spite of the introduction of European certificates of specialist
training, British health employers continued to place a much greater emphasis
on the UK certificate of specialist accreditation awarded by the Royal
Colleges. As Gladstone noted in 1992:
"Under GMC rules only those doctors who hold a certificate of UK
accreditation - granted by the respective Royal Colleges Joint
Committee on specialist training - can have the designation 'T' after
their name in the Medical Register.,,194
However, as is pointed out in a GMC footnote:
193 See Gladstone, op.cit, p.9.
194 Ibid., pp.9-1 O.
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"A doctor who has completed the training required for independent
medical practice in his or her speciality i.e. for appointment to a
consultant post within the National Health Service or as a principal in
general practice, is eligible to apply to have an indicator "T" to this
effect included in his or her entry."195
In contrast to this the names of those practitioners who hold the European
certificate are not mentioned in the Medical Register at all. Instead, the details
of those who hold the certificate are - according to GMC Standing Orders -
held on cards:
"...kept in [a] metal cabinet. .. locked when it is not in use. Only the
Registrar shall have access to the cabinet.,,196
For Gladstone, it is clear that the GMC has actively withheld information from
the public concerning the specialists who are qualified by means of the
European certificate. Commenting on this highly restrictive practice he
asserts:
"In withholding such information how far is the GMC acting in 'the
public interest' either of patients or of health care planning? Or
conversely, how far is it seeking to uphold a discriminatory system
which perpetuates the status quo of British medical training and
hospital practice by restricting the numbers eligible for consultant
status?,,197
He concludes:
"There can be little doubt that publication of the full Specialist List
would signal a revolution in British health care, not only by increasing
195 rbid
-!-', p.IO,
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid,
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the number of specialists but also, potentially, in reducing waiting
times and lists and offering patients an alterative and direct route into
specialist services.l'"
According to Isobel Allen the medical monopoly rests on a system which is
perpetuated by patronage and by personal recommendation and selection up
the up-coming generation. These factors encourage a conservatism in the
medical profession which demands that academic, intellectual and clinical
excellence are insufficient in and of themselves for a career at the top of
hospital mediclne.l'"
Allen's study was based on interviews with 640 doctors throughout Great
Britain who had qualified in 1966, 1976 and 1981. Not only does it describe
the disillusionment that many doctors felt with their careers but it also
indicated the role which personal recommendation plays in the system of
medical promotion and preferment. Contrary to her belief before carrying out
the study that "very personal patronage might be dying out,,200 her interviews
indicated its persistent importance.
In fact, significantly, whereas 31 per cent of both the 1966 and 1976 qualifiers
thought that patrons or sponsors were very important, 52 per cent of the 1981
qualifiers did SO.201
The research demonstrated that patrons tended to be male consultants, a fact
which, Allen points out, may disadvantage women and reinforce the male
'stranglehold' in certain areas of medical practice. A 1981 qualifier in her
sample, for example, pointed out that of the highly competitive specialities:
"... it's inevitable it will be men that are favoured because the set up is
ultra conservative and self-perpetuating.,,202
198 Ibid.
199 Isobel Allen (1988) Doctors and their Careers, Policy Studies Institute, p.153.
200 Ib'd
-L., pp.153-154.
201 Ibid.
202 Ib'd
-L.,p.167.
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One woman consultant, who she interviewed also reported that:
"They appoint not necessarily the best but the one who's not going to
rock the boat. .. I've seen a number of very bright people whose face
and personality don't fit and who were out. .. It's such a small world - so
enclosed - you've got to be able to work together. I can see how the
system has evolved. It's selt-preservatlon.v'"
In open markets, the threat of entry by newcomers not only puts pressure on
prices, but it also acts as a pressure towards innovation and the discovery of
optimal outcomes. In monopolies, however, resistance to innovation is strong.
Unchallenged professional conservatism and a resistance to change becomes
the dominant ethos.
It is ironic that after more than half a century of the NHS, and several hundred
years of politicians bestowing monopoly powers on medical professionals, it is
governmental failure in health systems that can be argued to cause precisely
those problems most popularly associated with notions of 'market failure'.
After centuries of politicised healthcare and decades of full blown health
nationalisation the resultant and statist problems of monopoly, consumer
ignorance, neglect of the poor and sick, lack of provision, and moral hazard
are clear for all to see. Externalities that in a de-politicised world would be
internalised by market processes remain problematic. Devoid of rational
market price signals, the misallocated resources of political-economy remain
largely unaccounted for.
Indeed, given the weight of evidence why is the dominant paradigm of market
failure still so prevalent amongst health opinion formers and not 'government
failure'? Below the popular rubrics of equality, altruism and even 'public
sector ethos' what do health opinion formers - in academia, government and
the media - really think about the political economy of healthcare? When it
203 Ibid., pp.162-163.
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comes to notions of government failure in health economics what are the
boundaries, background and subtext of their thinking?
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CHAPTER V
THE METHODOLOGY OF AN INQUIRY INTO NOTIONS OF MARKET
FAILURE AMONGST BRITISH HEALTH CARE OPINION FORMERS
This chapter is concerned with the methodology of an investigation that
explores and questions notions of market failure in modern health policy,
economics and popular discourse. As such, it is primarily concerned with the
methodological foundations of empirical research into the opinions of British
health opinion formers - journalists, academics, politicians, government
officials and members of interest groups.
Opinion Formation
It was Nigel Lawson who in 1992 stated:
"The National Health Service is the closest thing the English have to a
religion, with those who practise in it regarding themselves as a
priesthood. ,,1
In many ways, it is surprising that the NHS remains one of post-war Britain's
most durable and popular institutions. For as Roderick Nye of the Social
Market Foundation has commented:
"At heart [the NHS] has a mission to disappoint: by rationing health
care to individuals so that it is available to all on the basis of need. That
it has succeeded in this while retaining popular affection is a mark of
just how profound the fact of the NHS's existence has been in
managing people's expectations. ,,2
While it is always difficult to prove a causal relationship between opinion
formers such as journalists, academics, politicians, government officials,
~ Nigel Lawson, (1992) The View from Number Eleven, Doubleday, London. .
- Roderick Nye in Bosanquet, N., and Pollard, S., (1997) Ready for Treatment: Popular ExpectatIOns
and the Future of Health Care, Social Market Foundation.. London, p. vii.
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members of interest groups, and the widely held beliefs of ordinary citizens,
there nevertheless does exist in society views that are popular and
widespread - at any point in time.
In many instances, the job of the social scientist is to examine such beliefs,
and to provide more powerful explanations of their nature and boundaries
than would otherwise be afforded from everyday, commonsense,
interpretation.
As such, this study is concerned with those leading opinion formers who
interpret, guide and report on the NHS on a day-to-day basis. In exploring
their understanding of health economics and such notions as market failure,
government failure and market success, the limits and boundaries of current
discourse can be identified, clarified and ultimately challenged.
In Britain today, journalists, academics, politicians, government officials, and
members of health interest groups hold substantial power and influence over
the way health policy and delivery are reported and discussed.
The Media
The British national press is one of the most pervasive in the world, attracting
a comparatively high percentage of readers. It boasts no less than twenty
(general) daily and Sunday tltles'' and, in the year 2000, just five groups
controlled over four-fifths of national circulation." Remarkably:
"No new national newspaper launched in the last eighty years has
been able to stay independent."
3 This excludes the Sport, Sunday Sport and Sunday Business on the grounds that they are specialist
publications. This figure also excludes the Morning Star because it is rarely stocked by newsagents and
is therefore not nationally available.
4 Curran, J., (2002) Media and Power, Routledge. London, P. 231.
5 Ibid.
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Journalists in the national press, and on television and radio, have an
enormous role to play when it comes to the articulation of health policy
options and wider public opinion. For some authors power relations in a liberal
corporatist society mean that:
"...a consensus is formed through consultation between government
and organized interests. The system is 'liberal' in the sense that
political parties tend to alternate, the armed forces are firmly under the
control of civil authority and freedoms are not undermined by coercive
measures. But within this system, the consensus of society tends to be
defined by the major players... ,,6
For Curran and Seaton, the British national press puts forward a relatively
narrow and an essentially corporatist view of the world. They comment:
"The national press has reproduced a remarkably narrow arc of
opinion, indeed sometimes only one opinion, in its editorials on a range
of issues.,,7
Whereas liberal orthodoxy portrays the media as reflecting and serving
society, and its more radical, Marxian, counterparts maintain that the media
are implicated in the management of society, this study remains essentially
neutral on such questions of societal power. It is simply not within the purview
of this study to examine power relations between the organised media,
ordinary people in society and their complex interactions.
Whether the media reflects or manages public opinion on health issues is, in
many ways, irrelevant for the purposes of this study. What matters instead are
the nature, profile and boundaries of the dominant worldview. That is, the
widely held views and beliefs of opinion formers on the problems and
possibilities for health policy - and health delivery.
6 Ibid., pp. 231-232. . .
7 See: Curran. 1., and Seaton, J., (1997) Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcastmg m
Britain, 5th edition, London, Routledge.
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Academia
Today in Britain there are more than 2,800 higher education courses offered
in more than 150 universities, colleges, institutes and conservatolres." More
than 40 per cent of school leavers now continue on into higher education _
and by 2010 the government wants more than 50 per cent of schoolleavers to
participate in degree courses."
Dr. Madsen Pirie of the Adam Smith Institute suggests that the impact that
these institutions and courses have on students and wider opinion is not to be
underestimated:
"...You pack up for life while you are at university or college and the
goods you take on board have to sustain you through the journey. Very
few people make major intellectual changes during the course of their
adult lives, so obviously what is done in the universities is very
important for the future ... ,,10
Similarly, Dennis O'Keeffe and David Marsland conclude their work,
Independence or Stagnation? The Imperatives of University Reform in the
United Kingdom:
"British higher education is by far the most promising place to begin the
course of necessary economic and intellectual correction.?"
The Power of Government
In 2003, the British government accounted for nearly 40 per cent of Gross
Domestic Product (GOP). In total, government spending amounted to £456
8 Lee Elliot Major, 'Armed with the Facts', The Guardian, 28 May 2002.
9 Polly Curtis, 'University applications recover from slump', The Guardian, 18 July 2003.
to Dr. Madsen Pirie in a tape recorded interview. . .'
II O'Keefe, D., and Marsland, D., (2003) Independence or Stagnation? The ImperatIves of UnIversIty
Reform in the United Kingdom, CIVITAS, London, p. 63.
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billion - or £7,700 for every man, woman and child." According to HM
Treasury the global figure of government expenditure is rose to £485 billion in
2004-05 and again to £517 billion in 2005-06.
Expenditure on the NHS and personal social services accounts for a sizeable
share of planned government expenditure. In 2003-04 , the government spend
on the NHS was £72 billion , with another £17 billion detailed for personal
social services (Figure 3).
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Other personal
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Source: HM Treasury
Figure 3. UK public expenditure by department of state 2003-2004.
Back in 2002, the government announced plans for UK spending on health to
rise by 7.2 percent in real terms up to the year 2007-08.13 This means that by
2007-08 the government expects spending on health to be more than £110
billion pounds (Figure 4) .14
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Source: HM Tnwl8')'
Figure 4. UK state expenditure on health 2002-2008.
12 HM Treasury 2003 Budget Summary.
13 HM Treasury, 2002 Chancellor's Budget.
14 HM Treasury, 2003 Budget Summary.
IS Bell, D., ( 1976) The Coming of Post Industrial Society, New York, Basic Books.
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The NHS, personal social services and the Department of Health employs
more than one million people. Many tens of thousands more work in a wide
range of other health interests closely aligned to the state. These groups
include such organisations as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Action
on Smoking and Health (ASH), and the medical Royal Colleges. All receive
state funding, or legislative favour - or both.
The New Class Health Nexus
In many ways today's senior managers in and around the state's health nexus
hold characteristics and qualities similar to those first identified by the
proponents of New Class theory. Although far broader in scope than health,
the idea of a New Class was originally put forward by Daniel Bell in his book
The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society,"
Bell essentially argued that developed nations were on the verge of a post-
industrial society in which the production and distribution of knowledge would
replace the production and distribution of goods as the dominant activity of
society:
"Just as the business firm was the key institution of the past hundred
years because of its role in organising production for the mass creation
of products, the university will become the central institution of the next
hundred years because of its role as the new source of innovation and
knowledqe.:"
At its heart, the New Class has three common features, as Nigel Ashford has
commented:
"Firstly, they belong to a common occupational strata, related to
knowledge and ideas. Secondly, they share a set of common values,
16 Ibid., p. 343.
196
towards economics, politics and culture. Thirdly, they have a common
interest in an expanding public sector."17
It was Joseph Schumpeter who argued that intellectuals:
"...develop group attitudes and group interests sufficientlv strong to
make large numbers of them behave in a way that is usually
associated with the concept of social classes.,,18
Schumpeter suggested that the intelligentsia are hostile to free market
capitalism because:
"It lives on criticism and its whole position depends on criticism that
stinqs"."
For Irving Kristol, members of the New Class can be found in a detailed and
specific list. They include:
"Scientists, teachers and educational administrators, journalists and
others in the communications industries, psychologists, social workers,
those lawyers and doctors who make their careers in the expanding
public sector, city planners, the staffs of large foundations, the upper
level of the government bureaucracy and so on.,,20
To proponents of New Class theory, its most important members are
academics, for they act as the prime legitimators of society. Academics have
great power because of their direct contact with students, and because they
produce ideas consumed by other members of the New Class. Importantly,
academics act as a reference group for the other elements within the New
Class who do not have the time or facility to develop their own ideas.
17Ashford, N., (1986) Neo-Conservatism and the New Class: A Critical Evaluation. Sociological Notes
No.3., London, Libertarian Alliance, p.2.
18 Schumpeter, 1., (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London, Allen & Unwin, p. 134.
19Ibid.
20Kristol, 1(1978) Two Cheers for Capitalism, New York, Basic Books, p. 27.
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In the 1970s, Upset found that a positive incidence of leftism was associated
with being an academic professor, and in particular a social scientist.
Professors and university lecturers were far more likely to describe
themselves as liberal (in the American sense) or radical than any other group
in society. Social scientists, with their potential for a more direct impact on
public policy, were more leftwing and statist than other disciplines."
Similarly, David Marsland argued in his book Seeds of Bankruptcy:
Sociological Bias Against Business and Freedom, that British sociology and
its practitioners in the main have been captured by a statist, anti-enterprise,
anti-freedom mindset.22
Another major group employed in the New Class are those involved in
journalism. In recent decades the media - newspapers, television and radio-
have changed significantly. Journalism has changed from being a relatively
low status, working class profession to one with high status, salaries and
attractive to the upper middle class.
Today, an overwhelming majority of journalists are university graduates. As a
result of their education - and their desire to achieve and sustain their high
status - they look to academics as an important reference group:
"So that comments from academics are almost obligatory in the quality
newspapers and magazines".23
Andrew Greely attributed the feeling in the mass media to the psychology of
guilt:
21 In the US context, 76 per cent voted for George McGovern as President and 64 per cent identified
themselves as being liberal or very liberal.
22 Marsland, D., (1988) Seeds of Bankruptcy: Sociological Bias Against Business and Freedom,
~Iaridge Press, London. .
.3 Ladd., E. C and Upset, S., (1975) The Divided Academy, New York, Norton. Lipset, S., and
Dobson, R (1972) 'The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel', Daedalus Vol.IOl, No.3, pp 211-289.
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"... vis-a-vis the full-fledged academic, who presumably knows more
and is more morally pure than the media huckster"."
Members of the New Class are also found among government officials, public
sector employees (such as school teachers and social workers) and in key
professions such as law and medicine. The New Class thus represents a
substantial number of people in modern Britain, and across the West. But
even more important than their numbers is their position in the strategically
important sectors of modern society.
In the economic sphere the New Class is thought to be essentially socialist.
Not in terms of formally advocating the state ownership of the means of
production, but in its concerns with the distribution of income and wealth
arising from the market. Ashford explains it in the following terms:
"The New Class want the distribution of income to be determined by
the principle of social justice, which means by their contribution to
society determined collectively. However, such a position assumes that
someone knows what is socially just, and has the authority to distribute
income on those principles. Distribution would be determined by the
state, over which the New Class has so much influence, rather than the
market, where there are only a minority of consurners.?"
Similarly, Irving Kristol has commented:
"There is a class of people who believe that they can define 'social
justice', that they have an authoritative conception of the common good
that should be imposed on society by using the force of government.
These people can be called the New Class."26
24Greely, A., (1974) Building Coalitions, New York, New Viewpoints, p. 259.
2SAshford, N., op.cit., p. 4.
26 Kristol, I., (1978) Two Cheers for Capitalism, New York, Basic Books, p. 67
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Whilst an open society is arguably one without a consensus on the common
good and without a single authority that proclaims its access to the 'truth' on
such matters, the New Class thinks otherwise - or at least proclaims to.
For even in its circles there is no fundamental agreement on the distribution
that should arise from social justice. As Kristol points out, despite frequent
requests to publish an article describing the proper redistribution of income:
"...despite all the talk 'about equality', no one seems willing to commit
himself to a precise deflnition"."
For Ashford:
"Equality is but a surrogate term for the demand for the collective
distribution of income rather than for any particular distribution...The
New Class lack a clear conception of an egalitarian society, and
certainly do not have an agreed conception.r"
Arguably, New Class ideas on economics can be best seen in attitudes
towards the distribution of health care and other welfare services. Moynihan
complained that his proposals for a guaranteed family income were frustrated
by the New Class of service-dispensers, who preferred a service strategy by
which middle class professionals would be employed to provide the services,
rather than an income strategy by which the poor can purchase their own
requirements.
He quoted extensively from Samuel Gompers, one of the founding fathers of
the American trade union movement:
"They want to do good in the world - the majority, in truth, that they
may feel that flow of gratification that comes from doing for others.
They have a vision of a new world with themselves as creators...they
27 Ibid., p. 127.
28 Ashford, N., op.cit., p. 4.
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are experts in social welfare, domestic relations, child life, and the
thousand and one problems that arise out of the lives of the poor...AII
these solutions are formulated along the lines that necessitate
governmental machinery and the employment of experts - the
'intellectuals'. The conclusion is inevitable that there is a very close
connection between employment as experts and the enthusiasm for
human welfare.,,29
Arguably, one key source of power for the New Class is the weakness and a
lack of opposition to its ideas. One possible source of opposition might come
from the business community. Indeed, Kirstol argues that there is a form of
class war being waged between the New Class and those in business.
However, the latter lack an appropriate response and strategy because they
simply do not possess the necessary political and tactical skills to challenge
the new class."
Increasing acceptance of concepts such as corporate social responsibility"
undermines the prott-maximising and wealth creating function of business in
favour of a responsibility that instead can be directed and manipulated by
members of the New Class:
"The relative weakness of the business class in the field of ideas and
symbols, as compared with the massive strength of the New Class in
precisely these areas, has significantly altered the power relationship
between the two elites.,,32
To Upset, the working class are viewed as the natural allies of business as
part of a coalition for growth and as a defender of private sector values."
Ladd and Hadley demonstrated that in contrast to the essentially upper middle
29 Moynihan, D. P., (1973) The Politics of a Guaranteed Income, New York, Random House, p. 305.
Moynihan, D. P., (1975) Coping, New York, Random House, p. 381. .
30 Kristol, I., (1978) op.cit. Also see: Bruce-Riggs, M., (ed) (1979) The New Class, New Brunsick,
New Jersey, Transaction Books, Chapter 5.
31 Ashford, N., op.cit., p. 7. . . "
32Novak (1978) The American Vision Washington DC, American Enterpnse Institute, p. j·t
33 ' ,
Upset, S., (1978) op.cit., Chapter 13.
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class values stressing non-materialist satisfactions, self-fulfilment, and big
government expenditure, the working class believe in hard work, economic
security, and lower taxes."
Given such evidence, it is at least plausible that the leading opinion formers in
the worlds of British health journalism, academia, politics, government, and
interest groups will have a disproportionately high impact on the way the NHS,
healthcare and health policy are thought about in wider society.
In exploring their understanding of health economics and such notions as
market failure, government failure and market success, one should be able to
highlight and examine some of the limits, boundaries and biases of popular
discourse - and opinion.
Public Health and Public Opinion
Aneurin Bevan's declared aim, when he established the NHS was to
'universalise the best'. However, as Nick Bosanquet and Stephen Pollard
have suggested:
"..rather than universalising the best, its proudest boast should be that
it has universalised the adequate. To ensure that everyone receives
the best conceivable treatment has always been beyond even the
generous financing the service has received over the past 49 years.
The story of the NHS so far, which will characterise health care into the
next century, has instead been one of rationing scarce resources.?"
Given this reality of experience, Bosanquet and Pollard commissioned a
survey of public opinion by MORI during August 1997.36 The survey sought to
34 Ladd, E. c., and Hadley, C., (1978) Transformations of the American Party System New York,
Norton, 2nd Edition. .
35 Bosanquet, N., and Pollard, S., (1997) Ready for Treatment: Popular Expectations and the Future of
Health Care London Social Market Foundation, p. I.36 ' ,
Ibid., p. 39.
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34 Ladd, E. C., and Hadley, C., (1978) Transformations of the American Party System New York,
Norton, 2nd Edition.
3S Bosanquet, N., and Pollard, S., (1997) Ready for Treatment: Popular Expectations and the Future of
Health Care London Social Market Foundation, p. 1.
36 ' ,
Ibid., p. 39.
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explore in detail not just what people wanted from the NHS but, over the next
ten years, what they expected.
Using a senes of half hour, one-to-one interviews the research produced
represented the most extensive survey undertaken into the attitude of the
British public on the NHS. A total of 2,012 interviews were conducted face-to-
face, in-house, among adults aged 15 and over. The research was carried out
between July 12th and August 3rd 1997 across Britain. Quotas were set for
sex, age and working status, and the data that resulted was weighted to the
known population profile.
Almost two-thirds (64 per cent) of respondents said that they believe that
people often make unnecessary visits to their GP because the service costs
nothing at the point of use. Moreover:
"One in five (19 per cent) believe strongly that this is the case and one-
quarter disagree (although only 6 per cent disagree strongly). DEs are
more inclined than ABs to think that people make unnecessary visits.
"Fewer, albeit a substantial minority (35 per cent), think that
people go so far as to neglect their health because the NHS is there to
pick up the pieces. More (45 per cent) feel that such behaviour does
not exist. Again, DEs are more cynical than ABs in this respect.':"
Asked to say from a list of three possibilities how the NHS should be funded,
most (55 per cent) at that time opted for increasing taxes. 20 per cent
favoured maintaining current levels of taxation but increasing the level of
rationing. Slightly fewer (16 per cent) say they would favour cutting taxes
while encouraging individuals to take out private medical insurancer"
Significantly, the study found that:
37Ibid., pp. 42-43.
38-
Ibid., pp. 48-49.
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"Those especially likely to favour the introduction of rationing in return
for no increase in taxation are those from the lowest social classes and
aged under 25 (36 per cent), and those aged over 25 who are frequent
users of health services (29 per cent). Conversely, few ABC1s aged
35+ feel that this would be the best way forward (11 per cent)."39
Two-thirds of respondents (65 per cent) say that a health service paid for by
taxes should be free at the point of use for everyone. Almost one in five (17
per cent) feel that the NHS should charge everyone, except those most in
need. And a similar number (16 per cent) are in favour of a sliding scale of
charges based on income.
"Asked, which of these three options is most likely to exist in the Britain
of 2007, the majority of adults feel some kind of payment will be
required. A mere one in eight (13 per cent) envisage that a service that
is free at the point of delivery, much like the NHS of today, will still be in
place."?
When it comes to rationing:
"Two thirds (67 per cent) of adults think that the NHS of 2007 will
provide fewer services than the NHS of today and that certain services
will only be available privately. Far fewer think this scenario unlikely (18
per cent), and 14 per cent have no strong opinion either way. The very
old and the very young are among the least inclined to think that the
NHS will not provide as many services in ten years' time, although
even among these groups the majority anticipate reduced provlsion.:"
The evaluation of the data continues:
39 Ibid., p. 48.
40 Ibid., p. 54-55.
41 Ibid., p. 54.
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-
"This shows the disparity between expectations and desire, and,
arguably, between reality and wishes. Although widely expected, such
a change would clearly be unpopular. Four out of five adults say they
would oppose a reduction in the number of services provided by the
NHS, compared with just one-tenth who would be supportlva.r"
As well as expecting fewer services to be available, the public also expects to
see an increase in service rationing. In total, three-quarters (76 per cent) of
adults believe the amount of prioritising will have increased in a decade. Just
one-tenth expect the opposite.
"People in the age range 25-44, ASs and those paying tax at the
highest rates (groups among whom there is a considerable overlap)
are particularly inclined to feel that the degree of rationing will
escalate....Younger people, and those under 25 especially, are more
likely to be in favour of such a change than their older counterparts
(especially those aged 45-55). However, in no age (or indeed any
other) group does the proportion who support an increase in rationing
come close to the proportion who oppose it.,,43
Most (62 per cent) adults think that NHS services will no longer be free at the
point of use by the year 2007. Here:
"Age has a marked impact on perception. Young people (15-24) are
much more likely than older people (55+) to expect that payment will be
required for NHS services ...Clearly, such expectation is not based on
public longing. The vast majority (four in five) oppose the principle of
paying to use NHS services. By contrast, just one in eight (12 per
cent) are supportive (a mere 1 per cent strongly SO).,,44
42 Ibid.
43-
Ibid., p. 56.
44 Ibid., p. 64.
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-
Respondents widely anticipate that the proportion of individuals with private
medical insurance (PMI) will be greater in ten years' time that it is now.
"Eight in ten expect to see an increase in the proportion of individuals
who have voluntarily taken out PMI, compared with just 8 per cent who
think that an increase is unlikely. A clear majority (70 per cent) believe
that PMI paid for by individuals will be obligatory by 2007, and only one
in five think that this is unlikely. Half envisage that PMI paid for by
employers will be compulsory in ten years' time, and one-third think the
opposite.r"
Some 53 per cent of respondents say they would support an increase in the
proportion of adults voluntarily taking out PMI, and 18 per cent say they would
be opposed. Again:
"More people feel that individuals should be able to decide the amount
they spend on PMI than feel that a compulsory minimum should be set
by the government. Asked to imagine that free health care was
available only to those with lower incomes and that taxes were reduced
to enable those not eligible to take out PMI, more than two in five (45
percent) say that individuals should be free to decide how much they
spend on PM/.
"Just one-quarter think that a compulsory minimum should be
set, and three in ten feel unable to decide.?"
When it comes to the questions of quality of treatment:
"Opinion is divided over whether the quality of treatment offered by the
NHS in any way differs from the quality of treatment provided by
private suppliers. Four in ten think that the two services are about
45 Ibid., p. 84.
46 Ibid., p. 88.
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equal, three in ten think that private care has the edge, and one in ten
perceive the NHS to be superlcr.""
However, again, age has a considerable impact on perception. Younger
people are much more likely to be advocates of private treatment than their
older counterparts.
"For example, among the under 25s, 8 per cent say they consider the
NHS to offer a better quality of service and 46 per cent say the same
about private care. Among the over 65s, the corresponding figures are
17 per cent and 18 per cent respectively. By social class, C2s emerge
as the most positive about the quality of private treatment. ,,48
Here political affiliation has comparatively little impact on opinion.
"Although current Labour supporters are slightly more likely than
Conservatives to think that NHS treatment is better, as many Labour
supporters as Tories say that the quality of private health care is
best.,,49
Overall, the implications of this ground breaking research are clear. As
Bosanquet and Pollard conclude:
"The summary indicates that the public is beginning to accept that
change is inevitable. Some groups appear more receptive to change
than others, implying that they may be willing to consider yet more
reform, or that they may serve to influence other elements of society.
However, it should be appreciated that (in most cases) only a minority
. h ti I I f ,,50In eac group ac Ive y we comes re orm.
47 Ibid., p. 90.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50-
Ibid., p. 93.
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Although public opinion is today evidently in a very different world to that into
which the NHS was born, the MORI research clearly indicates a central
contradiction in popular perception.
"The most striking general finding of the survey is the gap between
expectations and wants. Broadly, the public wants the NHS to offer
everything, and to offer it free; 65 per cent say, for instance, the NHS
services would always be free. But, crucially, a mere 13 per cent
except that they will be free in ten years' time. Some 67 per cent think
that the NHS will provide fewer services and that those no longer
covered will only be available privately, even though 80 per cent do not
like such a prospect.
"It is on this expectations gap that modernisers should focus.
With expectations so clearly dampened, the battle is half way won."S1
Researching Limits, Boundaries and Bias
The research outlined above was conduced only weeks after Prime Minister
Tony Blair arrived into office in 1997. Since then it could be argued that his
government has exploited the public's 'dampened expectations' on health
and, as such, his minister's have been able to move forward with an
essentially modernising agenda.
As was stated in Chapter IV, acceptance of the private finance initiative,
public private partnerships, the 2000 Concordat with independent hospitals,
the arrival of independent not-for-profit Foundation Trusts, and even more
recently, privately designed, built, financed and operated Diagnostic and
Treatment Centres - all conspire to suggest a government at ease with major
elements of market-inclined reform.
Today, the political class are leaving the NHS's vision and promises of the
1940s behind. Instead of seeing the service in its fully nationalised format,
SI Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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politicians are busy recasting it as a regulator and a funder of healthcare - but
not the owner or manager of the facilities in which healthcare is actually
delivered.
Similarly, whilst they see the NHS remaining as a key funder of healthcare
they ultimately only see it as one of a number. With millions of people already
covered by private medical insurance, private cash plans or willing to self-
fund, it is perhaps no surprise that even back in 1997, 53 per cent of
respondents said they would support an increase in the proportion of adults
voluntarily taking out private health cover.52
Nevertheless, even with major elements of British state healthcare returning
to some semblance of private ownership, this does not necessarily mean that
anything like a genuinely free market is becoming accepted by opinion
formers or the electorate.
For as was stated earlier on in this study, ever since Roman times, political
elites in Britain have always sought to plan, control and regulate the provision
of health services. Through the military, the church, the Royal Colleges,
Parliament, and the timeless granting of legislative favour, the state has
always sought to empire-build and to control people's access to healthcare
and medicine.
Far from operating in a real market, healthcare as always been a highly
politicised and controlled activity: one that rests on a large measure of
coercion and governmental license.
As such, the principles of a genuine market order have never been applied to
this most important area of human progress and achievement. In this context,
the way that the language of the market is often applied to the analysis of
health policy is itself a highly questionable and potentially damaging practice.
For if the language and notions of the market are imputed to describe what
S'lb'
. -lQ., p. 88.
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are in reality identified problems that have more to do with state
interventionism and government failure, the entire debate becomes set on a
highly confused and ultimately meaningless linguistic foundation.
Given that health is in reality one of the most politicised areas of human
activity, and that the linguistic limits placed on its discourse require a sound
degree of objectivity, it is potentially disquieting if the boundaries set, place a
bias that precludes viable and sustained reasoning.
If the language and phraseology of the market are invoked, yet the structures,
incentives and reality of healthcare remain essentially statist, public discourse
runs the risk of being bound by an unintelligible world of economic and legal
relativism.
On the popular question of externalities for instance, whilst the genuine free
marketer might seek reform by the internalisation of externalities, the
unintelligible relativist might genuinely believe that externalities are an
inevitable outcome of what is already popularly accepted as a market.
To put it another way: if a market is not rigorously adhered to in terms of such
operational definitions as private property rights, the rule of law and market
driven reputation then it cannot be said in any meaningful sense to be a
genuine market.
If a General Medical Council, a Royal College or a private company are
granted legislative favour by the state, then they can no longer be said to be
of the market in any objective and meaningful sense.
As the foundations of western society and prosperity - private property rights,
the rule of law, and market-driven reputation - are not popularly articulated or
understood. The often confused and arbitrary language that overlays public
debate therefore suggests that from our ignorance adverse social power
relations are born.
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For arguably in a genuine market the providers of health would have to
surcome to the rigours of the consumer's power and the levelling principles of
arbitrage. Could it be that the reason why professional groups receive more
than 40 per cent more NHS spending per illness episode than those on lower
incomes is not - in causal terms - because the middle classes are better at
asserting their rights, but instead because such built-in inequity is the
inevitable product of the political economy of legislative favour and producer
capture?
It is not within the purview or range of this study to answer such an important,
and complex, question. Suffice to say, the task in hand here is much simpler.
This study is seeking to find how British opinion formers, at the beginning of
the twenty first century, think about markets in health and to what extent they
adhere to a rigorous and logical analysis?
When a representative sample of leading health opinion formers - journalists,
academics, politicians, government officials and members of relevant interest
groups - think about 'a free market in health', what meaning does such a
notion have for them? What is their perspective on what a market in health is,
or could-be?
Ultimately, in surveying respondents views and assessing relevant
commonalities and cleavages in their attitudes, the study is able to profile and
assess the limits, boundaries and biases of this influential group's beliefs and
suppositions.
Methodology and Inquiry
Given the historic evidence presented in the previous chapters of this study,
and the argument that British healthcare has always been highly politicised, it
is at least plausible to imagine that under analysis leading opinion formers will
find it difficult to articulate or even comprehend a market in health without
invoking populist notions of market failure.
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For as David Green has suggested:
"The dominant academic view is that attempts by ordinary people to
obtain health care for themselves, without the help of the state, are
bound to suffer from a number of serious 'market failures'. ,,53
It is the contention of this research that there are six primary biases, limits and
self-imposed boundaries that currently guide the beliefs of health opinion
formers.
The first is the concept of monopoly. It is commonly assumed that a health
market is particularly vulnerable to monopoly and producer capture.
However, instead of seeing these traits as the weaknesses of statism and
political culture it is an a priori belief amongst opinion formers that medical
professions will be able to gain legislative favour and organise against the
consumer to raise prices and to minimise accountability for medical
wrongdoing. Crucially, the idea of precluding such legislative favour and of
consumers becoming reliant on market-borne reputation (as opposed to
regulation) is simply not articulated.
One of the ironies of the monopoly debate in health (and in other markets) is
that those who often appear to be most concerned about it, invariably suggest
that it should be the greatest monopolist of them all - the state - that is used
to deal with the assumed problems that monopoly gives rise to.
The second issue is consumer ignorance. It is commonly held that because
of his superior knowledge, the doctor will always face the consumer as the
dominant party, and that this will be a problem made worse by medical
advance.
S3 Green, D., (1985) Working Class Patients and the Medical Establishment, Aldershot, Gower, p. 3.
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Here there appears to be little understanding or empathy for the view that
brands, reputation and third party assessments, essential features of a free
society, can overcome many of the problems of consumer ignorance. There is
little faith in the idea that the market would discover overtime means and
mechanisms that would empower and embolden the consumer. Again, the
idea that state monopoly or regulation would in anyway empower the
consumer more than a genuine market is an interesting yet questionable
notion.
The third area of popular concern is neglect of the poor and chronically
sick. Here, it is believed that even if the market does not wholly neglect the
poor and chronically sick, they would inevitably receive an altogether inferior
service.
Instead of seeing the market as an instrument that offers built-in incentives to
level social power and encourage greater prosperity for the benefit and
inclusion of all, it is seen as a divisive mechanism that perpetuates exclusion
and poverty. There is little assertion that it is the state that neglects the poor
and the chronically sick because they hold less voice and power under its
auspices.
Again, as Hayek, Mises and Rothbard have indicated there is little
understanding that in a real market new and innovative enterprises and
brands would emerge to deal with such vulnerable groups and in ways that
are not currently thought of.
The fourth area is externalities. It is widely believed that there are negative
externalities of third-party effects requiring government regulation, notably that
the doctor and the patient may ignore the exposure of others to contagious
disease. Here it is popularly assumed that a state will respond faster and
more effectively to an external problem than a genuine free market.
The fifth area is a lack of provision of public goods. Under this argument it is
held that some health care is a 'public good' and as such it must be supplied
213
by government. Perhaps the most popular reason for seeing health as a
public good is the idea that only government can effectively manage and
eliminate an outbreak of a contagious disease.
Instead of arguing that the market would itself create effective mechanisms
and means to deal with such a situation, government is viewed a priori as the
only agency capable of effective management. Importantly, when it comes to
the public goods debate, there is little questioning of the capacity for
politicians to cover-up, to deny, to obfuscate on, to misdirect, and to
mismanage - not least because states invariably lack the sophisticated means
bywhich vital evaluations and assessments can be encouraged.
The final argument popularly invoked to site market failure is the perverse
incentives of insurance. Here, it is argued that demand for healthcare is
more uncertain than for most other products and in practice this has meant
that insurance has played a major role in health care funding. As such, it is
said that there are special difficulties with health insurance. Once a person is
covered by insurance he has a reduced incentive to avoid health care costs.
Similarly, once premiums have been paid the individual has an incentive to
initiate the delivery of health care - that is, to 'get his money's worth'. Finally,
where a third party does not control payment, the doctor or the patient may
have an incentive not to contain costs.
In all of this, there has been scant regard for the perverse incentives of state
healthcare. Just because the demand for healthcare might be more uncertain
than for most other products it does not necessarily follow that government is
better placed to deal with this than powerful consumers in real markets would
be.
While it is popularly assumed that insurance is the private model of choice, it
remains possible that in a real market other arrangements would become the
norm. For example, it is often said that in a free market many uninsured motor
accident victims would simply be left to die by the side of the road. But would
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this really happen? Would a market not develop whereby some health
providers offered free rescue and medical treatment providing the victim
signed up to a health plan for a specified period. After all, this is precisely how
many motor vehicle accident organisations such as the Automobile
Association and the Royal Automobile Club work now.
Again, is it not true that once a person has been promised free and unlimited
healthcare by a government this reduces the incentive to avoid health care
costs?
Once taxes have been paid and the government has made this promise, do
not individuals have an incentive to initiate the delivery of health care and to
'get what is theirs by right'?
Finally, why would it be assumed that in a real market the doctor or the patient
would not have adequate incentives not to contain costs? Surely, that is what
markets arrange in and of themselves? The suggestion that governments (as
third party payers), can better ensure such an efficient outcome, is surely a
highly questionable and contentious proposition?
Whilst one of the key teachings of social science is that we are all ultimately
bound by the beliefs and epistemology of our age, it is nevertheless, as
Anthony Giddens has so powerfully argued,54 a primary function of those
formally engaged in social enquiry to challenge and expose the boundaries,
inconsistencies and contexts in which worldviews become accepted and are
ultimately internalised.
In exploring the underlying beliefs and values of health opinion formers in the
context of how they think about notions of market failure and market success,
it was decided early on that such an inquiry would be suitable for both
quantitative and qualitative research.
54 Anthony Giddens (1976) New Rules of Sociological Methodology, London, Hutchinson.
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The quantitative research was gathered though a telephone questionnaire
and interview with each respondent. Containing a series of questions that
explored the respondent's values, ideas and notions surrounding such areas
as monopoly, consumer ignorance, neglect of the poor and chronically sick,
externalities, public goods, and perverse incentives, a subsequent analysis of
the data gathered facilitates insights into the nature and degree of the
boundaries and intellectual limits that opinion formers currently set.
Although social inquiry is never value free, quantitative research in the form of
a questionnaire does facilitate a certain degree of dispassionate objectivity.
Through the setting of methodologically appropriate questions, a number of
statistical tools can be applied which in turn help to interpret and contextualise
the insights gained.
To further aid analysis, the qualitative research of this study has also been
facilitated by a series of open-ended questions towards the end of each
telephone interview. While such work - as Ann Bowling points out - often
tends to lack external validity:
"The aim is to understand complex phenomena and to generate
hypotheses, rather than to apply the findings to a wider populatlon't'"
Given the subject matter and the constraints of undertaking this research, it is
inevitable that the data and information achieved would have to be interpreted
to some extent.
However, given the powerful results achieved and outlined in Chapter VI, it is
only fair to say that the explanations provided are not a matter of subjective,
personal opinion, but instead, accurately reflect the values, beliefs and
boundaries of the population concerned.
SS Ann Bowling (2000) Research Methods in Health: Investigating Health and Health Sen ices. Opl'Il
University Press, Maidenhead, p. 190.
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The Sample
As suggested above, the sample for this study covers the influential worlds of
journalism, academia, politics, civil service - and key interest groups.
For reasons of definitional complexity and because of the sensitivity of the
research (not least for reasons of individual confidentiality), it was not possible
to examine a 'perfect' sample. Nevertheless, the research compiled is from an
accurate and representative sample of leading national newspaper, electronic
media, party political, civil service, and health interest group commentators.
It is estimated that out of the leading national newspapers, the author
questioned more than 90 per cent of currently serving and recent health
correspondents. Ten leading national health journalists were interviewed (see
Table 1).
Concerning the electronic media, ten leading health correspondents and
journalists from the BBC, Independent Television News and Sky News were
interviewed.
Similarly, ten leading health and social policy academics were interviewed. All
of them work in some of Britain's most respected university departments,
have written several books on healthcare and social policy, and/or regularly
appear as commentators on health in the press and media.
In politics, a sample of 10 past and current health spokesmen were
interviewed from the country's main political parties - Labour, Conservative
and Liberal Democrat - including those ranked at ministerial, junior ministerial
and backbench levels.
To further strengthen the parliamentary sample ten past and present
members of the House of Commons Health Select Committee were
interviewed.
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To access party policy expertise, ten party political advisers and researchers
on health policy and social policy were interviewed. Concerning the civil
service, ten senior officials from the Department of Health and other key
ministries - such as the Treasury - were interviewed.
Ten senior respondents were interviewed from a wide range of health interest
groups. These included respondents from the General Medical Council, the
British Medical Association, a selection of Royal Medical Colleges, leading
health trades unions, private sector organisations, charities, and patients
groups.
Ten leading public policy thinkers from a selection of think tanks were
interviewed.
Finally, ten senior medical and health professionals were interviewed.
Sample Frame Number of
Respondents
1. Newspaper Health Journalists 10
2. Electronic Media Health Journalists 10
3. Health and Social Policy Academics 10
4. Party Political Health Spokesmen 10
5. Members of the House of Commons Health 10
Select Committee
6. Party Political Advisers on Health and 10
Social Policy
7. Senior Civil Servants 10
8. Health Interest Groups 10
9. Think Tanks 10
10. Senior Medical and Health Professionals 10
Table 1.
Combined, a list of one hundred leading health commentators were surveyed
making this the largest ever analysis of notions of market failure and success
amongst influential British opinion formers.
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From the outset, respondents were told that the information gathered was for
an academic thesis concerned with the analysis of notions of market failure
and success in healthcare.
Given the political sensitivities surrounding this subject, the respondents were
assured that their anonymity would be guaranteed at all times and that their
identities would not be revealed.
The research was conducted between 15th November 2004 and 15th April
2005. Throughout the process, it was made clear that what were wanted was
the respondent's own personal views.
As such, 'don't know' (OK) options were not included in the quantitative
research because, as Schuman and Presser advised, in a survey like this,
which is interested in people's underlying dispositions, it is better to
encourage a definite 'one way or the other' response by not providing a "get
OUt".56
Overall, as will be seen in the next chapter, there was an unusually low level
of non-response. The data achieved was generated from one hundred
percent of the initial sample frame.
Important Research
This research is of fundamental importance because it seeks to illuminate the
boundaries, limits and presumptions upon which one of the most important
debates of our civilisation is conducted.
For the discourse surrounding the economics and politics of healthcare is not
simply relevant to Britain and the National Health Service. It has wider global
implications that potentially impact on the lives of millions of humans around
the world.
56 Schuman, H., and Presser, S., (198I) Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys, New York.
Academic Press.
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It is perhaps a timeless truth that all humans require some degree of
healthcare during the course of their lives. Medicine, healthcare and the
fellow-feeling that should accompany them are a vital and necessary
ingredient of all human life.
Today, in 2006, Britain remains the fourth largest economy in the world. It is
one of the world's leading industrial nations. And its economic, military and
cultural prowess carries huge international weight and influence. As a world
connected in real-time increasingly speaks English as an international
language, then what is done in health policy, in Britain, really does matter.
For whilst during the first six decades of the twentieth century British Fabian
socialists sought to export their ideas on health, welfare and economics to
foreign and commonwealth nations around the world." Britain's policy
exporters now seem to have become, the primary champions of a new
corporatist project: namely, public private partnerships.
In the broader political, economic and cultural context, the way leading British
health opinion formers think about healthcare, and the economic rubrics that
of necessity underpin it, are of huge significance.
For as the twenty first century opens up before us and the world of healthcare
leaves behind the model of full blown nationalisation, the question arises as to
what will replace it? If its emergent demise suggests a transition or a vacuum,
what will be underlying principles that guide market-inclined reform?
In the future, will opinion formers continue to perpetuate historic notions of
market failure in healthcare or give new voice to notions of government
failure? When it comes to markets in health, is there intellectual scope
amongst opinion formers for notions of market success?
57 Donald F. Butsky, (2000) Democratic Socialism: A Global Survey, Praeger, Connecticut, Westport.
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CHAPTER VI
IDEAS OF MARKET AND GOVERNMENT FAILURE AMONGST
BRITISH HEALTH OPINION FORMERS
In exploring and questioning notions of market and government failure in
healthcare, this chapter presents the results of research from one hundred
leading opinion formers. In clarifying the conceptual boundaries surrounding
commonly held notions of health economics, it seeks to expose some of the
current healthcare debate's limitations and deficiencies.
Research Findings
As was made clear in Chapter V, the research element of the study centred
on a telephone interview and questionnaire that was used between 15th
November 2004 and is" April 2005. Overall, 100 respondents were chosen in
the sample frame, 10 from each of the following categories of opinion former:
newspaper health journalists, electronic media health journalists, health and
social policy academics, party political health spokesmen, members of the
House of Commons health select committee, party political advisers on health
and social policy, senior civil servants, health interest groups, think tank policy
experts, senior medial and health professionals.
100 per cent of the respondents fully participated in the research. Together,
they account for a high percentage of British health opinion formers and as
such the data generated can be said to have a high degree of external
validity.
The survey itself was divided into three sections. The first two sections sought
quantitative data with the third concentrating on qualitative information. The
first section (Section A) dealt with 'Opinions towards Market Failure in
healthcare' and the second (Section B) concentrated on 'Opinions towards
Government Failure in healthcare'. The third section (Section C) concerned
general 'Parameters in the healthcare debate'.
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In total, there were 21 questions with 7 in section A (1-7),7 in section B (8-14)
and 7 in section C (15-21).
Questions 1 to 7 invited respondents to agree or disagree with particular
statements. For each question, respondents were given the following
instruction: "On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being 'strongly disagree' and 10 being
'strongly agree' can you please tell me what you think of the following
statement".
Q.A1. "If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to stop problems of Monopoly."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaperhealth journalists 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 2 1 0 5.4
Electronic media health journalists 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 6.3
Health and social policy academics 4 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 4.3
Party political health spokesmen 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 2 0 5.3
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 2 2 7.5
Party political advisers on health and social policy 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 1 6.7
Seniorcivil servants 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 5.6
Health interest group representatives 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 4 7.8
Think tank policy experts 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 4.7
Senior medical and health professionals 1 0 1 1 3 0 2 2 0 0 5.3
Totals 9 6 11 4 11 8 11 19 7 14=100
Overall Average 5.9
In response to the statement "If a real market in healthcare existed,
Government would still have to intervene to stop problems of monopoly" all
respondent categories answered within the (slightly negative) 4.3 to
(reasonably positive) 7.8 range. Overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged a
score of 5.9.
Nevertheless, below this headline average there were some important
differences. While health interest group representatives (7.8), party political
advisers (6.7) and electronic media journalists (6.3) tended to agree with the
view that government would have to stop problems of monopoly there was
clearly more caution from the health and social policy academics (4.3) and the
think tank policy experts (4.7). The latter appeared to be much more
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questioning of the notion of monopoly and somewhat sceptical of the benefits
ofgovernment interventionism.
Q.A2 "If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to provide objective information to overcome problems of Consumer
Ignorance".
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 6.9
Electronic media health journalists 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 1 3 7.7
Health and social policy academics 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 5.6
Party political health spokesmen 0 1 1 0 0 2 3 2 1 0 6.3
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 2 3 0 7.1
Party political advisers on health and social policy 0 0 3 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 5.0
Senior civil servants 2 0 2 3 0 0 1 2 0 0 4.3
Health interest group representatives 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 4 7.4
Think tank policy experts 4 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 3.2
Senior medical and health professionals 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 3 0 0 5.3
Totals 11 3 11 10 5 7 18 14 7 14=100
Overall Average 5.8
In response to the statement "If a real market in healthcare existed,
Government would still have to intervene to provide objective information to
overcome problems of consumer ignorance" all respondent categories
answered within the relatively wide (negative) 3.2 to (reasonably positive) 7.7
range. Overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged a score of 5.8.
Nevertheless, below this figure there were some important differences. While
electronic media health journalists (7.7), health interest group representatives
(7.4) and newspaper health journalists (6.9) tended to agree with the view that
government would have to provide objective information to overcome
problems of consumer ignorance there was clear scepticism from the think
tank policy experts (3.2).
This latter group appeared to be not only more questioning of the notion of
objective information per se but were sceptical of it when its codification and
dissemination was attempted through government intervention.
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Q.A3 "If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to protect the Poor and Chronically Sick from Neglect."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 3 8.5
Electronic media health journalists 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 7 9.5
Health and social policy academics 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 3 6.0
Party political health spokesmen 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 2 7.6
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 6 9.1
Party political advisers on health and social policy 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 3 7.0
Senior civil servants 2 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 5.7
Health interest group representatives 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 5 8.5
Think tank policy experts 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 5.5
Senior medical and health professionals 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 3 1 0 6.0
Totals 8 2 3 5 5 6 14 12 12 33-100
Overall Average 7.3
In response to the statement "If a real market in healthcare existed,
Government would still have to intervene to protect the poor and chronically
sick from neglect" all respondent categories answered within the relatively
wide (neutral) 5.5 to (very positive) 9.5 range. Overall, the opinion forming 100
averaged a reasonably positive score of 7.3.
Nevertheless, below this figure there were some important dlfferences. While
electronic media health journalists (9.5), health interest group representatives
(8.5) and newspaper health journalists (8.5) tended to agree with the view that
government would have to intervene to protect the poor and chronically sick
from neglect there was a seemingly neutral scepticism from the think tank
policy experts (5.5), senior civil servants (5.7), the health and social policy
academics (6.0) and the senior medical and health professionals (6.0).
While the think tank policy experts, civil servants and the health and social
policy academics were at best neutral towards the idea of government
interventionism benefiting the poor and chronically sick a similarly neutral
stance from the senior medical and health professionals might have come
from the perspective that they - not central government - are best placed to
help the poor and chronically sick.
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Q.A4. "If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to help protect people from such external factors as contagious
disease."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 5 8.8
Electronic media health journalists 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 8.8
Health and social policy academics 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 3 6.7
Party political health spokesmen 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 5 8.3
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 9.4
Party political advisers on health and social policy 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 7.2
Senior civil servants 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 0 1 3 7.0
Health interest group representatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 5 8.8
Think tank policy experts 0 1 0 0 4 1 1 2 0 1 6.1
Senior medical and health professionals 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 5.3
Totals 1 5 7 3 8 3 11 12 11 39=100
Overall Average 7.6
In response to the statement "If a real market in healthcare existed,
Government would still have to intervene to protect people from such external
factors as contagious disease" all respondent categories answered within the
(neutral) 5.3 to (very positive) 9.4 range. Overall, the opinion forming 100
averaged a positive score of 7.6.
Nevertheless, below this figure there were some important differences. While
members of the House of Commons Health Select Committee (9.4), electronic
media health journalists (8.8) newspaper health journalists (8.8) and health
interest group representatives stood out as tending to agree with the view that
government would have to protect people from such external factors as
contagious disease there was a more neutral stance from the senior medical
and health professionals (5.3) and the think tank policy experts (6.1).
While members of think tanks might be in the business of challenging
seemingly plausible assumptions, with senior medical and health
professionals it is possible that their neutrality stems from the fact that they
see themselves as being much more relevant to the protection of people from
contagious disease than any government agency or department. In short, they
see themselves as independent agents and advocates on the frontline of
healthcare delivery.
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a.A5. "If a real market in healthcare existed, this would not stop some of it
being run by government because healthcare is a natural public good."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0 2 6.3
Electronic media health journalists 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 3 7.3
Health and social policy academics 5 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3.0
Party political health spokesmen 2 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 3.8
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 4 1 7.2
Party political advisers on health and social policy 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 4.6
Senior civil servants 4 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 4.9
Health interest group representatives 0 0 2 1 0 1 3 2 0 1 6.3
Think tank policy experts 4 1 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2.4
Senior medical and health professionals 2 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 0 0 5.5
Totals 19 8 10 6 10 7 14 9 8 9=100
Overall Average 5.1
In response to the statement "If a real market in healthcare existed, this would
not stop some of it being run by government because healthcare is a natural
public good" all respondent categories answered within the relatively wide
(negative) 2.4 to (positive) 7.3 range. Overall, the opinion forming 100
averaged a controversial score of 5.1.
Nevertheless, below this figure there were some important differences. While
electronic media health journalists (7.3) and newspaper health journalists
(6.3) tended to agree with the statement that healthcare is a natural public
good there was clear disagreement from think tank policy experts (2.4) and
health and social policy academics (3.0).
Such strong rejections from these two latter respondent groups suggest that
they either saw the question as being contentious or they view healthcare as
being a natural private good.
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Q.A6. "Because people's healthcare is unpredictable some of its costs will
always have to be covered by government - private arrangements such as
insurance cannot do it all."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists a 1 a 1 a a 4 1 1 2 7.1
Electronic media health journalists a a a 1 1 a 1 2 2 3 8.0
Health and social policy academics 3 a a a 1 a 2 1 1 2 5.9
Party political health spokesmen 1 a a a 1 a 1 3 2 2 7.5
Members of the H of C health select committee a a a 1 a a a 3 1 5 8.7
Party political advisers on health and social policy a 4 1 a 1 1 a 2 a 1 4.8
Senior civil servants 3 1 3 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 3.5
Health interest group representatives a a a 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 7.6
Think tank policy experts 3 1 1 a 2 1 a 1 a 1 4.2
Senior medical and health professionals 1 a 3 a a a 2 4 a a 5.6
Totals 11 7 8 4 8 3 13 18 9 19=100
Overall Average 6.2
In response to the statement "because people's healthcare is unpredictable
some of its costs will always have to be covered by government - private
arrangements such as insurance cannot do it all", all respondent categories
answered within the relatively wide (negative) 3.5 to (positive) 8.7 range.
Overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged a slightly positive score of 6.2.
Nevertheless, below this figure there were some important differences. While
members of the House of Commons Health Select Committee (8.7), electronic
media health journalists (8.0) and newspaper health journalists (7.1) tended to
agree with the statement that 'because people's healthcare is unpredictable
private arrangements such as insurance cannot do it all', senior civil servants
(3.5) the think tank policy experts (4.2) and party political advisers on health
and social policy (4.8) all disagreed.
Expressing neutrality were the senior medical and health professionals (5.6)
and the health and social policy academics (5.9).
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a.A7. "lf people. are covered .by private healthcare, there is a greater incentive
for them to use It and get their money's worth."
f- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 0 1 0 3 0 2 3 1 a 6.5
Electronic media health journalists 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 2 2 7.5
Health and social policy academics 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 a 2 6.3
Party political health spokesmen 2 1 a 0 3 2 2 a a a 4.5
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 0 a 1 a 0 4 2 2 1 7.6
Party political advisers on health and social policy 0 0 1 2 0 3 1 3 a a 6.0
Senior civil servants 4 0 2 0 a 0 1 1 2 a 4.3
Health interest group representatives 0 1 1 2 4 0 1 a 0 1 5.0
Think tank policy experts 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 6.4
Senior medical and health professionals 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 2 3 a 6.7
Totals 8 3 7 10 12 7 18 17 11 7=100
Overall Average 6.0
In response to the statement "if people are covered by private healthcare,
there is a greater incentive for them to use it and get their money's worth" all
respondent categories answered within the (slightly negative) 4.3 to
(reasonably positive) 7.6 range. Overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged a
slightly positive score of 6.0.
While senior civil servants (4.3), party political spokesmen (4.5) and health
interest group representatives (5.0) erred on the side of disagreement,
members of the House of Commons Health Select Committee (7.6), electronic
media journalists (7.5), senior medical and health professionals (6.7)
newspaper health journalists (6.5) and think tank policy experts (6.4) tended
to agree with the view that if people were covered by private healthcare they
would have a greater incentive to use it.
The questions in section B - numbered 8 to 14 - again invited respondents to
agree or disagree with particular statements. As with section A (above), but
this time dealing with 'Opinions towards Government Failure in healthcare',
each respondent was given the following instruction: On a scale of 1-10, with
1 being 'strongly disagree' and 10 being 'strongly agree' can you please tell
me what you think of the following statement".
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a.B8. II If. a system of ~eal state healthcare existed, a market providing people
with choices would stili have to be allowed to stop problems of Monopoly."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 2 2 7.9
Electronic media health journalists 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 5.3
Health and social policy academics 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 5 8.0
Party political health spokesmen 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 0 2 6.1
Members of the H of C health select committee 1 0 0 1 0 3 1 2 2 0 6.4
Party political advisers on health and social policy 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 3 7.7
Senior civil servants 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 4 8.1
Health interest group representatives 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 6.2
Think tank policy experts 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 8.2
Senior medical and health professionals 0 0 2 2 0 4 0 0 1 1 5.7
Totals 6 3 7 5 5 13 9 15 13 24-100
Overall Average 6.9
In response to the statement "if a system of real state healthcare existed, a
market providing people with choices would still have to be allowed to stop
problems of monopoly" all respondent categories answered within the
(neutral) 5.3 to (positive) 8.2 range. Overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged
a reasonably positive score of 6.9.
Nevertheless, below this headline average there were some important
differences. While think tank policy experts (8.2), senior civil servants (8.1)
health and social policy academics (8.0), newspaper health journalists (7.9)
and party political advisers on health and social policy (7.7) tended to agree
with the view that if a system of real state healthcare existed, 'a market
providing people with choices would still have to be allowed to stop problems
of monopoly', health interest group representatives (6.2), party political health
spokesmen (6.1), senior medical and health professionals (5.7) and electronic
media health journalists (5.3) were all respondent categories that were much
more middling in their answers.
Significantly, no respondent category overtly disagreed with the statement
and therefore the idea that under real state healthcare a market providing
people with choices would still have to exist if problems of monopoly were to
be ameliorated.
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a.89. "It a system OT r~al state neanncare .eXISteO, people would have to be
allowed to access a wide range of competing health information so that
individuals could overcome the problems of Consumer Ignorance."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 6 8.2
Electronic media health journalists 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 3 3 8.2
Health and social policy academics 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 5 8.6
Party political health spokesmen 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 4 1 7.7
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 1 1 7.8
Party political advisers on health and social policy 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 2 3 8.3
Senior civil servants 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 5 9.0
Health interest group representatives 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 7.7
Think tank policy experts 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 3 3 8.4
Senior medical and health professionals 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 2 1 7.8
Totals 0 0 2 2 6 5 17 18 20 30=100
Overall Average 8.1
In response to the statement "if a system of real state healthcare existed,
people would have to be allowed to access a wide range of competing health
information so that individuals could overcome the problems of consumer
ignorance" all respondent categories answered within a remarkably narrow,
consensual and positive 7.7 to 9.0 range. Overall, the opinion forming 100
averaged a positive score of 8.1.
With all respondent categories generally agreeing with the idea that under
state healthcare people would still require competing channels of health
information to overcome the problems of consumer ignorance it was clear that
the respondents were sensitive to the limits and unintended consequences of
state power.
As if inherently accepting of the subjectivity of knowledge and the medical
discovery process all categories seemingly accepted that a legal or black
market in information would exist and help overcome the problems of
consumer ignorance.
Significantly, no respondent category believed that a real state healthcare
system could on its own overcome the problems of consumer ignorance.
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'-"Q.810. "lf a system of real state healthcare existed, there would still be a I
need for many private healthcare charities and groups to protect the Poor a d
Chronically Sick from Neglect." n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 6.3
Electronic media health journalists 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 6.4
Health and social policy academics 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 4 7.3
Party political health spokesmen 0 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 6.6
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 3 8.4
Party political advisers on health and social policy 0 0 3 1 0 0 4 1 0 1 5.9
Senior civil servants 1 0 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 5.7
Health interest group representatives 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 7.5
Think tank policy experts 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 4 7.6
Senior medical and health professionals 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 5.4
Totals 4 7 13 4 4 5 12 18 10 23=100
Overall Average 6.7
In response to the statement "if a system of real state healthcare existed,
there would still be a need for many private healthcare charities and groups to
protect the poor and chronically sick from neglect" all respondent categories
answered within a relatively narrow (neutral) 5.4 to (very positive) 8.4 range.
Overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged a slightly positive score of 6.7.
While members of the House of Commons Health Select Committee (8.4),
think tank policy experts (7.6), health interest group representatives (7.5) and
health and social policy academics (7.3) all agreed with the inevitability of
private healthcare charities and groups playing a vital role in protecting the
poor and chronically sick from neglect - even under a system of real state
healthcare - senior medical and health professionals (5.4), senior civil
servants (5.7) and party political advisers on health and social policy (5.9)
where less sure. For the latter three respondent categories such a view is
more controversial.
Having said that, no respondent category overtly disagreed with the idea that
under any state system private healthcare charities and groups will always
have an important role to play for the poor and chronically sick.
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0.811. "If a .system ot real state neaitncare existed, private healthcare would
still have to Intervene to help protect people from such external factors as
contagious disease."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 3 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 3.6
Electronic media health journalists 2 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.3
Health and social policy academics 2 2 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 1 4.4
Party political health spokesmen 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 4.1
Members of the H of C health select committee 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 1 5.3
Party political advisers on health and social policy 2 1 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2.9
Senior civil servants 4 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3.5
Health interest group representatives 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 5.1
Think tank policy experts 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 2 6.5
Senior medical and health professionals 0 4 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 4.1
Totals 19 18 15 7 11 7 6 9 2 6=100
Overall Average 4.1
In response to the statement "if a system of real state healthcare existed,
private healthcare would still have to intervene to help protect people from
such external factors as contagious disease", all respondent categories
answered within the relatively broad (very negative) 2.3 to (slightly positive)
6.5 range. Nevertheless, overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged a negative
score of 4.1.
While think tank policy experts (6.5) just erred on the side of the positive, all
the other respondent categories tended towards the negative. Electronic
media health journalists (2.3), party political advisers on health and social
policy (2.9) and newspaper health journalists (3.6) were all overt in their
disagreement with the idea that private healthcare had much, if anything, to
offer in terms of protection when it came to such external factors as
contagious disease.
Significantly, no respondent category overtly supported the idea that under a
system of real state healthcare, private healthcare would have much to offer
against the societal threat of contagious disease.
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Q.B1l .. "IT a system o~ real state neauncare exrsten, trus would not stop some
Iof it being run by a private market because healthcare is a natural private I
d " igoo.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists a 1 1 1 1 a 2 2 1 1 6.3
Electronic media health journalists a 2 1 2 a 2 1 2 a a 5.0
Health and social policy academics 1 a a 1 1 1 2 1 a 3 6.8
Party political health spokesmen a 1 1 a 1 1 2 1 3 a 6.5
Members of the H of C health select committee 1 1 1 a 2 4 a a 1 a 5.8
Party political advisers on health and social policy 1 a 1 a 3 a 1 3 1 a 5.9
Senior civil servants a a 1 a 1 a a 4 1 3 7.9
Health interest group representatives a a 1 1 1 1 a 4 a 2 7.0
Think tank policyexperts a 1 a a 2 1 1 1 1 3 7.2
Senior medical and health professionals 1 2 a a 2 1 a 3 a 1 5.5
Totals 4 8 7 5 14 11 9 21 8 13=100
Overall Average 6.3
In response to the statement "if a system of real state healthcare existed, this
would not stop some of it being run by a private market because healthcare is
a natural private good", all respondent categories answered within the
relatively narrow (slightly negative) 5.0 to (positive) 7.9 range. Overall, the
opinion forming 100 averaged a slightly positive score of 6.3.
While senior civil servants (7.9), think tank policy experts (7.2), health interest
group representatives (7.0) and health and social policy academics (6.8) erred
on the side of the positive, all the other respondent categories found the
statement more controversial and therefore fell somewhere in the middle.
Electronic media health journalists (5.0), senior medical and health
professionals (5.5) and party political advisers on health and social policy
(5.9) all provided middling scores.
Significantly, no respondent category overtly disagreed with the view that
under a system of real state healthcare some of it would still be run by a
private market because healthcare is a natural private good.
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0.813. "E:3ecause people's nean:ncare IS unpreoictaoie some of its costs will i
always have to be covered by private healthcare - government arrangement I
such as taxation cannot do it all." s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 1 1 2 6.8 I
Electronic media health journalists 2 1 2 1 2 0 0 1 1 a 4.1 I
Health and social policy academics 0
i
0 0 1 a 1 2 2 0 4 8.0
Party political health spokesmen 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 1 7.4
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 0 3 1 a a 2 1 1 2 6.4
Party political advisers on health and social policy 1 a 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 2 6.8
Senior civil servants 1 1 a 1 1 a 2 1 a 3 6.4
Health interest group representatives 0 1 1 0 0 3 2 2 0 1 6.3
Think tank policyexperts 0 1 0 0 2 a 0 2 0 5 7.8
Senior medical and health professionals 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 6.0
Totals 5 7 7 6 7 9 15 15 8 21=100
Overall Average 6.5
In response to the statement "because people's healthcare is unpredictable
some of its costs will always have to be covered by private healthcare -
government arrangements such as taxation cannot do it all", all respondent
categories answered within the (slightly negative) 4.1 to (positive) 8.0 range.
Overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged a slightly positive score of 6.5.
While health and social policy academics (8.0), think tank policy experts (7.8),
party political advisers on health and social policy (6.8) and newspaper health
journalists (6.8) were all positive, electronic media health journalists were
negative (4.1). Senior civil servants (6.4), health interest group
representatives (6.3) and senior medical and health professionals (6.0)
provided more middling scores.
Significantly, no respondent category profoundly disagreed with the view that
'because people's healthcare is unpredictable some of its costs will always
have to be covered by private healthcare - government arrangements such
as taxation cannot do it all'.
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'-Q.814. "If peopl~ are covere~ by state healthcare, there is a greater incentive
for them to use It and get their money's worth."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Newspaper health journalists 0 0 1 0 3 0 2 2 2 0 6.6
Electronic media health journalists 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 5.6
Health and social policy academics 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 5 7.6
Party political health spokesmen 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 0 5.8
Members of the H of C health select committee 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 3 7.8
Party political advisers on health and social policy 0 1 0 0 2 1 3 1 1 1 6.6
Senior civil servants 0 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 2 6.6
Health interest group representatives 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 5.4
Think tank policy experts 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 7.9
Senior medical and health professionals 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 2 6.9
Totals 1 6 8 4 17 6 16 13 12 17=100
Overall Average 6.6
In response to the statement "if people are covered by state healthcare, there
is a greater incentive for them to use it and get their money's worth" all
respondent categories answered within a (neutral) 5.4 to (positive) 7.9 range.
Overall, the opinion forming 100 averaged a slightly positive score of 6.6.
While think tank policy experts (7.9), health and social policy academics (7.6)
and senior medical and health professionals (6.9) were all positive, health
interest group representatives (5.4) and electronic media health journalists
(5.6) provided middling scores.
Significantly, no respondent category profoundly disagreed with the view that
lif people are covered by state healthcare, there is a greater incentive for them
to use it and get their money's worth'.
The questions in section C - numbered 15 to 21 - were more qualitative in
their orientation. Seeking more open-ended and personal responses they
sought to further clarify the conceptual boundaries surrounding commonly
held notions of health economics and therefore to expose some of the current
healthcare debate's limitations and deficiencies.
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Question C15: In Healthcare, what would be the consequences of a genuine,
private, market system?"
Question C15 demanded an open response to the following statement: "In
Healthcare, what would be the consequences of a genuine, private, market
system?"
In reply, most of the newspaper health journalists expressed concern with the
"inequity" such a system would bring and they tended to focus on the
consequences of a more open market in health information. While many saw
limitations in such a system - "there would be an under class", "inequitable,
expensive, big holes in the cover", "marginalise some, benefit lots, potentially
inequitable", "could lead to a degree of exclusion for lower income people" -
others stressed the perceived benefits: "better standards, increased
competition and... increased access to information", "the well informed would
do better", "eventual improvement to poor and chronically sick although
possibly not in the transition period". Here, the overwhelming majority tended
to associate a genuine private market with "greater cost" and more "expense".
More and better information would disproportionately empower the better off.
Likewise, electronic media health journalists also tended to believe that such
a system "would leave society's more vulnerable with an inferior service",
"more would be spent on a system that covered fewer people...those who
could afford more would get better healthcare". A genuine private market
system "would neglect the needy and chronic illness", the "very poor would be
very poorly served". As if a free market encourages a zero sum game with a
fixed quality of wealth one respondent concluded "Doctors and nurses would
go to better hospitals leading to a long term disaster". Another stated "Lack of
access for less well off - better funded system in the short term".
Health and social policy academics were much more positive in their
responses: "better access to services and more innovation", "everyone in
society would be better off... poor would get better treatment and care", "lower
236
cost, diversity of approaches, fast medical progress". While one respondent
concluded, "there would be more expenditure overall but there would also be
better health for the same expenditure. Better quality, lower costs...more
health for the buck, better outcomes", another asserted: "new medical
techniques and funding mechanisms would be discovered that we currently
cannot imagine".
The responses from the party political health spokesmen were very mixed.
While some saw "greater diversity of provision", "more incentive to improve",
"less waiting", "greater choice" and ""people would have a [greater] interest in
their own health", others asserted: "could lead to problems for some",
"chronically sick [would be] uninsurable and dependent on charity", "look at
the USA to see private market horror". While generally believing the market
would be more "efficient", most remained worried about the poor and long
term ill.
Overseen by majority of Labour members of parliament, most respondents
from the House of Commons Health Select Committee tended to the negative.
For them, a genuine private market would encourage the "poor to go back to a
dark Victorian age". It would be "too expensive" with "little investment for the
poor". That said there were also members who asserted "would need
partnership, private health is strong on quality", "much better for everyone,
state healthcare has not been good for the poor", and "much better patient
focused service". While one person interpreted the question in the immediate
terms of the NHS "disaster for the health service", another stated "quicker".,
The party political advisers on health and social policy were strikingly positive.
They saw a genuine private market health system as being "cheaper, faster,
better, more democratic", "lead to higher standards, "[greater] innovation and
higher efficiency... over time lower costs", "more efficient, health outcomes
improved, poor in all probability would receive better care than in state
system", "quicker", "consumer power, better access, higher standards of
responsiveness", "allow growth" and even "address more need, allow a
thousand blooms to flourish". Indeed, in this group there were only three
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negative respondents: "rising drug prices", "lack of universal coverage" and
"put more pressure on health infrastructure".
For senior civil servants the picture was mixed. Some were clearly worried by
the notion of a genuine market and what it might mean: "poorer and more
deprived communities would suffer unless there was safeguards",
"government would have to regulate to ensure fairness" and "[would require]
government as purchaser especially with chronic disease" were all common
responses. Others welcomed a market approach asserting: "increased
accessibility, drive up quality", "appropriate use of resources, better informed
consumer decisions", "better outcomes for consumers" and "better innovation,
better healthcare at lower cost".
Health interest group representatives gave, as one might expect, a wide
ranging and varied set of responses. While some were concerned with the
issues of inequality and poverty, others saw it as providing a framework for
more choice, better quality and greater efficiency. On the negative side:
"inequality and increased quality for the rich", "more expensive, unnecessary
duplication", "those with low incomes would not be able to pay",
"disasterous... it is not the same as running Tescos. In healthcare there are
not consumers. People are not capable of being consumers", "costs would be
high". On the positive side: "more personal ownership of responsibility for
health", "people would need to know more about shopping around for
insurance policies etc", "plurality of provision [would lead to] more efficient
allocation of resources, greater choice [and] possibly better quality".
Alongside the party political advisers on health and social policy (above) the
think tank policy experts tended to see a genuine private market in positive
terms. For them, such a system would deliver: "much easier access... [and]
more new practice [such as] mobile operating theatres". It would also offer
"higher standards for all, universal access not achieved at present", "vast,
vast, vast improvement, service up, prices down, [as with] cosmetic surgery
there would be a true market with lots of competition", "vast improvement, like
food and electronics", "greater efficiency and choice, lower costs for
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lIP"
individuals, greater innovation through competition", "more equitable access".
Here, negative comments were hard to come by although a couple of
respondents did assert: "But you need a mix", "many people uncovered could
not afford insurance, [here, the] state would have to intervene".
The final group, the senior medical and health professionals, tended to be
negative about a genuine market system. Their comments included
"generally, the poor would be disadvantaged", "tiered approach [would]
produce vulnerable at risk groups", "weakest to the wall", "disaster, you need
combination of private and NHS", "would exclude some people", "a two tier
health service providing healthcare on demand to those who could afford if',
"some people unable to access [healthcare] like in the USA". The few positive
comments included: "competition could only be good", "people would take
better care of themselves ... more innovation", and "more choice".
Question C16: "In Healthcare, what would be the consequences of a genuine,
full blown, state system?"
Mirroring C15 (above), C16 asked for open responses to the statement: "In
healthcare, what would be the consequences of a genuine, full blown, state
system?"
As with C15, many of the newspaper health journalists expressed an interest
in 'information' - "reduced access to information" - as well as other domains.
Overall, the journalists were damning of a genuine, full blown, state system:
"very limited choice, lack of innovation, patients not getting the best,
corruption", "lack of innovation, slow to introduce new treatments, insensitive
to patient choice and demand", "waiting lists, lack of choice, rationing",
'reduced research and development, delays, inefficient distribution". On the
Positive side, some of the responses were self consciously utopian: "couldn't
eXist, would always be mixed", "ironically, much more likelihood of two tier
system postcode lottery", "in an ideal world good well costed health provision
for all, but less choice and freedom."
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The electronic media health journalists tended to believe that such a system
"would be very expensive and inefficient, taxation would go up and up",
"higher taxation and rationing", "bureaucratic and slow moving". While one
respondent commented "the NHS is pretty close to this" another retorted "long
term decline in service and delivery as no private sector benchmark. With no
pressure on doctors and hospitals to treat people as customers [we] will be
stuck in the 1970s". Here only one respondent was positive: "if affordable
,
ideal. If a good state system evolved needs would be met".
The health and social policy academics were damning in their responses:
"shortages, crisis over rationing, people who would go abroad to exercise
choice", "inconsistency between expectations and availability", "everyone
worse off. Poorest and most inarticulate would die [as in] Soviet Russia and
North Korea. No innovation", "poor quality, less choice". Significantly, some
respondents in this group questioned the medical monopoly that currently
underpins all systems of healthcare and even the impact that a full blown
state healthcare would have on healthcare workers: "unless the problem of
medical professional monopoly is dealt with it would be as inefficient as it is
today", "less opportunity for healthcare workers".
While responses from the party political health spokesmen were mixed many
highlighted their concerns with rationing by mentioning queues: "Monopoly
purchaser, restrictions on supply, queuing", "reasonable for sick and poor, but
queues", "queues and more rationing", "quality less good than it could be,
rationing by queuing", "if there was no rationing, the sky would be the limit in
terms of cost. However, this would lead to lots of wasted resources. There
would have to be rationing otherwise the treasury would be crippled. This
rationing would be through queues, waiting lists or discrimination". 80 per cent
of respondents in this group complained about rationing, high costs, and the
perceived inevitability of queuing.
Although with C15 (above) many respondents from the House of Commons
Health Select Committee appeared to be opposed to a genuine private market
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in health, when asked to comment on a full blown state system they were
equally scathing: "death, bad service", "would require higher taxes", "could not
afford it...unrealistic utopia", "more problems, thank god we have always had
a private health sector that can now be exploited", "impossible, non starter
,
would bankrupt country", "bureaucracy, slow", "more equity but queues and
lack of money", "better for poor, slower... for society". In this group only one
person was overtly supportive: "decent healthcare for everyone irrespective of
their background, birth and status in life, good healthcare for all is the ideal, it
is possible".
The party political advisers on health and social policy were strikingly
negative. They saw a genuine full blown state healthcare system in the
following terms: "higher costs, more middle class capture, less accountability",
"corruption, inefficiency, grotesque inequalities of outcome and a black market
in private care", "shortages of doctors and nurses", "mediocrity of service",
"disaster, the more statist the more a disaster, mass production, lowest
common denominator", "lack of drug innovation", "poor research and
development". The positive comments were: "you need state and private in
competition to make a good system" and "greater universal access".
For senior civil servants the picture would be universally worse: "low dynamic
efficiency in the medium to long term", "worse than now, efficiency and
equality down, longer waiting", "inappropriate resource allocation", "risk of no
innovation", "inefficient", "poor quality, monopoly, lack of incentive to improve",
"Sovietisation, statistics bound system, lies told as route to promotion", "not
customer facing", "provider inefficiency", "worse for patients than now",
The health interest groups gave a varied set of responses. On the negative
side: "arrogant monopoly provider, patients would have little incentive to have
knowledge or information about health and healthcare", "there would always
be...constraints and longer waits", "no choice, public sector is fraught with
SUpply and demand problems", "a full blown system would be a heavy burden
on the tax payer", "monopolistic, unresponsive services", "lack of access to
information, quality levels at a minimum, rising costs", "failure, failing
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standards, system ... scuppered by demand, low capital investment". On the
positive side: "There would be universal coverage, higher standards
throughout the service, a higher amount of GOP would go to healthcare. No
waiting lists", and "everyone would achieve equitable treatment in quality and
speed if paid for by taxation".
The think tank policy experts tended to see a genuine full blown state
healthcare system in negative terms. For them, such a system would deliver:
"rationing by queuing, failing standards, monopoly", "lowering of standards",
"monopoly, no incentives to improve", "complete mess", "catastrophic, they
would only get contagious diseases right but then only vaguely",
"unaccountable, inability to provide basic uniform level of service, impersonal",
"poor cost control, inequitable access, no universal coverage", "much worse,
rhetorical equality, inefficient allocation of resources, over consumption, very
poor spending on good practice", "failing provision, lack of incentive, lack of
efficiency, low innovation and choice".
With the senior medical and health professionals the responses were mixed.
Welcoming the statement, respondents said: "improvement on present",
"should give equal access and quality based on demand, if adequately
resourced", "if it worked ... people would get appropriate care". On the negative
side: "doctors become lazy and provide inadequate care, politicians become
gods", "not enough money could be provided by taxation to have a full blown
state system, lack of choice", "disaster, need a mixture", "very high costs,
could take up to 100 per cent of taxation, government could not keep up with
service and technological developments", "higher taxes, expensive, very
costly".
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Q.C17. "In healthcare, which is more prone to the problems of monopol ?"
f- y.
The State The Market
Newspaper health journalists 10 00
Electronic media health journalists 06 04
I-Health and social policy academics 09 01
Party political health spokesmen 10 00
Members of the H of C health select committee 07 03
Party political advisers on health and social policy 08 02
Senior civil servants 10 00
Health interest group representatives 08 02
Think tank policyexperts 10 00
Senior medical and health professionals 04 06
Totals 82 18
Question C17 stated: "in healthcare, which is more prone to problem of
monopoly - the state or the market?" In response, an overwhelming 82 per
cent said the state with only 18 per cent choosing the market.
Moreover, all respondent categories chose the state except for one single
group. From the respondent category senior medical and health professionals
60 per cent voted for the market while 40 per cent voted for the state.
Significantly, 100 per cent of think tank policy experts, newspaper health
journalists, party political health spokesmen and civil servants chose the state
as did 90 per cent of health and social policy academics, 80 per cent of health
interest group representatives and 80 per cent of party political advisers on
health and social policy.
Q.C18. "In healthcare, which two of the following four groups has most to gain
from statutory restrictions on the advertising of medicines?"
Medical Professionals Private health bosses Treasury Ministers Consumers
Newspaper health journalists 05 02 10 03
Electronic media health journalists 08 01 06 05
Health and social policy academics 08 04 07 01
Party political health spokesmen 05 03 09 03
MPs on H of C health select committee 03 04 09 04
Party political advisers on health/soc policy 06 04 10
00
Senior civil servants 07 02 07
04
05 I
Health interest group representatives 06 04 05
j
Think tank policyexperts 09 00 10
01
Senior medical and health professionals 04 05 08
03
Totals 61 29 81
29
'--
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Question C18 stated: "in healthcare, which two of the following four groups
has most to gain from statutory restrictions on the advertising of medicines:
medical professionals, private health bosses, treasury ministers, consumers?"
In response, an overwhelming majority 81 per cent chose treasury ministers
and a reasonable majority - 61 per cent - chose medical professionals. The
other two groups - private health bosses and consumers - tied with both
receiving 29 per cent.
These headline numbers are important because they suggest that the
respondents overwhelmingly see the statutory restrictions on medicines as
primarily benefiting cost-containing politicians - in this case treasury
ministers. Likewise a majority (61 per cent) see such restrictions as enhancing
the professional power of the medical interest.
Significantly, while 90 per cent of think tank policy experts view medical
professionals as being key beneficiaries of statutory restrictions on the
advertising of medicines, 100 per cent of them see treasury ministers in this
light too.
"Which one of the following statements would you chose to most describe
your attitude? (A) If a contagious disease threatens Britain, I would trust
politicians and government to be open from the start and to do the right
things. (8) If a contagious disease threatens Britain, I do not beli~ve
politicians and government would be open from the start and to do the nght
things."
Q.C19. Attitude A Attitude B
Newspaper health journalists 01 09
Electronic media health journalists 03 07
Health and social policy academics 03 07
Party political health spokesmen 08 02
Members of the H of C health select committee 04 06
Party political advisers on health and social policy 05 05
Senior civil servants 05 05
Health interest group representatives 02 08
Think tank policy experts 02 08
I-..Senior medical and health professionals 01 09
Totals 34 66 ~
'--
244
Question C19 stated: "Which one of the following statements would you chose
to most describe your attitude? (A) If a contagious disease threatens Britain, I
would trust politicians and government to be open from the start and to do the
right things. (B) If a contagious disease threatens Britain, I do not believe
politicians and government would be open from the start and to do the right
things."
In response, a substantial 66 per cent chose option B and thereby expressed
the view that if a contagious disease threatened Britain they would not trust
politicians and government to be open from the start and to do the right
things. Only a third of all respondents - 34 per cent - expressed the view that
they would trust politicians and the government.
Significantly, 90 per cent of newspaper health journalists, 90 per cent of
senior medical and health professionals, 80 per cent of think tank policy
experts and 80 per cent of health interest group representatives all chose
option B.
Only a majority of party political health spokesmen - 80 per cent - supported
option A and in so doing expressed their view that politicians and government
would be "open from the start and do the right things".
Both party political advisers on health and social policy academics and senior
civil servants were equally divided with 50 per cent choosing A and 50 per
cent choosing B.
Invited to give open-ended comment on the reasons for their answer one
newspaper health journalist commented "not completely cynical, cock up
rather than conspiracy". This view was again reflected amongst an electronic
media health journalist who said "ignorance rather than malaise".
Across all respondent categories trust of politicians and government was low.
Whilst some believed that by the nature of their work there would always be
. . 't b reved thatunintended consequences for politicians a clear rnajon Y e I
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government could not be trusted "political correctness is nonsense and the
government are crap about rights", "this government lies, it is impossible to
trust them", "while the Department of Health might be good, I would not trust
the politicians", "I would not trust this lot, the lying is huge", "this government
is not good with truth".
While some believed that often it is not always right for ministers to be open
from the start of an outbreak - "wouldn't be open but might be the right thing to
do, especially in [an] epidemic", "openness and doing the right thing can be
competing" - just over a third were positive: "the Department of Health and
the government machine are good with plans for this kind of crisis", "you can
trust politicians and government but they wont necessarily get it all right",
"they do their best, systems are in place for this", "the health and other
ministries would do their best - of any party. They have good planning,
expertise and people. They would do the correct thing". Interestingly, one
person said: "in the past I would have said two. But now, I work in the
department and know how things are done".
Question C20: Many people argue that because disease and epidemics can
impact on everyone in society, politicians must be in charge of public health.
What do you think?"
Moving on directly from question C19, C20 stated: "Many people argue that
because disease and epidemics can impact on everyone in society, politicians
must be in charge of public health. What do you think?"
In reply, most newspaper health journalists implicitly accepted a role for
politicians to be in charge of public health: "agree, regulatory role, heard
immunity [however there] could be more involvement of the private sector",
"have to be in a democratically elected society", "public health is a legitimate
government issue", "someone must be in charge, politicians are elected",
"agree but not solely, could just coordinate", "legitimate coordination role",
"need some sort of regulating role", "this is where public health meets
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defence". Only three people fundamentally agree with the statement: "not
necessarily", "providers could be private", "no, strongly disagree, would not
trust politicians with total authority, small role in coordination and
dissemination of information".
With t~e electronic media health journalists there was more general
scepticism: "don't agree at all", "if you look at the government's approach to
SSE and foot and mouth political and financial considerations get in the way
of the best solutions", "not true, individuals are more educated than politicians
think they are, individuals would make better choices than politicians".
Alternatively some did see a role for politicians and government in this area:
"aqree, government is about making stable, successful, happy societies -
something as basic as healthcare is a government duty", "there has to be a
central overview of public health ... politicians will always be involved in public
health because of the way it is funded".
Health and social policy academics were again mixed. Supporting this role for
politicians respondents said: "broadly agree", "yes in large measure a national
response is needed as public health in the nineteenth century showed". One
respondent even commented "genuine emergencies need emergency action.
Otherwise politicians should have a very limited role in public health. For
example, the Black Death is like going to war so you would not use peacetime
measures. However, this rarely happens, so government should keep out of
public health". Against the politicians, respondents asserted: "in an ideal world
a more disinterested body would be in charge", "not necessarily politicians",
"disaqree, don't think that just because something has universal effects it
needs government action". Again one respondent concluded: "public health is
increasingly the rubric used by western political elites to justify the therapeutic
state and a wide range of health fascist restrictions and bans on people's
freedom and lifestyle choice. Healthcare is a natural private good. Public
health in its statist sense is an abomination".
Party political health spokesmen were universally supportive of the idea:
Uagree - politicians and chief medical officer is a government responsibility",
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"will have a role to play", "yes", "yes and their officials", "public health is a
priority for government", "decisions on public health must be taken on a
population level therefore ultimately parliament should oversee public health
work", "there is a role for government in contagious disease". Not being able
to perceive a market alternative one respondent concluded "yes, an unelected
alternative is not good"."
Whilst some members of the House of Commons Health Select Committee
supported the role of politicians - "common sense", "yes of course, not a
question" - others added the caveat that such work should be lead by
clinicians: "No, independent public health doctors should be in charge", "no,
doctors, politicians must oversee the funding of a public health system [as]
they are elected". Interestingly, one person commented "yes, but there is too
much nannying" whilst another concluded "[there should be the] private
delivery of [an] active strategy of public health",
One of the most mixed set of comments came from the party political advisers
on health and social policy. Displaying a wide range of opinion they said: "yes,
aspects should be politically managed", "politicians should have an important
role but this should not amount to a monopoly", "patient groups should also
have a role irrespective of government", "a role for politicians in public health
is easier to defend than in other areas of healthcare", "don't agree", "has to be
a politically accountable system, at present, politicians are the best as they
are answerable to the people", "ultimately agree, public health equals public
good", "to a certain extent, small role within reason", "don't agree at all, too
simplistic, epidemics are usually regional not global", "national politicians get it
wrong, management should be at regional and global levels - public and
private too", "politicians must ensure universal and free at the point of delivery
healthcare does not need to be centralised, regional better to cope with,
regional needs".
Overall, 60 per cent of senior civil servants generally agreed: "ultimately, the
health of the nation must have a strategic and supervisory role", "do need to
have public health responsibilities, but the government could be in charge of
248
strategy", "it should not be left to the private sector", "you could argue that the
state should concentrate on this and leave other healthcare alone", "public
opinion will demand that they are". The other respondents in this category put
forward alternative views: "no need to fund or provide", "not true", "not a must,
other alternatives available", "not must".
Likewise, health interest group representatives were mixed in their responses:
"largely true", "no certainly not, need informed professionals", "there is a clear
political aspect", "agree that overall, state has public health responsibility",
"politicians should not be in charge of anything", "agree", "strongly agree", "if
politicians are advised by the medical profession then yes it is OK". Dividing
up the various aspects of public health one respondent concluded: "charities
and individuals have a role in keeping people healthy; however, there is a
need for some sort of central coordinating body".
Significantly, most think tank policy experts disagreed with the statement in
C20: "one does not need the state for vaccinations", "I disagree", "not
necessarily", "disagree, down to individuals to be responsible because it
impacts on all in society", "no, epidemics are rare things and the government
track record in public health is not good". On the other side a couple of
respondents said: "there is a political role for coordinating, but private bodies
are better at dealing with outbreaks", "some truth, the Black Death is like a
military attack", "there are some public health issues that may need
government, for example, the use of the military in outbreaks".
Finally, senior medical and health professionals tended to see a role for
politicians and government but were generally concerned with regulatory
issues and the involvement of clinicians: "doctors must be in charge, totally
independent from government", "ought to be given to pubic health experts and
not politicised", "the government need to be there but not necessarily
politicians", "not sure it has to be politicians, some sort of regulatory body", "a
disasterous idea", "should not be run by politicians and should not be party
dependent", "delivery no, need healthcare professionals and a national
framework".
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Question C21: How do you react to the following statement? The reason the
poor and chronically sick are always neglected is because ever since Roman
times, political elites in Britain have always sought to plan, control and
regulate the provision of health services. Through the Roman military, then
the church, the Royal Colleges, Parliament, and the timeless granting of
legislative favour, the state has always sought to empire-build and to control
people's access to healthcare and medicine."
Question C21, the final question of the survey, stated: "How do you react to
the following statement? The reason the poor and chronically sick are always
neglected is because ever since Roman times, political elites in Britain have
always sought to plan, control and regulate the provision of health services.
Through the Roman military, then the church, the Royal Colleges, Parliament,
and the timeless granting of legislative favour, the state has always sought to
empire-build and to control people's access to healthcare and medicine."
In reply, most newspaper health journalists agreed with the statement but
added various caveats: "I am not quite so cynical, but element of truth", "true",
"disagree", "some truth ... state systems do serve the middle classes better",
"probably do agree historically", "sympathetic by would not knee jerk agree",
"exaggeration", "strongly agree, anecdotal evidence and record of government
over the years shows this to be true however well intended".
Conversely, most electronic media health journalists, disagreed: "don't agree
at all, they are neglected not because of control but due to education,
environment and social conditions", "don't agree", "this credits the state and
politicians with far too much ability to control populations, I believe in cock up
rather than conspiracy, the state has been unable to care for the poor and
chronically sick but not by design", "disagree", "disagree, various politicians
attempted to expand healthcare beyond the elite", "don't know, parts may be
true", "I dont believe they are always neglected". A couple of respondents
agreed with the statement in C21: "the powers that be have always sought to
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influence healthcare as it affects people who vote for them, politicians have a
more underhand influence than people understand", "parts may be true, poor
get a worse deal by default, they are not articulate, cannot complain and their
services are therefore not improved".
The health and social policy academics surveyed offered varying - yet often
more in depth - responses: "big historical generalisation...generally the state
does not have the capacity especially control over the church", "while not
claiming that the state is always motivated to maximise social welfare,
reliance, mainly on private institutions (as in the USA) tends to exclude the
poor even more strongly ... this is not an attack on private delivery of
healthcare but on reliance mainly on private finance", "don't agree fully with
this historical analogy, the medieval period was a great mixture of provision
and the types of medicine ... need to look at much wider social factors", "to an
extent true, money and power gets the foot in the door to health". In addition
the supportive responses, "agree" and "agree with that" one respondent
concluded: "this statement is totally true because it focuses on the central
question of power in society. From tribes in pre-history to the modern world,
the chiefs and monarchs of the state have always granted monopolistic and
legislative favour to the would-be monopolists of the day. Throughout the
ages medical professionals, through the church and then parliament, have
always sought state power and sold it in the name of the public good. As
such, there has never been a necessary divorce between healthcare and
political power. Throughout history, there has never been a genuine market in
health provision. As such, the poor and chronically sick - the socially
powerless - have always suffered. They have been marginalised and suffered
at the hands of the public good".
Similarly, the party political health spokesmen had firm views: "something in
that, inclined to agree", "completely over the top", "not sure, I don't really
know", "not sure, never thought of this, sounds interesting", "more than a grain
of truth about controlling access and empire building of the state, can apply to
modern times but not sure historically", "nonsense, far more complicated",
"not sure I do agree". One Member of Parliament concluded: "not
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characterised by state control. [The problem is a] lack of health provision
overall. People were developing private arrangements before the NHS. Poor
people have no market power, so they are left with a state system and are
grateful for what they get...Not sure about the church...since the advent of the
welfare state, the inevitable price of state intervention is state control".
Members of the House of Commons Health Select Committee tended to
either hesitantly support the statement in C21 or steer a cautious middling
path: "not sure", "not sure government has always been so involved", "this is
mudding the state with the churches and the colleges", "sounds good",
"sounds too simplistic but interesting", "there is always an issue of elite
control, but elites can help the poor too", "healthcare demands government
acting for us all", "elites have always oppressed the poor, but this is the fault
of classes and power not the state".
Party political advisers on health and social policy tended to express positive
support: "agree", "elements are true, but too universal", "agree strongly",
"some elements of truth, but not universally, true in twentieth century", "very
interesting, broadly agree, people and elites pursue their own power". Only
one person strongly disagreed: "completely disagree. Politicians have created
universal and free system that has given the poor the first ever access to
healthcare. Healthcare can be provided by the private sector, but only to
assist the state sector."
While most senior civil servants surveyed tended to agree - "partly true",
"yes", "agree", "states try to control costs", "pretty cool" - others were more
critical: "do not agree", "don't really agree, don't think [the state] is anti-poor",
"strongly disagree, political intervention aims at equality of access, their failure
is neither here nor there".
The health interest group representatives were split down the middle:
"elements of truth", "couldn't disagree", "probably partly true", "agree", "the
reason for neglect of poor and sick is because the state has not learnt from
private sector marketing". On the other side: "disagree despite criticism, the
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state has not sought to empire build or neglect, the state model is more likely
to protect the poor", "this is silly, there is an argument that the state is not
good at healthcare provision but the NHS removed fear and dread of the poor
for doctors and medical bills; healthcare is a human right, not a whim of the
market or largesse of the rich". Interestingly one respondent concluded:
"absolutely agreed up to the first Labour government, now definately not since
the introduction of the NHS".
A clear majority - 80 per cent - of the think tank policy experts surveyed
strongly agreed: "radical enthusiasm for this statement, problem has been
worse since world war two", "strongly agree", "partly agree", "quite true, but
not whole truth", "broadly agree", "true, agree with spirit, interest groups do
bend NHS to their own benefit", "has to be true, nature of regulation; UK never
had true alternative so therefore people are not fully trusting of the private
sector". Conversely, other respondents concluded: "nonsense, tirade", "I don't
agree that the poor always miss out but there is unnecessary control in
healthcare".
Finally, senior medical and health professionals presented a wide range of
responses: "don't agree with the first part as the NHS spends loads on the
poor", "prefer to think that despite some politicisation of healthcare some
people/politicians have genuinely wanted and attempted to improve
healthcare of all", "it is a cynical view that actually it is too expensive to
provide adequate healthcare, but if government had enough money they
would do it", "access is controlled but not sure that this is why the poor and
chronically sick are neglected, it is often a lack of education amongst the poor
that leads to neglect rather and intention", "agree", "agree, this has evolved
although this is not what was set out to be done", "true, but not sure the state
has sought to deliberately restrict access", "sometimes the poor and
chronically sick are helped by the state", "don't agree that the poor always
miss out but there is unnecessary control in healthcare", "probably relevant at
the time; the church now has less impact but have been replaced by other
interests over time".
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CHAPTER VII
FROM BIG GOVERNMENT TO CONSUMERISM:
THE LIMITS AND BOUNDARIES OF
CORPORATIST DISCOURSE IN HEALTHCARE
This chapter provides an overview of the major research findings. In
highlighting the constraints and weaknesses of current thinking amongst
health opinion formers, it contextualises the limits and boundaries of the
respondent's views. In exploring the respondents' notions of market failure,
political failure, monopoly, consumer ignorance, neglect of the poor and
chronically sick, externalities, public goods, private goods, the perverse
incentives of insurance, and the moral hazards of state welfare, the current
limits and parameters of thinking are exposed and examined.
Comparative Overview of the Research Findings
a.A1. "If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to stop problems of Monopoly.
Average 5.9
a.Ba. "If a system of real state healthcare existed, a market providing people
with choices would still have to be allowed to stop problems of Monopoly."
Average 6.9
Overall, the research found that while respondents were somewhat neutral
towards the statement "if a real market in healthcare existed, Government
would still have to intervene to stop problems of monopoly" (5.9), they tended
to agree with the countervailing view (6.9) that:
"if a system of real state healthcare existed, a market providing people
with choices would still have to be allowed to stop problems of
monopoly".
With more respondents unsure about notions of monopoly being associated
with a real market in healthcare (however they interpreted the notion 'real
market'), the findings suggest that they believe that under a system of real
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state healthcare (again, however, they interpreted this) a market providing
people with choice would still have to be allowed to stop problems of
monopoly. There is a sense perhaps that some kind of market and choice
mechanism are inevitable preconditions to any viable healthcare system.
Whether this erring on the side of the laissez faire market is the result of the
current debate on the NHS or a broader scepticism about the theoretical
limitations of state healthcare, however, remains unclear.
What is clear is that when it comes to the notion of monopoly in state and
market driven healthcare systems the market currently tends to be seen as
being slightly less problematic. The market is perhaps seen in terms of being
a slightly better check on monopoly power than the state.
Q.A2 "If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to provide objective information to overcome problems of Consumer
Ignorance".
Average 5.8
Q.B9. "If a system of real state healthcare existed, people would have to be
allowed to access a wide range of competing health information so that
individuals could overcome the problems of Consumer Ignorance."
Average 8.1
Likewise, the research found that while respondents were somewhat neutral
towards the statement "if a real market in healthcare existed, Government
would still have to intervene to provide objective information to overcome
problems of consumer ignorance (5.8) they strongly supported the
countervailing view (8.1) that:
"If a system of real state healthcare existed, people would have to be
allowed to access a wide range of competing health information so that
individuals could overcome the problems of consumer ignorance".
With most respondents questioning the benefits and even perhaps the notion
of objective government information for healthcare consumers, the research
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found that under a system of real state healthcare (however conceived) a
market providing people access to a wide range of competing health
information would still have to exist so that people could overcome the
problems of consumer ignorance.
As such, there is a sense that some kind of market in health information is
inevitable and/or desirable. Whether the system in question is state or market
driven government information is viewed with a greater degree of scepticism.
Choice is seen as a means by which individuals can overcome the problems
of informational consumer ignorance.
Q.A3 "If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to protect the Poor and Chronically Sick from Neglect."
Average 7.3
Q.B10. "If a system of real state healthcare existed, there would still be a
need for many private healthcare charities and groups to protect the Poor and
Chronically Sick from Neglect."
Average 6.7
The research found that while respondents were somewhat supportive of the
view that "if a system of real state healthcare existed, there would still be a
need for many private healthcare charities and groups to protect the poor and
chronically sick from neglect" (6.7), the respondents were even more
supportive of the statement (7.3):
"If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to protect the Poor and Chronically Sick from Neglect."
Significantly, when seeking to protect the poor and chronically sick from
neglect, respondents seemed to both accept a role for private healthcare
institutions under state healthcare and a role for government healthcare
institutions under a market system.
Overall, respondents tended to see both systems as containing checks and
balances for the other. Perhaps chiming with the rhetoric and agenda of public
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private partnerships, the opinion formers surveyed no longer hold the view
that the state should or could attempt to 'do it all'.
The stereotypical view of the 1940s that the NHS will provide all healthcare for
everyone is no longer seen as appropriate - or even possible. When it comes
to the poor and chronically sick, there is a general acceptance of a role both
for private and state healthcare.
Q.A4. "If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to help protect people from such external factors as contagious
disease."
Average 7.6
Q.B11. "If a system of real state healthcare existed, private healthcare would
still have to intervene to help protect people from such external factors as
contagious disease."
Average 4.1
The research found that while respondents were somewhat sceptical of the
statement "if a system of real state healthcare existed, private healthcare
would have to intervene to help protect people from such external factors as
contagious disease" (4.1), they were much more supportive of the view (7.6)
that:
"If a real market in healthcare existed, Government would still have to
intervene to help protect people from such external factors as
contagious disease".
With such a wide cleavage (3.5) and a positive score for the statist
perspective of (7.6) it is clear that not only are most respondents sceptical
about the free market's capacity to respond to contagious disease but that
most people see this as an area which demands direct government
coordination and intervention.
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Overall, respondents appear to be distrustful of the idea that a free market
could generate the institutional means by which the principles of the good of
the herd could be protected over and above that of the individual.
a.A5. "If a real market in healthcare existed, this would not stop some of it
being run by government because healthcare is a natural public good."
Overall Average 5.1
a.B12. "If a system of real state healthcare existed, this would not stop some
of it being run by a private market because healthcare is a natural private
good."
Overall Average 6.3
Overall, the research found that respondents were neutral towards the
statement "if a real market in healthcare existed, this would not stop some of it
being run by government because healthcare is a natural public good" (5.1).
Instead, they cautiously supported the view (6.3):
"if a system of real state healthcare existed, this would not stop some
of it being run by a private market because healthcare is a natural
private good."
With a cleavage of just 1.2 and a consensus that generally accepts healthcare
has both having private and public goods characteristics the respondents
tended to see both systems as containing checks and balances for the other.
Again chiming with the contemporary rhetoric and agenda of public private
partnerships in healthcare, the opinion formers surveyed no longer hold the
view, prevalent in the late 1940s, that the state could or should provide all
healthcare for everyone.
Indeed, both extremes were seen by the respondents as being problematic
and as having profound limitations.
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0.A6. "Because people's healthcare is unpredictable some of its costs will
always have to be covered by government - private arrangements such as
insurance cannot do it all."
Overall Average 6.2
0.B13. "Because people's healthcare is unpredictable some of its costs will
always have to be covered by private healthcare - government arrangements
such as taxation cannot do it all."
Overall Average 6.6
Looking at the issue of insurance and taxation, the research found that while
respondents were very marginally supportive of the statement, "because
people's healthcare is unpredictable some of its costs will always have to be
covered by government - private arrangements such as insurance cannot do
it all", they were only slightly more positive towards the view (6.6) that:
"Because people's healthcare is unpredictable some of its costs will
always have to be covered by private healthcare - government
arrangements such as taxation cannot do it all."
Although the cleavage between the two groups was narrow at only 0.4 and
both groups were only marginally positive with their scores there is
nevertheless a clear pattern emerging. While respondents accept a role for
government healthcare there is also a general agreement that "government
arrangements such as taxation cannot do it all".
Whereas in the late 1940s one might have expected more respondents to
have accepted the view that market based systems such as insurance cannot
'do it all' today's opinion formers are slightly more sceptical of this historic and
statist position.
This is not to say that the respondents are in anyway confident in or
supportive of private medical insurance. Instead, the results just suggest that
there is a tentative acceptance of a role for private medical insurance
alongside tax funded healthcare.
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a.A? "If people are covered by private healthcare, there is a greater incentive
for them to use it and get their money's worth."
Overall Average 6.0
a.B14. "If people are covered by state healthcare, there is a greater incentive
for them to use it and 'get their money's worth'."
Overall Average 6.6
Looking at the issue of private health and taxation, the research found that
while respondents were only marginally supportive of the statement, "If people
are covered by private healthcare, there is a greater incentive for them to use
it and get their money's worth" they were slightly more positive towards the
view (6.6) that:
"If people are covered by state healthcare, there is a greater incentive
for them to use it and 'get their money's worth".
Although the cleavage between the two groups was very narrow at only 0.6,
and both groups were only marginally positive with their scores, there is
nevertheless a clear pattern emerging. While respondents accept a role for
government there is also a general agreement that "government does not
have all the answers".
In a limited way the NHS is perhaps viewed as providing perverse incentives.
Because it is funded from general taxation and 'free' at the point of use there
is more incentive for patients to use its services and to 'get their money's
worth'.
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Question C15: In Healthcare, what would be the consequences of a genuine,
private, market system?"
Question C16: "In Healthcare, what would be the consequences of a genuine,
full blown, state system?"
Concerning questions C15 and C16 it is interesting to note that many of the
points made against a genuine, private, market in healthcare are also made
against a genuine, full blown, state system. Both are said to be: "inequitable",
"two tier", "rationed" and "costly". Conversely, many of the positive points
concerning a genuine private market system are also used to support a full
blown state system: "efficient", "poor would do better", "more cost effective".
While state healthcare was generally viewed as utopian, bureaucratic and
requiring higher taxes, the market is generally differentiated in terms of
encouraging innovation, better information and greater personal responsibility.
Overall, respondents tended to favour public private partnerships, "thank god
we have always had a private health sector that can now be exploited", and
they also favoured regulation to "ensure fairness". Significantly, only one
respondent questioned the monopoly that currently underpins all systems of
healthcare: "unless the problem of medical professional monopoly is dealt
with [a genuine, private, market system would] be as inefficient as it is today".
Q.C17. "In healthcare, which is more prone to the problems of monopoly?"
The State The Market
Totals 82 18
Given the probing question: "in healthcare, which is more prone to the
problems of monopoly, the state or the market?", 82 per cent of respondents
chose the state.
Building on the questions A1 (If a real market in healthcare existed,
Government would still have to intervene to stop problems of Monopoly) and
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B8 (If a system of real state healthcare existed, a market providing people
with choices would still have to be allowed to stop problems of Monopoly), the
response to C17 makes it clear that, under pressure and with no opportunity
for a graduated response, an overwhelming majority of respondents see the
problems of monopoly power as being more associated with the state than the
market.
This is interesting not least because it chimes with the position held by the
radical advocates of the free market Austrian school of economics that true
monopolies only exist because of state intervention. In the words of the
Ludwig von Mises Institute:
"Economists of the classical school were right to define a monopoly as
a government-grant privilege, for gaining legal rights to be a preferred
producer is the only way to maintain a monopoly in a market setting.
Predatory pricing cannot be sustained over the long haul, and not even
the attempt should be regretted since it is a great benefit to consumers.
Attempted cartel-type behaviour typically collapses, and where it does
not, it serves a market function. The term "monopoly price" has no
effective meaning in real market settings, which are not snapshots in
time but processes of change. A market society needs no antitrust
policy at all; indeed, the state is the very source of the remaining
monopolies we see in education, law, courts, and other areas.":
Q.C18. "In healthcare, which two of the following four groups has most to gain
from statutory restrictions on the advertising of medicines?"
Medical Professionals Private health bosses Treasury Ministers Consumers
Totals 61 29 81 29
Building on previous questions concerning information to patients (A2 "if a real
market in healthcare existed, government would still have to intervene to
provide objective information to overcome problems of consumer ignorance"
and B9 "if a system of real state healthcare existed, people would have to be
I See more on the Austrian Economics Forum at: http://austrianforulll.com/index.php?showtopicc--l19
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allowed to access a wide range of competing health information so that
individuals could overcome the problems of consumer ignorance."), C18
asked: "in healthcare, which two of the following four groups has most to gain
from statutory restrictions on the advertising of medicines - 1. medical
professionals, 2. private health bosses, 3. treasury ministers and 4.
consumers?"
Importantly, an overwhelming majority of respondents - 81 per cent - saw
treasury ministers as having the most to gain from the statutory restrictions on
the advertising of medicines. Again, a majority - 61 per cent - also identified
medical professionals as generally benefiting from such restrictions.
Identifying the cost containment pressures on treasury and other government
ministers, the respondents clearly believe that censorship is used by
politicians to stem consumer power and therefore demand. Similarly, far from
wanting to empower healthcare consumers with an open market in
information, respondents seem suspicious of the medical profession and its
desire to control and censor. Only a minority of respondents - 29 per cent -
believe that there would be any benefit for private healthcare bosses or
consumers to have restricted access to health information - in this case the
advertising of medicines. As such, the opinion formers surveyed seem to
believe that government is rationing healthcare supply and information and
that to preserve their own power and status doctors are complicit in this
venture.
Question C19: Which one of the following statements would you chose to
most describe your attitude? (A) If a contagious disease threatens Britain, I
would trust politicians and government to be open from the start and to do the
right things. (B) If a contagious disease threatens Britain, I do not beli~ve
politicians and government would be open from the start and to do the nght
things."
Attitude A Attitude B
Totals 34 66
As stated in the previous chapter, in response to the question if a contagious
disease threatened Britain respondents would trust - or not trust - "politicians
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and government to be open from the start and to do the right things" a
substantial 66 per cent chose the negative (option B). Only a third of
respondents - 34 per cent - expressed the positive view (option A).
Whilst most people who chose to comment tended to distrust politicians (and
where highly critical of a perceived culture of spin and untruthfulness) many
tended towards the "cock up rather than conspiracy" perspective. They were
concerned with the unintended consequences of political action. Importantly,
a number of people pointed out that openness was not always consonant with
"doing the right thing".
Question C20: Many people argue that because disease and epidemics can
impact on everyone in society, politicians must be in charge of public health.
What do you think?"
Turning to the issue of externalities question C20 asked "many people argue
that because disease and epidemics can impact on everyone in society,
politicians must be in charge of public health. What do you think?"
In response, while a majority of respondents accepted a role for politicians to
be in charge of public health, many added the caveat they should involve
other experts such as clinicians. At the extreme, several respondents likened
a contagious disease outbreak to a war: "this is where public health meets
defence".
Alternatively, a small number of respondents focused on a broader definition
of public health and attacked politician's interventions in people's lifestyle
choices: "public health is increasingly the rubric used by western political
elites to justify the therapeutic state and a wide range of health fascist
restrictions and bans on people's freedom and lifestyle choice. Healthcare is a
natural private good. Public health in its statist sense is an abomination".
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Only an extreme minority said that politicians and the state should have no
role in the public health of epidemics: "don't think that just because something
has universal effects it needs government action". Not being able to perceive
a market alternative one respondent concluded "yes, an unelected alternative
is not good"."
Question C21: How do you react to the following statement? "The reason the
poor and chronically sick are always neglected is because ever since Roman
times, political elites in Britain have always sought to plan, control and
regulate the provision of health services. Through the Roman military, then
the church, the Royal Colleges, Parliament, and the timeless granting of
legislative favour, the state has always sought to empire-build and to control
people's access to healthcare and medicine."
In response to the statement: "the reason the poor and chronically sick are
always neglected is because ever since Roman times, political elites in Britain
have always sought to plan, control and regulate the provision of health
services. Through the Roman military, then the church, the Royal Colleges,
Parliament, and the timeless granting of legislative favour, the state has
always sought to empire-build and to control people's access to healthcare
and medicine" the 100 opinion formers surveyed were divided.
While a number questioned the history presented - particularly the medieval
period - some clearly agreed with the general proposition that healthcare has
always fallen under the purview of elite power by various forms of legislative
favour. While 40 per cent of those surveyed disagreed with the statement, 50
per cent expressed a positive or sympathetic response. That said, a
significant minority of respondents - some 10 per cent - confessed to not
having thought about healthcare in terms of societal and elite power.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION:
POLITICS, COERCION AND POWER _
AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC FAILURE IN
HEALTHCARESYSTEMS
This study has examined notions of government and market failure in British
healthcare by tracking and analysing the changing views of opinion formers.
In presenting its research findings it has highlighted the attitudes of today's
opinion formers towards populist notions of health economics and has
provided insights into the limits and boundaries of contemporary debate.
Significantly, it has shown that substantial swathes of elite opinion no longer
support the National Health Service (NHS) in its traditional - fully nationalised
- form. Instead, a majority of opinion formers now believe in a much greater
role for private healthcare - although they remain sceptical of a purist
libertarian position. Overall, the average British opinion forming respondent
believes the following.
Looking at private funding arrangements versus the state, a majority of the
opinion formers surveyed believe that because people's healthcare is
unpredictable, some of its costs will always have to be covered by private
healthcare - "government arrangements such as taxation cannot do it all".
Perhaps mindful of the pressures on the NHS and contributions made by a
wide range of health and social care charities, most respondents believe that
the state cannot cover the costs of unlimited healthcare.
That said, the average respondent also believes that if a real market in
healthcare existed government would still have to intervene to protect the
poor and chronically sick from neglect.
Indeed, the opinion formers believe that many of the points that can be made
against state healthcare can also made against private healthcare.
Recognising the inevitability of scarce resources, both systems are thought to
be 'inequitable', 'two tier', 'rationed' and 'costly'.
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For respondents, many of the positive points concerning private healthcare
are also used to support a state system. Both are seen as being potentially
'efficient', 'helping the poor to do better' and ultimately 'more cost effective'.
That said, while the average respondent sees full blown state healthcare as
being 'utopian', 'bureaucratic' and requiring 'higher taxes', the market is
generally thought superior at harnessing 'innovation', providing 'better
information' and encouraging 'greater personal responsibility'.
Significantly, the average respondent tends to favour public private
partnerships but does not equate the concept of monopoly with the monopoly
power of the medical and other healthcare professions. Indeed, very few
respondents seem to appreciate that healthcare, irrespective of sector, is
ultimately predicated upon the legislative favour of government through the
professions.
Most respondents tend to believe that if a system of real state healthcare
existed, a market providing people with choices would still have to be allowed
to stop problems of monopoly. Chiming with the principles of libertarian
orthodoxy, they tend to see state healthcare as being a much greater
monopolist than the market.
Most opinion formers support the view that if a system of real state healthcare
existed, people would have to be allowed access to a wide range of
competing health information so that individuals could overcome the problems
of consumer ignorance. Wary of the state control of information a majority
side with the principles of the open society and reject state censorship.
Again, sensitive and hostile to governmental cost containment measures
respondents identify treasury ministers and medical professionals as
benefiting from the statutory restrictions on the advertising of medicines.
The average respondent believes that if a real market in healthcare existed,
government would still have to intervene to help protect people from such
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external factors as contagious disease. However, at the same time, they tend
not to trust politicians and government to be "open from the start and to do the
right things". On this latter point, 'cock up' tends to be most opinion formers
preferred view of government - not conspiracy.
In response to the statement, "many people argue that because disease and
epidemics can impact on everyone in society, politicians must be in charge of
public health", the average respondent accepts the role for politicians and/or
the state but they tend to add the caveat that other experts, such as clinicians,
should be fully involved. Providing medical, health and security professionals
have an appropriate input, few respondents object to politicians and the state
intervening in times of epidemic or national emergency.
The average respondent views healthcare as being a natural private good _
not a pubic good as often argued in many academic text books.
The average respondent believes that if people are covered by state
healthcare, there is a greater incentive for them to use it and "get their
money's worth".
Overall, the average respondent tends to view state healthcare as providing
perverse incentives. They tend to believe that more healthcare will be
unnecessarily consumed under a state system than in a market system.
Finally, the average opinion former tends to be uncertain when it comes to the
idea that through the granting of legislative favour, the state has always
sought to empire-build and to control people's access to healthcare and
medicine. There is a general belief that history is more complex than this -
although there is also a willingness to accept that the NHS benefits the middle
classes more than the poorest and most disadvantaged in society.
Overall, these results show that the world has moved on significantly since the
heady days of the 1940s. Today, there is not only greater understanding of
the failure of state healthcare - and a more balanced approach towards the
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appropriate role of markets - but there is also an awareness of the problems
of producer capture.
In its traditional, fully nationalised, mode the NHS enjoys little support
amongst opinion formers. Having much less faith in the authority of top down
direction than previous generations there is a clear acceptance of markets
and a key role for consumers.
That being said, while the overall debate remains dominated by corporatist
notions of public private partnerships, there is only very marginal support for a
genuine libertarian market in healthcare - if any at all.
Today, as with most other historic phases in the development of medicine and
healthcare, the overwhelming majority of opinion formers believe that there is
an important role (however loosely defined) for government.
It is clear from the results generated that the state is seen by opinion formers
to be the ultimate guarantor of communitarian safety in times of biological or
chemical attack. It is also seen as a vital institutional nexus responsible for the
setting of professional standards and the enforcement of contract.
In the contemporary healthcare debate, while the utopian statism of the early
NHS now finds little favour, the more fundamental rubrics legitimating state
intervention remain. Not only do the limits and boundaries of contemporary
policy conversation recognise a role for state intervention but, as with
defence, intelligence and policing, healthcare is viewed as an integral part of a
wider and almost timeless political order.
However strident and popular ideas of market driven healthcare might
become in the years ahead there is, as yet, no serious constituency amongst
opinion formers that truly questions the grander and statist narrative
underpinning the discourse of healthcare and the sector's professionals.
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As with the markets that flourished in healthcare during the Middle Ages and
the nineteenth century, the ultimate rubrics of statism remain largely
unchallenged in their institutional and moral senses. However powerful free
market consumerism might become in the future, a residual acceptance of
state power provides the intellectual platform upon which legislative favour
can be inexorably sought and perpetuated.
In many ways healthcare has always been a deeply corporatist venture run in
association with a range of mystical, military, religious, or purely political, state
elites: the forces Ayn Rand categorised as the witch doctor and Attila. Yet, as
in all previous eras, politics, state coercion and power not only seem set to
remain entwined with the affairs of healthcare but the modern biomedical
paradigm appears to be firmly bound by its discourse and constraints.
In the future, as opinion formers perhaps continue to adjust back to a broader
acceptance of independent healthcare provision and funding, one is therefore
unlikely to hear demands for a truly radical shake up of healthcare - even
from the private sector itself.
Instead, all the indications suggest that the key players in British healthcare
will continue to prefer gradual and incremental reform. Mindful of their vested
interests and the views of other opinion formers they will shun the re-ordering
anarchy of truly a dynamic and competitive health market in favour of a more
limited and conservative approach. As with the worlds of defence, intelligence
and policing the stage is set in healthcare for the continued perpetuation of a
corporatist agenda that slowly transcends the stereotypical boundaries of
public versus private, regulation versus brand reputation and left versus right.
As the twenty first century opens up before us a clear majority of opinion
formers might no longer believe in the NHS but they still firmly believe in
important roles for the state. When it comes to economic failure in healthcare
systems, politics, coercion and power seem set to remain key ingredients long
into the future.
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